Dofloo, also known as AESDDoS, is a botnet malware family first detected in 2014 and used to build large-scale distributed denial-of-service networks. It targets Linux and Windows systems, with variants also identified among MIPS-based IoT malware. Its DDoS capabilities include SYN, LSYN, UDP, UDPS, and TCP floods. Dofloo collects system information and transmits it to command-and-control infrastructure, allowing operators to select follow-on actions according to the compromised machine’s hardware configuration. Some variants can load cryptocurrency miners.
Dofloo campaigns have compromised Docker environments through exposed, unauthenticated Docker APIs. Attackers scan for accessible Docker services, enumerate running containers, and use Docker execution functionality to deploy the malware inside existing containers. Other campaigns have delivered Dofloo through vulnerabilities in Atlassian Confluence, including CVE-2021-26084. Its observed targets include internet-facing servers, containerized workloads, and embedded devices.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
misconfigured APIs of the Docker Engine-Community DevOps utility that allow external access to the communication ports are abused by attackers making it possible to infiltrate misconfigured servers
The Dofloo botnet malware is subsequently "deployed using the docker exec command" to all discovered containers
The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform remote command execution by taking advantage of an insecure handling of OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) on affected Confluence servers.
The attacks begin with an Internet scan for vulnerable Docker hosts by sending TCP SYN packets to port 2375 — the Docker daemon communication port which allows for unencrypted and unauthenticated communication
System information is also collected by the Trojan after execution, with the data being packed and sent to its command-and-control (C&C) server
with the bad actors connecting to all live host they found and asking for running containers
the data being packed and sent to its command-and-control (C&C) server allowing its masters to decide what the next course of action will be
downloads Linux Shell/Windows Powershell dropper scripts from a remote C&C server... The script then finally downloads the XMRig cryptocurrency miner files.
allowing external access — whether intentionally or by misconfiguration — to API ports allows attackers to gain ownership of the host... and to gain remote access to users’ servers and hardware resources
executing the malware that will enable the "attackers to launch several types of DDoS attacks, such as SYN, LSYN, UDP, UDPS, and TCP flood."
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.