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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Spinner

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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menuPass

The hackers use new tools, which have not previously been described: a sophisticated multi-layered loader and a backdoor dubbed SPINNER.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
Mustang Panda

The hackers use new tools, which have not previously been described: a sophisticated multi-layered loader and a backdoor dubbed SPINNER.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
Twisted Panda

As the payload, the Spinner a newly added backdoor is the main component, which is obfuscated by using two methods of obfuscation.

via gbhackersgbhackers.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Moreover, there are also phishing emails containing sanctions-related information that has been sent to Russian entities within the Rostec Corporation... several Russian research institutes affiliated with the defense industry received malicious emails.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

On March 23, malicious emails were sent to several defense research institutes based in Russia... contained a link to an attacker-controlled site ... and had a malicious document attached.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The emails... contained a link to an attacker-controlled site mimicking the Health Ministry of Russia minzdravros[.]com

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The DLL executes a portion of the INIT file in charge of cleaning up the files created by the malicious document and creates a scheduled task for persistence

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

0x10050001 Run command using cmd.exe cmd line Output from Command Line

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The external template contains a macro code that imports several API functions from kernel32

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

All the attached documents are crafted to look like official documents from the Russian Ministry of Health... Each document downloads an external template

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The DLL executes a portion of the INIT file in charge of cleaning up the files created by the malicious document and creates a scheduled task for persistence

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It creates a new registry key OfficeInit under SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run that points to the cmdl32.exe path.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The DLL executes a portion of the INIT file in charge of cleaning up the files created by the malicious document and creates a scheduled task for persistence

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then decompresses the decrypted buffer... Figure 7: Injection to msiexec.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It creates a new registry key OfficeInit under SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run that points to the cmdl32.exe path.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The payload uses two compiler-level obfuscations: Control flow flattening... Opaque predicates

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The loader is a 32-bit DLL utilizing dynamic API resolving with name hashing for evasion and anti-analysis.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The dropper... masquerades as a legitimate Windows executable EFS REKEY Wizard... All the attached documents are crafted to look like official documents from the Russian Ministry of Health

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then decompresses the decrypted buffer... Figure 7: Injection to msiexec.exe

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

It first reads an XOR-encrypted blob from the INIT file and decrypts it in memory... It uses RC4... then decompresses the decrypted buffer

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

Each document downloads an external template from the URLs with a similar format... The external template contains a macro code

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

It then collects data about the infected system and creates a string containing... Local IP

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

It then collects data about the infected system and creates a string containing... Username

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It then collects data about the infected system... Bot ID Computer name Local IP Windows version Username Sleep time...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The full version of the SPINNER backdoor contains the following capabilities: Collects information about the infected machine (enumerate disks, files).

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

In this case, Spinner is the backdoor used by a command-and-control server for the purpose of running additional payloads.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The packet is sent through the HTTP/S depending on the URL retrieved from the malware configuration.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Its main purpose is to run additional payloads received from the C&C server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltrates files from the infected machine... The packet is sent through the HTTP/S depending on the URL retrieved from the malware configuration.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.