MalwareUsed by 2 actors

FurBall

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Domestic Kitten

A new version of the 'FurBall' Android spyware has been found targeting Iranian citizens in mobile surveillance campaigns conducted by the Domestic Kitten hacking group, also known as APT-C-50.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com

APT-C-50

A new version of the 'FurBall' Android spyware has been found targeting Iranian citizens in mobile surveillance campaigns conducted by the Domestic Kitten hacking group, also known as APT-C-50.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The new version of FurBall is distributed via fake websites that are visually clones of real ones, where victims end up after direct messages, social media posts, emails, SMS, black SEO, and SEO poisoning.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In the fake version, there’s a Google Play button that supposedly lets users download an Android version of the translator, but instead of landing on the app store, they are sent an APK file named ‘sarayemaghale.apk.’

Execution

1 technique

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

If needed, the malware can receive commands to execute directly from its command and control (C2) server, which is contacted via an HTTP request every 10 seconds.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

In terms of the new obfuscation layer, ESET says it includes class names, strings, logs, and server URI paths, attempting to evade detection from anti-virus tools.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The new version of FurBall is distributed via fake websites that are visually clones of real ones... In one case spotted by ESET, the malware is hosted on a fake website mimicking an English-to-Persian translation service popular in the country.

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Depending on what permissions are defined in the Android app's AndroidManifest.xml file, the spyware is capable of stealing the following information: Clipboard contents Device location SMS messages Contact list Call logs Record calls Content of notifications Installed and running apps Device info

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

If needed, the malware can receive commands to execute directly from its command and control (C2) server, which is contacted via an HTTP request every 10 seconds.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

bleeping computerNews

Oct 20, 2022

Hacking group updates Furball Android spyware to evade detection

Android spyware used in mass-surveillance campaigns against Iranian citizens. It is distributed via fake websites delivering APK files and can steal data such as clipboard contents, location, SMS messages, contacts, call logs, notifications, installed apps, and device information. The analyzed sample had reduced permissions but retained C2-based command execution capability and added obfuscation to evade detection.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 2 actors

FurBall

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Domestic Kitten

A new version of the 'FurBall' Android spyware has been found targeting Iranian citizens in mobile surveillance campaigns conducted by the Domestic Kitten hacking group, also known as APT-C-50.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com

APT-C-50

A new version of the 'FurBall' Android spyware has been found targeting Iranian citizens in mobile surveillance campaigns conducted by the Domestic Kitten hacking group, also known as APT-C-50.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1566PhishingEvidence1

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Execution

1 technique

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

If needed, the malware can receive commands to execute directly from its command and control (C2) server, which is contacted via an HTTP request every 10 seconds.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

In terms of the new obfuscation layer, ESET says it includes class names, strings, logs, and server URI paths, attempting to evade detection from anti-virus tools.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

If needed, the malware can receive commands to execute directly from its command and control (C2) server, which is contacted via an HTTP request every 10 seconds.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

bleeping computerNews

Oct 20, 2022

Hacking group updates Furball Android spyware to evade detection

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.