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Mallory
Malware

Satacom

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs194Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Initial access The malware is delivered by “drive by download” technique.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

In this campaign we observed a PowerShell script being downloaded that installs a malicious Chromium-based browser extension that targets Google Chrome, Brave and Opera.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The command used for extraction is as follows: "C:\Users\???\AppData\Roaming\Viqwo Stars Ci\Rotq App\UnRar.exe" x -p3809610121t -o+ ...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The sample requires user interaction to execute, triggered by the execution of the setup.msi file.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

The malicious links or ads on the sites redirect users to malicious sites such as fake file-sharing services.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The archive contains several legitimate DLLs and a malicious Setup.exe file that the user needs to execute manually to initiate the infection chain.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

The main purpose of the malware that is dropped by the Satacom downloader is to steal BTC from the victim’s account by performing web injections into targeted cryptocurrency websites. The malware attempts to do this by installing an extension for Chromium-based web browsers.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The shellcode then proceed to start explorer.exe and use process hollowing to load the malicious stage 2 using CreateProcessInternalA, ZwQueryInformationProcess, ReadProcessMemory, ZtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and NtResumeThread API calls.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The shellcode then proceed to start explorer.exe and use process hollowing to load the malicious stage 2 using CreateProcessInternalA, ZwQueryInformationProcess, ReadProcessMemory, ZtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and NtResumeThread API calls.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

This buffer is then decoded, revealing the shellcode... Another buffer in then created and data is copied to it using the rep movsb instruction. This buffer is then decoded, revealing the stage 2 executable.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Since the malware later attempts to execute the payload using rundll32, it is highly likely that the final payload is a DLL...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

After that, the script searches for the possible locations of shortcuts for each of the targeted browsers in such places as Desktop, Quick Launch and Start Menu.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.

Collection

4 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

JavaScripts: requesting commands from the C2 (left pane) and taking screenshots (right pane)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The malicious extension has various JS scripts to perform browser manipulations while the user is browsing the targeted websites, including enumeration and manipulation with cryptocurrency websites.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

The extension performs various actions on the account in order to remotely control it using the web inject scripts, and eventually the extension tries to withdraw the BTC currency to the threat actors’ wallet.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

This archive contains 2 files: A 7zip password protected archive, the sole purpose of this protection is to bypass malware analysis; and a picture file reminding the password of the next archive to the victim.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Stage 2 is responsible for communicating with the command and control (C2) server... the malware attempts to establish a connection to the C2 using WinHttpSendRequest.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

To do so, it performs a DNS request to don-dns[.]com through Google DNS (8.8.8.8, another decrypted string) and it queries for the TXT record.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Downloads a shellcode, saves it as a .dat file, decrypts it using XTEA, and executes it in memory. The malware downloads an additional file from the C2 using URLDownloadToFileA...

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The reason for using the last cryptocurrency transaction of a specific wallet to retrieve the C2 address is that the server address can be changed by the threat actors at any time.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

194 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching194Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.