LeetHozer
- Type
- Botnet
- Capabilities
- Initial accessScanningBrute forceDefense evasionDDOS
- Platforms
- LinuxIOT
LeetHozer is a Linux-based IoT botnet malware family first observed in March 2020. It primarily targeted XiongMai H.264 and H.265 video-surveillance devices, exploiting a vulnerability to enable Telnet access and then attempting authentication with default credentials. It scans for vulnerable devices using Mirai-style fast port scanning and reuses parts of Mirai’s reporting and loading mechanisms, but its bot implementation, string encryption, network behavior, and command-and-control protocol differ substantially from conventional Mirai variants.
LeetHozer supports remotely directed DDoS attacks, including raw TCP, ICMP echo, and UDP flooding. Following successful infection, it reports device information and awaits attack commands. Its custom command-and-control protocol uses a two-stage handshake and supports heartbeats, bot-group reporting, and attack instructions. Observed versions use either direct IP-based or Tor-based command-and-control connectivity. Embedded operational strings are protected with repeated XOR operations.
LeetHozer shares a distinctive exploitation sequence and download infrastructure with a Moobot variant, while its encryption method was subsequently reused by Moobot_leet. Flodrix is an evolving LeetHozer variant observed in campaigns exploiting CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow to deploy architecture-specific Linux payloads. Flodrix extends the lineage with additional DDoS modes, executable self-deletion, process manipulation, and termination of selected competing processes.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
We exposed a new branch developed by this group, LeetHozer, on April 27, 2020, and compared with Matryosh, the similarities between the two are reflected in the following 3 aspects.
Techniques & procedures
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials. root:xc3511 root:xmhdipc root:klv123 root:123456 root:jvbzd root:hi3518 root:tsgoingon
LeetHozer takes advantage of the vulnerability through the target device's TCP 9530 port to start the telnetd service, then login to the device with the default password to complete the infection process.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials. root:xc3511 root:xmhdipc root:klv123 root:123456 root:jvbzd root:hi3518 root:tsgoingon
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials. root:xc3511 root:xmhdipc root:klv123 root:123456 root:jvbzd root:hi3518 root:tsgoingon
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials. root:xc3511 root:xmhdipc root:klv123 root:123456 root:jvbzd root:hi3518 root:tsgoingon
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
After that, it starts to scan internet to find more devices with open port 9530, and try to use the vulnerability to open the telnetd service on more victim devices.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
LeetHozer takes advantage of the vulnerability through the target device's TCP 9530 port to start the telnetd service, then login to the device with the default password to complete the infection process.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The sample uses a custom algorithm for encryptiton. The decryption algorithm is as follows: xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
The sample also reports the infected device information to the reporter, and establishes communication with C2, waiting for instructions to launch DDos attack.
Tor-C2 has a pre-process to establish a connection through Tor proxy. The hardcode proxy list: 45.82.176.194:9034 ... 185.30.228.141:9050
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Receive the C2 command and prepare for DDos attack. The attack commands supported by different versions are different. version command V1 tcpraw v2 tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain
Observables
115 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.