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Malware2 associated actors4 associated CVEs

nccTrojan

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs24Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

nccTrojan, also known as MsmRAT, is a Windows remote access trojan used by the China-linked cyberespionage group TA428, also tracked as BRONZE DUDLEY. It has been observed since at least March 2019 and is associated with Operation LagTime IT. Targets include East Asian government organizations and defense and aviation organizations in Russia and Mongolia. It was also deployed in a 2022 espionage campaign targeting defense-related enterprises and public institutions in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan.

The malware supports remote shells, operating-system command and program execution, disk and file enumeration, process listing and termination, bidirectional file transfer, and file management, including deletion, copying, and moving. These functions enable remote control, host reconnaissance, and exfiltration of confidential files.

Two major branches differ in deployment and communications. Version 1 can be delivered during initial intrusion through Royal Road-generated malicious RTF documents and uses XOR-obfuscated command-and-control traffic. Version 2 is generally deployed after lateral movement and acquisition of elevated privileges, including through existing Poison Ivy or PortDoor infections. An installer registers its DLL payload as an automatically starting Windows service masquerading as a legitimate system component. Version 2 uses a custom TCP protocol with AES-encrypted payloads and requires a configured activation code before accepting backdoor commands. Version 2.45, identified in January 2022, selects the first responding configured command-and-control server and reports host and user information.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0144via vb2020 vblocalhostEternalBlueUsed a tool to exploit MS17-010 for lateral movement, NETBIOS scanner for environmental investigations, tools to steal credentials and new RATs such as Tmanger or nccTrojan.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0798via nao sec blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCERoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0802via nao sec blogExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via nao sec blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA428

In January 2022, we identified a new, improved version of nccTrojan – 2.45.

via ics cert kasperskyics-cert.kaspersky.com
BRONZE DUDLEY

BRONZE DUDLEY ... Tools ... NCCTrojan, PhantomNet, PoisonIvy, Royal Road

via secureworkssecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

nccTrojanは攻撃の初期段階(Royal Road RTF Weaponizerによって生成されたRTFを開くこと)で実行されることもあります

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Tmanger has following functions: Remote Shell (cmd.exe); Remote Shell (powershell.exe)... nccTrojan has following functions: Remote Shell.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

v2はインストーラによってサービスに登録されることで動作します。... Instsrv.exeはその名のとおりインストーラで、WindowsResKits.dllをシステムディレクトリにコピーし、サービスとして登録します。

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Instsrv.exe creates and start following fake service. Fake service: Microsoft Windows Resource Kits.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

When Instsrv.exe is executed, it registers a fake service as Windows Resource Kits... and starts the service. When the service starts, the svchost.exe process loads WindowsResKits.dll.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Instsrv.exe creates and start following fake service. Fake service: Microsoft Windows Resource Kits.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

When Instsrv.exe is executed, it registers a fake service as Windows Resource Kits... and starts the service. When the service starts, the svchost.exe process loads WindowsResKits.dll.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

"1002" ファイルの削除 ... 10 ファイルやフォルダの削除

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

サービス名 Microsoft Windows Resource Kits %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\svchost.exe -k WindowsResKits

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

nccTrojan has following functions: ➢Operate Files (Copy, Move, Delete)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

nccTrojan has following functions: ➢Send Disk Information

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

We confirmed that the same following functions are implemented in the nccTrojan as the RAT. • Send Process List

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Tmanger has following functions: Send Host Information; nccTrojan has following functions: Send Disk Information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

We confirmed that the same following functions are implemented in the nccTrojan as the RAT. • Send File List

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

v1は単純なXORであるため復号は容易ですが、v2は多少複雑な構造となっています。... DATAフィールドはAESによって暗号化されています。

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Configuration data lists C&C servers on ports 443, 8080, 80, and 5222; sections describe C&C communication for Poison Ivy, Tmanger, and nccTrojan.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

It is used to download three cab files (‘o.cab’, ‘nbt.cab’ and ‘in.cab’) from the C&C server, and execute the files stored in the cab files.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

We confirmed that the same following functions are implemented in the nccTrojan as the RAT. • Remote Shell

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

"3003" ファイル転送用接続上での感染端末からのファイルのダウンロード ... 12 感染端末からのファイルのダウンロード

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

"4001" プロセスの停止 ... 21 プロセスの停止

Indicators of compromise

Observables

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching24Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.