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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

SCSKAppLink.dll

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs20Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Process injectionDefense evasion
Delivery
Watering holeDrive by
Platforms
Windows

SCSKAppLink.dll is a Windows downloader attributed to the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group. It downloads and executes additional malware and has been deployed in watering-hole attacks against South Korean organizations. Associated activity identified in early 2022 affected approximately 47 companies and institutions, including defense companies, with related Lazarus targeting extending to the chemical sector.

The infection chain uses compromised South Korean websites to exploit vulnerable installations of INITECH INISAFE CrossWeb EX. Visiting a compromised site can trigger the download and execution of the malware. Compromised Microsoft IIS servers have served as distribution infrastructure for these attacks.

SCSKAppLink.dll operates through injection into the legitimate INISAFE CrossWeb EX service process. The service executable examined during investigations retained its valid digital signature and showed no evidence of modification. The malicious DLL checks its host process and, when running inside the INISAFE service, contacts external infrastructure to retrieve and execute another payload. Its code also contains checks for other Windows host processes, although several corresponding branches lack executable functionality. Exploitation of unpatched INISAFE installations continued after security updates became available.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-26606via ahnlab asec blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Dream Security MagicLine4NXMagicLine4NX 1.0.0.17 이하의 버전에서는 CVE-2021-26606 취약점이 존재한다. 해당 취약점은 버퍼 오버플로우 취약점으로 원격에서 임의의 명령어를 전송하여 악성코드 감염 등의 피해를 유발할 수 있다. | INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe의 취약점에 의해 악성코드 배포 사이트에서 라자루스 악성코드(SCSKAppLink.dll)가 다운로드된 후 실행된다.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

AhnLab described watering-hole attacks that installed Lazarus malware identified as SCSKAppLink.dll through vulnerable INISAFE CrossWeb EX.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

The group is known to use the watering hole technique for initial access. The group first hacks Korean websites and modifies the content provided from the site.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

It was identified in the attack case at the time that the threat actor used poorly managed or vulnerable web servers as the initial access point. Ordinarily, when attackers find a web server with a vulnerable version from scanning, they use the vulnerability suitable for the version to install a WebShell or execute malicious commands.

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

취약한 INISAFECrossWebEX를 사용 중인 사용자의 PC가 해당 사이트에 웹 브라우저로 접근하게 되면, INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe의 취약점에 의해 악성코드 배포 사이트에서 라자루스 악성코드(SCSKAppLink.dll)가 다운로드된 후 실행된다.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

it was found that the dll file was injected into inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe to be operated

Stealth

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

it was found that the dll file was injected into inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe to be operated

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Other branches check the injection status for svchost.exe, rundll32.exe, and notepad.exe.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence2

Other branches check the injection status for svchost.exe, rundll32.exe, and notepad.exe.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

SCSKAppLink.dll이 인젝션된 inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe는 악성코드 배포지에 접속한 뒤, 인터넷 임시폴더 경로에 다운로더 악성코드 main_top[1].htm 파일을 다운로드하고

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The branch code is designed to access hxxps://materic.or.kr/include/main/main_top.asp?prd_fld=racket to download and run additional malware strains

Indicators of compromise

Observables

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.