Malware

Harmony Loader

Harmony Loader is a Windows reflective loader used as part of a Midas ransomware intrusion. It functioned as an in-memory loading component within a broader attack chain that also involved DLL sideloading through the legitimate DISM utility, malicious DismCore.dll payloads, obfuscated PowerShell, batch scripts, and Visual Basic Script. The intrusion showed sustained post-compromise activity, including service creation for remote execution, credential harvesting with Mimikatz, lateral movement over internal RDP, use of commercial remote-access tools, and data exfiltration prior to ransomware deployment. Harmony Loader was observed as a decrypted reflective loader during the attack, indicating a role in staging or executing payloads while reducing on-disk exposure. It is associated with a campaign targeting a technology-sector victim in late 2021 and formed one component of the tooling used by operators behind a Midas ransomware incident. The malware targets Windows environments and is best characterized as a loader used during post-exploitation and defense-evasion phases of the intrusion.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The attackers heavily relied on customized PowerShell scripts, in some cases installing them as Windows Services to execute them.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Repeated commands executed on several machines over the course of an hour set up services that, when started, sideloaded the malicious DismCore.dll.

Persistence

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The attack involved repeated iterations of the threat actors creating Windows services designed to execute, on one machine at a time, several PowerShell scripts the attackers had placed on a few of the other compromised servers.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Stealth

3 techniques

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

They also orchestrated parts of the attack using Visual Basic Script and Batch files, executed using the DISM.exe utility.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Repeated commands executed on several machines over the course of an hour set up services that, when started, sideloaded the malicious DismCore.dll.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

encrypted form of https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI (detected as ATK/sRDI-A)

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

c2 address used by threat actors

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

sophos threat researchNews

Jan 1, 2026

Windows services lay the groundwork for a Midas ransomware attack | SOPHOS

Named by Sophos as a potentially associated component or detection in the attack chain.

sophos threat researchNews

Jan 1, 2026

Windows services lay the groundwork for a Midas ransomware attack | SOPHOS

A loader or potentially unwanted component mentioned by Sophos as one of the detections associated with components of this attack.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Harmony Loader