Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

HACKERAI C2 Agent

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs31Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

HACKERAI C2 Agent is a malware framework used in a South Asia-focused espionage campaign assessed with moderate confidence to overlap with APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe, or a closely related Pakistan-linked actor. It is associated with operations targeting telecom, government, defense, energy, and other critical infrastructure organizations, including Afghan telecom-themed targeting and lures impersonating government or software update workflows.

The malware uses GitHub Gists as a covert command-and-control channel rather than relying solely on conventional attacker-controlled infrastructure. It retrieves tasking from GitHub-hosted content and uploads stolen results through the same service, blending malicious traffic with legitimate cloud activity. Reported functionality includes system fingerprinting, collection of basic host information, remote command execution, and data exfiltration. It also establishes persistence by hijacking browser shortcuts so the malware executes before the legitimate browser while still launching the expected browser application to reduce user suspicion.

HACKERAI C2 Agent shares tradecraft and functional overlap with related malware families in the same campaign, notably PATCHCORD and SHEETCORD, which similarly emphasize covert command-and-control and browser-shortcut abuse. Analysis has noted implementation artifacts consistent with AI-assisted development, including unusual code comments, debugging remnants, and redundant logic. The malware has been distributed through themed installer and archive lures tied to the broader espionage operation.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT36

A third malware family, HACKERAI C2 Agent, shows signs of AI-assisted development and uses GitHub Gists for C2.

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

SHEETCORD, a Go-based implant... abusing Google Sheets for C2 communication... HACKERAI C2 Agent... replaces PATCHCORD's custom HTTP server and SHEETCORD's Google Sheets with GitHub Gists, using dedicated upload and download functions for both tasking and data exfiltration.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Victims were lured with files that impersonated trusted telecom services, government updates, and software installers.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The investigation began with the discovery of a suspicious ZIP archive, Telecom_TMS, on VirusTotal in June 2026. The archive contained a malicious Inno Setup installer, TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe, which delivered the PATCHCORD implant.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware can gather basic information about a compromised system, run commands remotely, and establish persistence by altering browser shortcuts.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The function constructs a command string using cmd.exe /c followed by the received command and spawns it as a hidden process using CreateProcessA API with the CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

PATCHCORD establishes persistence by hijacking browser shortcuts... Once confirmed, the implant creates a backup of the original shortcut... and rewrites the shortcut... sets the shortcut's target path to the implant's own executable... As a result, every time the user clicks a browser shortcut, PATCHCORD executes first.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

PATCHCORD establishes persistence by hijacking browser shortcuts... Once confirmed, the implant creates a backup of the original shortcut... and rewrites the shortcut... sets the shortcut's target path to the implant's own executable... As a result, every time the user clicks a browser shortcut, PATCHCORD executes first.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The implant receives an encoded payload as part of the tasking response, decodes it using the same custom Base64 alphabet and decrypts it using a XOR-based routine with a key derived from the session context.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The installer contains version metadata designed to impersonate Afghan Telecom, with the CompanyName, FileDescription, and ProductName fields set to "Afghan Telecom," "TMS Afghan Telecom Setup," and "TMS Afghan Telecom," respectively.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The implant checks for VirtualBox and VMware device handles... verifies the system has more than one processor and at least 2GB of RAM... scans active TCP connections for ports commonly associated with analysis tools... monitors cursor movement and user input to detect automated sandbox environments. If any check is triggered, the implant enters a randomized sleep loop of 30 to 90 seconds.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The implant checks for VirtualBox and VMware device handles... and checks for attached debuggers through both IsDebuggerPresent and the PEB BeingDebugged flag.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The implant fingerprints the victim system by collecting the hostname, username, operating system version, process identifier, executable path and process name before constructing a JSON registration payload for the C2 server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The implant checks for VirtualBox and VMware device handles... verifies the system has more than one processor and at least 2GB of RAM... scans active TCP connections for ports commonly associated with analysis tools... monitors cursor movement and user input to detect automated sandbox environments. If any check is triggered, the implant enters a randomized sleep loop of 30 to 90 seconds.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The implant checks for VirtualBox and VMware device handles... and checks for attached debuggers through both IsDebuggerPresent and the PEB BeingDebugged flag.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

This one drops the traditional web server entirely and instead uses the Google Sheets API for command and control, creating a dedicated spreadsheet tab for each victim to send and receive instructions.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The registration payload is sent as an HTTP POST request to the root path of the C2 server... the implant enters a polling loop, sending GET requests to the constructed /api.jsp tasking URL at regular intervals.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence4

SHEETCORD, written in Go, has also been identified, which abuses Google Sheets for C2 communication... HACKERAI C2 Agent... uses GitHub Gists for C2.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The earliest activity traces back to December 2025 with appstoore[.]duckdns[.]org, a dynamic DNS domain, followed by the registration of appstoore[.]solutions in late January 2026.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+1 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching31Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.