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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

PATCHCORD

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs33Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

PATCHCORD is a custom compiled C/C++ Windows backdoor used in an ongoing cyber-espionage campaign targeting Afghan telecommunications providers and government, defense, energy, and critical-infrastructure organizations across South Asia. The activity has been linked with moderate confidence to the Pakistan-aligned Transparent Tribe, also tracked as APT36. It is delivered through sector-specific phishing and social-engineering lures, including fraudulent VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom and purported telecommunications-management software.

PATCHCORD fingerprints infected hosts, enumerates running processes, communicates with command-and-control infrastructure, adjusts its beaconing interval, and executes arbitrary shell commands. It can decode, decrypt, and execute shellcode in memory, reducing payload artifacts on disk. The implant employs browser-shortcut hijacking for persistence, modifying shortcuts for common browsers so that PATCHCORD runs before the legitimate browser while continuing to launch the intended application to reduce user suspicion. Variants have also used a Windows Run-key persistence mechanism. A variant used against India’s energy sector incorporated virtual-machine, sandbox, debugger, security-tool, and low-resource-environment checks.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-6387via acronis blogExploited in the wildregreSSHionAn exposed staging server revealed the operator's broader toolkit, including SuperShell C2 framework, multiple RAT frameworks, credential harvesting tools, and exploit tooling for CVE-2024-6387 (regreSSHion). | The backdoor, tracked as PATCHCORD, is a compiled C/C++ implant delivered through sector-specific lures, including fake VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom (AFTEL) and telecom management tools.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT36

Acronis Threat Research Unit tied the long-running persistent threat group to another campaign aimed at Afghan telecom providers and South Asian critical infrastructure organizations using a backdoor called PATCHCORD.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
APT-36

This year, researchers from Acronis have observed Transparent Tribe doing its usual business, but with a sharpened-up toolset: fresh backdoors called "Patchcord" and "Sheetcord."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence5

Its phishing lures have impersonated network and logistics tools used by a large Afghani telecommunications company, a fuel-conservation tool for India's energy sector, an Indian government employee benefits resource, and so on.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The investigation began with the discovery of a suspicious ZIP archive, Telecom_TMS, on VirusTotal in June 2026. The archive contained a malicious Inno Setup installer, TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe, which delivered the PATCHCORD implant.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Its phishing lures have impersonated network and logistics tools used by a large Afghani telecommunications company, a fuel-conservation tool for India's energy sector, an Indian government employee benefits resource, and so on.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Patchcord supports a few basic functions like host fingerprinting and process enumeration, but most importantly, it's designed to run arbitrary code in-memory.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

Execute arbitrary commands via "cmd.exe"

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence3

Decode and decrypt a shellcode payload received from the C2 server and execute it in memory

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

it writes its own executable path to the Windows Registry key and establishes persistence across reboots... uses the Windows Startup folder to establish persistence using a Visual Basic Script

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence6

Patchcord, like plenty of aged malware before it, injects itself into that interaction, rewriting the shortcut to instead execute itself first, and then the intended browser second.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

it writes its own executable path to the Windows Registry key and establishes persistence across reboots... uses the Windows Startup folder to establish persistence using a Visual Basic Script

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence6

Patchcord, like plenty of aged malware before it, injects itself into that interaction, rewriting the shortcut to instead execute itself first, and then the intended browser second.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The implant receives an encoded payload as part of the tasking response, decodes it using the same custom Base64 alphabet and decrypts it using a XOR-based routine with a key derived from the session context.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

The backdoor, tracked as PATCHCORD, is a compiled C/C++ implant delivered through sector-specific lures, including fake VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom (AFTEL) and telecom management tools.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

a variant of the backdoor that features anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques to sidestep detection

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

A variant of Patchcord first seen in March also implemented a variety of checks for detecting whether it's running in a virtual machine or sandbox environment.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Once active, it communicates with command and control (C2) servers, capable of listing processes, executing shellcode in memory, and running arbitrary commands.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

a variant of the backdoor that features anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques to sidestep detection

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

Once active, it communicates with command and control (C2) servers, capable of listing processes

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

fingerprints the host... The backdoor implements a remote command execution capability through PowerShell instead of "cmd.exe," gathers basic host information

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

a variant of the backdoor that features anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques to sidestep detection

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

A variant of Patchcord first seen in March also implemented a variety of checks for detecting whether it's running in a virtual machine or sandbox environment.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

a variant of the backdoor that features anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques to sidestep detection

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The threat actor has been stealing data from his desktop and looking into his WhatsApp and private data

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

registers with its C2 server ("46.30.188[.]13") to receive tasking commands... uses Google Sheets for command-and-control (C2) communications... uses GitHub Gists for C2

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

registers with its C2 server ("46.30.188[.]13") to receive tasking commands

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

The threat actor deployed PATCHCORD, SHEETCORD, and HACKERAI C2 Agent, transitioning from a custom C/C++ backdoor to Go-based implants that abuse Google Sheets and GitHub Gists for covert command-and-control.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The threat actor has been stealing data from his desktop and looking into his WhatsApp and private data. They're trying to use that data to [design] decoy Excel files, or something like it, to phish some more employees.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The earliest activity traces back to December 2025 with appstoore[.]duckdns[.]org, a dynamic DNS domain, followed by the registration of appstoore[.]solutions in late January 2026.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

33 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching33Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.