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Shiotob, also known as Bebloh and URLZone, is a Windows banking malware family historically used to steal user credentials, especially online banking information, and later widely employed as a downloader for additional payloads. It injects itself into legitimate processes such as Explorer to blend malicious activity with normal system behavior and maintain execution within trusted processes. Shiotob communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTPS and uses a domain generation algorithm to derive fallback command-and-control domains, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure and preserve resilience against takedowns. Reported behavior includes anti-sandbox delays before initial network activity, periodic Internet connectivity checks, repeated attempts to contact seed and generated domains, and continued cycling through generated domains until a successful command-and-control response is received.
Operationally, Shiotob has been associated with spam-driven banking Trojan campaigns targeting multiple countries, including Japan and several European states. In these campaigns it was commonly delivered through malicious email attachments, including localized lures and JavaScript-based downloaders, and then used to retrieve and install follow-on malware such as Ursnif and Pushdo. Although capable of directly stealing banking credentials, it was frequently used as an initial-stage downloader in broader financially motivated intrusion chains. Its use of process injection, encrypted web communications, and DGA-based command-and-control made it a durable component of large-scale malware distribution operations.
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11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The malware injects itself into legitimate processes, for instances explorer.exe .
The callback routine consists of an infinite loop that tries to POST data to algorithmically generated domains. The loop terminates only when a successful POST is made, including a valid response from the C&C peer.
HTTPS connection, method: POST, URL: https://wtipubctwiekhir.net/gnu/ ... HTTPS connection, method: POST, URL: https://rwmu35avqo12tqc.com/gnu/
133 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A banking trojan that can steal online banking credentials, but in this campaign it was primarily used as a downloader that communicated with C2 over HTTPS and installed additional payloads such as Ursnif.
Credential-stealing malware focused especially on banking-related information. It injects into legitimate processes, uses anti-sandbox delays, and employs a DGA to generate rotating C2 domains for POST-based callback communications.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.