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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Get PC details (OS,Computer name, GUID for identify you in the POS botnet, etc..)
Check for process: Some are whitlisted: "System", smss.exe, csrss.exe, winlogon.exe, services.exe, lsass.exe, svchost.exe, spoolsv.exe, wscntfy.exe, alg.exe, mscorsvw.exe, ctfmon.exe, explorer.exe: And when finally a process is found: Read the process and search for pattern
If internet is reachable it will try to bypass firewalls and communicate to a the control panel ... call the gate via GET request
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Point-of-sale malware that scrapes payment card Track 2 data from process memory, exfiltrates stolen data to a remote control panel over HTTP, supports download-and-execute and self-update commands, and can also operate offline by writing logs to a specifically named USB drive.
Mentioned only in a sidebar link title.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.