MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Prilex

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Prilex

The malware used in the attack was named Prilex and had been developed from scratch by using privileged information and advanced knowledge of the ATM network. ... Prilex has evolved out of ATM-focused malware into modular point-of-sale malware targeting payment systems developed by Brazilian vendors.

via securelistsecurelist.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique

T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

a target business may receive a call from a “technician” who insists that the company needs to update its PoS software

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

Execution

1 technique

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Shell Execute a specified command via CMD

Persistence

3 techniques

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SetStartup Add the process to a startup registry key

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Once it identifies a running transaction, the malware will intercept and modify the content of the transaction in order to be able to capture the card information and to request new EMV cryptograms to the victim’s card.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

instead of allocating memory to the hook procedure, Prilex finds free space within the modules memory, a technique called code cave

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SetStartup Add the process to a startup registry key

Stealth

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

instead of allocating memory to the hook procedure, Prilex finds free space within the modules memory, a technique called code cave

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

Defense Impairment

1 technique

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer module is responsible for intercepting all communications between the point-of-sale software and the PIN pad used for reading the card during the transaction.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Discovery

2 techniques

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

After obtaining initial network access, the attacker would run a network recognition process to find the IP address of each of the ATMs.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware will look for the location of a particular set of executables and libraries in order to apply the patch, thus overwriting the original code.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

With that information in hand, the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials and then installing custom-crafted malware in the desired systems.

Collection

4 techniques

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

With the patch in place, the malware collects the data from TRACK2, such as the account number and expiration date, in addition to other cardholder information needed to perform fraudulent transactions.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer module is responsible for intercepting all communications between the point-of-sale software and the PIN pad used for reading the card during the transaction.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

StartSendScreen Start screen capture

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

This module is responsible for checking the directory specified in the CABPATH parameter in the config file and sending all cab files generated from the stolen transactions to the server

Command and Control

1 technique

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The fake technician may visit the target in person or request the victims to install AnyDesk and provide remote access for the “technician” to install the malware.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

the files are sent through an HTTP POST request

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

securelistNews

May 13, 2021

Prilex: Brazilian PoS malware evolution | Securelist

Brazilian malware family that evolved from ATM jackpotting and card-cloning malware into modular point-of-sale malware. It patches or hooks payment software and Windows APIs, intercepts PIN pad and transaction communications, steals TRACK2/cardholder data, captures or requests EMV cryptograms, supports fraudulent 'GHOST transactions,' and includes backdoor, stealer, and uploader modules.

talosintelligence otherNews

May 30, 2019

10 years of virtual dynamite: A high-level retrospective of ATM malware

Named ATM malware family included in the IOC set; no further functionality described in the content.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Prilex

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Prilex

via securelistsecurelist.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique

T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

a target business may receive a call from a “technician” who insists that the company needs to update its PoS software

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

Execution

1 technique

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Shell Execute a specified command via CMD

Persistence

3 techniques

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SetStartup Add the process to a startup registry key

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

instead of allocating memory to the hook procedure, Prilex finds free space within the modules memory, a technique called code cave

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SetStartup Add the process to a startup registry key

Stealth

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

instead of allocating memory to the hook procedure, Prilex finds free space within the modules memory, a technique called code cave

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials

Defense Impairment

1 technique

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer module is responsible for intercepting all communications between the point-of-sale software and the PIN pad used for reading the card during the transaction.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Discovery

2 techniques

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

After obtaining initial network access, the attacker would run a network recognition process to find the IP address of each of the ATMs.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware will look for the location of a particular set of executables and libraries in order to apply the patch, thus overwriting the original code.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

With that information in hand, the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials and then installing custom-crafted malware in the desired systems.

Collection

4 techniques

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The stealer module is responsible for intercepting all communications between the point-of-sale software and the PIN pad used for reading the card during the transaction.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

StartSendScreen Start screen capture

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

This module is responsible for checking the directory specified in the CABPATH parameter in the config file and sending all cab files generated from the stolen transactions to the server

Command and Control

1 technique

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The fake technician may visit the target in person or request the victims to install AnyDesk and provide remote access for the “technician” to install the malware.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

the files are sent through an HTTP POST request

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

securelistNews

May 13, 2021

Prilex: Brazilian PoS malware evolution | Securelist

talosintelligence otherNews

May 30, 2019

10 years of virtual dynamite: A high-level retrospective of ATM malware

Named ATM malware family included in the IOC set; no further functionality described in the content.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.