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FlowerPippi is a Windows backdoor used by the cybercriminal activity cluster TA505 and observed in a June 2019 campaign targeting organizations in Japan, the Philippines, and Argentina. It has been characterized as a lightweight first-stage backdoor with basic remote-access functionality and downloader behavior, enabling operators to profile an infected host and deliver follow-on payloads.
The malware is written in C++ and appears designed for staged intrusion operations rather than standalone impact. After execution, it generates a victim identifier from the host MAC address using the FNV-1a algorithm and transmits host metadata to command-and-control infrastructure, including domain or workgroup information, proxy configuration, administrative privilege status, operating system version, and system architecture. Its outbound victim data is encrypted with RC4.
FlowerPippi supports a compact command set focused on post-compromise tasking. Documented capabilities include downloading and executing additional executables, downloading and loading DLL payloads, running arbitrary system commands, and deleting itself. These features make it suitable as an initial foothold or transition mechanism to more capable second-stage malware. Some samples were packed with a custom packer associated with TA505, further linking the malware to that actor’s tooling ecosystem.
FlowerPippi fits TA505’s broader operational shift from large-scale malware distribution toward more targeted intrusions using staged loaders, backdoors, and enterprise compromise. TA505 is known for phishing-led intrusion chains and subsequent deployment of additional malware families and hands-on-keyboard activity. Within that context, FlowerPippi serves as a simple but effective backdoor/downloader component in targeted campaigns against Windows environments.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A C++ backdoor/downloader used by TA505 that collects host information, generates a victim ID from the MAC address, communicates with its C2 using RC4-encrypted data, and can download and execute EXEs or DLLs, run arbitrary commands, and delete itself.
Basic RAT/backdoor with reconnaissance capability, observed once in TA505 activity.
Basic RAT/backdoor observed once with TA505 and also intended for initial reconnaissance as a first-stage implant.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.