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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

Pro-Ocean

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-10271via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildOracle WebLogic WLS-WSAT XMLDecoder Remote Code ExecutionIn our analysis, we found Pro-Ocean targeting... Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2017-10271)... The list of vulnerable software that Pro-Ocean exploits includes: Oracle WebLogic – CVE-2017-10271. | We’ve named the malware Pro-Ocean after the name the attacker chose for the installation script. Pro-Ocean uses known vulnerabilities to target cloud applications.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-3088via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildArbitrary File Upload and Remote Code Execution in Apache ActiveMQ FileserverIn our analysis, we found Pro-Ocean targeting Apache ActiveMQ (CVE-2016-3088)... The list of vulnerable software that Pro-Ocean exploits includes: Apache ActiveMQ – CVE-2016-3088. | We’ve named the malware Pro-Ocean after the name the attacker chose for the installation script. Pro-Ocean uses known vulnerabilities to target cloud applications.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Rocke

We’ve named the malware Pro-Ocean after the name the attacker chose for the installation script. Pro-Ocean uses known vulnerabilities to target cloud applications.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Pro-Ocean uses known vulnerabilities to target cloud applications. In our analysis, we found Pro-Ocean targeting Apache ActiveMQ (CVE-2016-3088), Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2017-10271) and Redis (unsecure instances).

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

...and add several cron jobs that will do the same thing periodically.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The hiding module is responsible for concealing Pro-Ocean’s malicious activity. It uses a native Linux feature, LD_PRELOAD... During execution, the hiding module compiles a C file into a library and adds it to /etc/ld.so.preload.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

...and add several cron jobs that will do the same thing periodically.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

Pro-Ocean will try to gain persistence by copying itself into numerous locations, create a new malicious service that will execute the malware in case it is not running...

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

...and add several cron jobs that will do the same thing periodically.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

Pro-Ocean will try to gain persistence by copying itself into numerous locations, create a new malicious service that will execute the malware in case it is not running...

Stealth

6 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Here, we uncover a revised version of the same cloud-targeted cryptojacking malware, which now includes new and improved rootkit and worm capabilities.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The miner seeks to hide using several obfuscation layers on top of the malicious code... The modules are gzipped inside the unpacked binary.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The binary is packed using UPX... However, in this case, the UPX magic string has been deleted from the binary, and therefore, static analysis tools cannot identify this binary as UPX and unpack it.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Although Pro-Ocean attempts to disguise itself as benign, it packs an XMRig miner...

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Erase all of the cron tasks to make sure that other malware will not be able to recover.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The hiding module is responsible for concealing Pro-Ocean’s malicious activity. It uses a native Linux feature, LD_PRELOAD... During execution, the hiding module compiles a C file into a library and adds it to /etc/ld.so.preload.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

In the case that the malware runs in Tencent Cloud or Alibaba Cloud, it will use the exact code of the previous malware to uninstall monitoring agents to avoid detection.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Disable the iptables firewall so that the malware will have full access to the internet.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

This script retrieves the machine’s public IP by accessing an online service that does so in the address "ident.me" and then tries to infect all the machines in the same 16-bit subnet (e.g. 10.0.X.X). It does this by blindly executing public exploits one after the other in the hope of finding unpatched software it can exploit.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

It does this by running the “grep” command searching for other processes and network connections and then terminates them if found.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Look for SSH keys and attempt to use them in order to infect new machines.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once it finds unpatched software and exploits it, the Python script sends a payload that will download an installation script from a malicious HTTP server... After laying the groundwork, the installation script will determine the machine CPU architecture and try to download the corresponding binary using various tools including curl, wget, python2, python3 and PHP.

Impact

2 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

Attempt to remove other malware and miners including Luoxk, BillGates, XMRig, Hashfish and more... Once found, it kills them. ... This script loops forever and searches for processes that utilize more than 30% of the CPU... Once found, it kills them.

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Its goal is to mine Monero into the attacker’s wallet, and it does so by deploying an XMRig miner 5.11.1 and a JSON configuration, then starting to mine.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.