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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

Surtr

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs56Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2012-0158via citizenlabExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionWhile the malicious attachments appear to be DOC files due to their file extension, they are actually RTFs crafted to exploit a vulnerability in Microsoft Word: CVE-2012-0158. This particular vulnerability was first exploited in early April 2012 and a patch was released by Microsoft on April 10, 2012. | Attached to the email were what appeared to be three Microsoft Word documents (.doc), but which were trojaned with a malware family we call “Surtr”.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The email in question purported to be from a prominent member of the Tibetan community and repurposed content from a community mailing list. Attached to the email were what appeared to be three Microsoft Word documents (.doc), but which were trojaned with a malware family we call “Surtr”.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Surtr’s capabilities include listing of file directories and contents on the victim computer and any USB drives connected to a victim machine, viewing web cache, executing remote commands and logging keystrokes.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

While the malicious attachments appear to be DOC files due to their file extension, they are actually RTFs crafted to exploit a vulnerability in Microsoft Word: CVE-2012-0158.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It also stores its C2 information and a campaign code in the registry. Depending on the configuration, Surtr will either create multiple registry keys in SoftwareMicrosoftWindows Media in HKU (hkey users) with text data or a single key called XC consisting of binary data.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

For persistency, Surtr adds a key to the registry to ensure it runs when the infected computer is restarted.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Surtr creates either a new explorer or iexplore process and injects itself into this new process using CreateRemoteThread function.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

For persistency, Surtr adds a key to the registry to ensure it runs when the infected computer is restarted.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The keylogger output is disguised by adding a constant to the ordinal value of the character... Depending on the configuration... These are usually xor encrypted with a key of 0x1.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Surtr creates either a new explorer or iexplore process and injects itself into this new process using CreateRemoteThread function.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It also stores its C2 information and a campaign code in the registry. Depending on the configuration, Surtr will either create multiple registry keys in SoftwareMicrosoftWindows Media in HKU (hkey users) with text data or a single key called XC consisting of binary data.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Surtr’s capabilities include listing of file directories and contents on the victim computer and any USB drives connected to a victim machine, viewing web cache, executing remote commands and logging keystrokes.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Surtr’s capabilities include listing of file directories and contents on the victim computer and any USB drives connected to a victim machine

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Surtr’s capabilities include listing of file directories and contents on the victim computer and any USB drives connected to a victim machine, viewing web cache, executing remote commands and logging keystrokes.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

This data can then be sent to the C2. It is compressed using zlib DEFLATE so the network traffic is not human readable without decompression.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Surtr connects to a command and control server (C2) and downloads a stage two component to %ALL USERS%/Application Data/Microsoft/Windows/Burn/_[VICTIM COMPUTER NAME].log.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Surtr connects to a command and control server (C2) and downloads a stage two component to %ALL USERS%/Application Data/Microsoft/Windows/Burn/_[VICTIM COMPUTER NAME].log.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

56 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching56Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.