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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The commands make use of a Windows version of cURL (renamed to wbza) to download and execute Autoit3.exe and the bundled script eszexz.au3.
Using Eric Zimmerman’s “LECmd.exe” to analyze the malicious LNK file, we can extract the command line it would execute upon opening.
The execution of the VBScript file in C:tgphasrxmp.vbs triggers the download and execution of the file hXXp:// 5[.]188[.]87[.]58:2351/wbzadczl
The pre-compiled AutoIT script hides the code in the middle of the file by looking for the magic bytes 0x4155332145413036 (AU3!EA06).
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.