DBGPRINT
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
- Platforms
- Windows
Waterbear, also known as DBGPRINT, is a long-running Windows backdoor associated with the China-linked espionage cluster commonly tracked as BlackTech and also linked to HUAPI/Plead. Active since at least 2009, it has been used as a second-stage implant in intrusions targeting organizations in East Asia, including Taiwanese government environments, and has also been observed against government, education, healthcare, finance, technology, and think tank sectors.
Waterbear is notable for its modular and comparatively sophisticated design. Campaigns have used a multi-component architecture that commonly includes a PE loader, a DLL containing injected shellcode, and a final malicious payload. The malware evolved across numerous versions over roughly a decade, adopting shellcode-based staging, in-memory implant decryption and execution, plugin loading, and later tradecraft such as double DLL sideloading and x64 support. Its staging logic includes anti-analysis measures such as debug checks and self-modifying or pattern-elimination techniques intended to hinder detection.
The malware establishes execution by using a stager that initializes APIs dynamically, checks network conditions including proxy settings, derives session material, validates the remote server through a challenge mechanism, decrypts the implant, and runs it directly in memory. Reported variants use encrypted communications and custom key derivation, including RC4-based routines in the staging workflow.
Waterbear provides broad post-compromise functionality typical of an espionage backdoor. Documented capabilities include drive and file enumeration, file upload and download, file execution and manipulation, window enumeration and control, screenshot capture, remote desktop functions, process and service management, network connection management, remote shell access, and registry management. It has also been described as incorporating anti-antivirus functionality. In observed operations it served as a persistent foothold and flexible second-stage platform for follow-on activity and data theft.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
dbgPrint 為中國駭客族群 HUAPI 慣用的後門程式,其名稱來自於該後門程式早期版本的字串(strings)內容。dbgPrint 後門程式通常由 PE 型態的 Loader、插入 shellcode 的 DLL 檔及惡意 Payload 所組成。
Malware Profile: DBGPRINT — Alias Waterbear; Since at least 2009; DLL export name “DbgPrint”; Acted as second stage; Advanced malware design; Adopt shellcode stager; Able to load the plugins.
Techniques & procedures
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
提到政府部門的委外資訊服務供應商遭中國駭客組織攻擊現況,目前已知有市政府、水資源局等至少 10 個單位,以及 4 家資訊服務供應商遇害。… 圖一、駭客透過供應鏈攻擊我政府機關
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Command code Capability 1006 Start remote shell
Double DLL Sideloading (White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Command code Capability 2013 Create registry key 2014 Set registry key 2015 Delete registry key 2016 Delete registry value
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Actor Injects RC4 Decryption svchost.exe SecurityProduct Injects Injects
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
RC4 Key of Payload XOR / Shift Random 16 bytes File path String + File name
Actor Injects RC4 Decryption svchost.exe SecurityProduct Injects Injects
RC4_KSA(Pre-session key) decrypted data size header = RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data1) decrypted data size = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data2) decrypted data header = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data3) decrypted data = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data4)
(White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL
Check for proxy setting Test connection
Double DLL Sideloading (White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL
Decrypt implant & Execute in memory
Check PEB!IsDebugged
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Command code Capability 2013 Create registry key 2014 Set registry key 2015 Delete registry key 2016 Delete registry value
Command code Capability 6 Rename file 7 Create folder 8 Delete file 11 Move file
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
Command code Capability 822 Enumerate services
Command code Capability 2011 Enumerate registry
Command code Capability 817 Enumerate process
Command code Capability 2 Enumerate disk drives
Command code Capability 3 List files
Check for proxy setting Test connection
Check PEB!IsDebugged
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command code Capability 814 Screenshot
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Command code Capability 4 Upload file to C2 server 5 Download file from C2 server
Command code Capability 816 Remote desktop
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Command code Capability 827 Manipulate service
Observables
36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.