Malware

Getmypass

GetMyPass is a Windows point-of-sale malware family designed to scrape payment-card track data from process memory. It operates as a configurable RAM scraper: it enumerates running processes, opens selected processes, reads their memory, searches for Track 1 and Track 2 payment-card data patterns, and validates candidate card numbers with the Luhn algorithm before storing results locally. Analyses of early samples indicate the malware depends on a local configuration file to define operational parameters such as target process selection and timing, making it flexible for different merchant environments.

The malware writes harvested payment-card data to local output files rather than implementing a full-featured command-and-control channel in the analyzed samples. Early variants could optionally encrypt stolen data with RC4 using a built-in key, while later variants encrypted output by default and added logic to preserve prior collections by rotating output into backup files instead of overwriting a single result file. This evolution suggests active development focused on improving operator usability and reducing exposure to disk-based detection methods that look for plaintext card data.

GetMyPass has been characterized as less mature than some other contemporary POS malware families because analyzed samples lacked integrated exfiltration, credential theft, keylogging, and lateral movement capabilities. Its role appears to be narrowly focused on local collection of payment-card data, requiring operators to supply separate access, staging, and data-removal mechanisms. The malware has also been observed using a mutex for single-instance control and retaining debug artifacts, further indicating an actively developed but comparatively simple POS scraping tool.

GetMyPass emerged during the broader surge of POS malware targeting retail and merchant payment environments, alongside families such as Backoff, BlackPOS derivatives, LusyPOS, Daredevil, and NewPOSThings. Its primary target set is Windows-based point-of-sale systems and associated merchant endpoints where unencrypted payment-card data may be present in memory during transaction processing.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

This function is responsible for iterating over processes, calling OpenProcess, and then ultimately ReadProcessMemory.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

This function is responsible for iterating over processes, calling OpenProcess, and then ultimately ReadProcessMemory.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware will first search for an ini file named 1.ini in the same directory as the malware. Without the ini file the malware will exit.

Credential Access

1 technique

T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Typical PoS RAM scraper malware captures the payment card information directly from the memory, where it scrapes customer data and information.

Discovery

2 techniques

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

This function is responsible for iterating over processes... Many of the POS ram scrapers will use this same sort of functionality to crawl and enumerate processes.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware will first search for an ini file named 1.ini in the same directory as the malware. Without the ini file the malware will exit.

Collection

3 techniques

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

the malware appears to do something in common with other POS RAM scrapers. Process Dumping Searching for CC data Validation using Luhn's algorithm Writing that to a file

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The resulting encrypted data is written to a file rep.bin.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

Once the numbers have been validated, they are passed to an RC4 function and written out to rep.tmp and rep.bin

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app12 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

4 SOURCESView more in app

trendmicro comNews

Dec 11, 2014

The Evolution of Point-of-Sale (PoS) Malware | Trend Micro (US)

A flexible, configuration-dependent PoS malware described as a multicomponent malware similar to an earlier BlackPoS variant.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Getmypass