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Malware3 associated actors

DBGPRINT

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Platforms
Windows

Waterbear, also known as DBGPRINT, is a long-running Windows backdoor associated with the China-linked espionage cluster commonly tracked as BlackTech and also linked to HUAPI/Plead. Active since at least 2009, it has been used as a second-stage implant in intrusions targeting organizations in East Asia, including Taiwanese government environments, and has also been observed against government, education, healthcare, finance, technology, and think tank sectors.

Waterbear is notable for its modular and comparatively sophisticated design. Campaigns have used a multi-component architecture that commonly includes a PE loader, a DLL containing injected shellcode, and a final malicious payload. The malware evolved across numerous versions over roughly a decade, adopting shellcode-based staging, in-memory implant decryption and execution, plugin loading, and later tradecraft such as double DLL sideloading and x64 support. Its staging logic includes anti-analysis measures such as debug checks and self-modifying or pattern-elimination techniques intended to hinder detection.

The malware establishes execution by using a stager that initializes APIs dynamically, checks network conditions including proxy settings, derives session material, validates the remote server through a challenge mechanism, decrypts the implant, and runs it directly in memory. Reported variants use encrypted communications and custom key derivation, including RC4-based routines in the staging workflow.

Waterbear provides broad post-compromise functionality typical of an espionage backdoor. Documented capabilities include drive and file enumeration, file upload and download, file execution and manipulation, window enumeration and control, screenshot capture, remote desktop functions, process and service management, network connection management, remote shell access, and registry management. It has also been described as incorporating anti-antivirus functionality. In observed operations it served as a persistent foothold and flexible second-stage platform for follow-on activity and data theft.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BlackTech

dbgPrint 為中國駭客族群 HUAPI 慣用的後門程式,其名稱來自於該後門程式早期版本的字串(strings)內容。dbgPrint 後門程式通常由 PE 型態的 Loader、插入 shellcode 的 DLL 檔及惡意 Payload 所組成。

via teamt5teamt5.org
Huapi

Malware Profile: DBGPRINT — Alias Waterbear; Since at least 2009; DLL export name “DbgPrint”; Acted as second stage; Advanced malware design; Adopt shellcode stager; Able to load the plugins.

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
Earth Hundun

Report about DBGPRINT backdoor by TeamT5

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

提到政府部門的委外資訊服務供應商遭中國駭客組織攻擊現況,目前已知有市政府、水資源局等至少 10 個單位,以及 4 家資訊服務供應商遇害。… 圖一、駭客透過供應鏈攻擊我政府機關

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Command code Capability 1006 Start remote shell

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Double DLL Sideloading (White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Command code Capability 2013 Create registry key 2014 Set registry key 2015 Delete registry key 2016 Delete registry value

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Actor Injects RC4 Decryption svchost.exe SecurityProduct Injects Injects

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

RC4 Key of Payload XOR / Shift Random 16 bytes File path String + File name

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Actor Injects RC4 Decryption svchost.exe SecurityProduct Injects Injects

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

RC4_KSA(Pre-session key) decrypted data size header = RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data1) decrypted data size = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data2) decrypted data header = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data3) decrypted data = Modified_RC4_PRGA(PRGA_data4)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

(White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Check for proxy setting Test connection

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Double DLL Sideloading (White) Benign EXE (Gray) Malicious DLL (Black) Malicious DLL

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Decrypt implant & Execute in memory

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Check PEB!IsDebugged

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Command code Capability 2013 Create registry key 2014 Set registry key 2015 Delete registry key 2016 Delete registry value

T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

Command code Capability 6 Rename file 7 Create folder 8 Delete file 11 Move file

Discovery

7 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Command code Capability 822 Enumerate services

T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Command code Capability 2011 Enumerate registry

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Command code Capability 817 Enumerate process

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Command code Capability 2 Enumerate disk drives

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Command code Capability 3 List files

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Check for proxy setting Test connection

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Check PEB!IsDebugged

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Command code Capability 814 Screenshot

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Command code Capability 4 Upload file to C2 server 5 Download file from C2 server

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Command code Capability 816 Remote desktop

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

Command code Capability 827 Manipulate service

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.