Malware

Babadeda crypter

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware is loaded by patching a legitimate DLL library within an installed application, which loads another malicious DLL library.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The patched DLL’s (librawf.dll ... ) import address table was further patched to include two additional DLL libraries.

Stealth

6 techniques

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

OpcJacker from chunks of data stored in data files of various formats, such as Waveform Audio File Format (WAV) and Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM).

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The first stage shellcode then decrypts and combines all chunks to form the second stage shellcode (a loader) and the main malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

we observed OpcJacker being distributed through several different campaigns that usually involve fake websites advertising seemingly legitimate software and cryptocurrency-related applications, but are actually hosting malware.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

There is a configuration table containing offsets of encrypted chunks... The first stage shellcode then decrypts and combines all chunks to form the second stage shellcode (a loader) and the main malware.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware is loaded by patching a legitimate DLL library within an installed application, which loads another malicious DLL library.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The patched DLL’s (librawf.dll ... ) import address table was further patched to include two additional DLL libraries.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trend micro researchNews

Mar 29, 2023

New OpcJacker Malware Distributed via Fake VPN Malvertising | Trend Micro (US)

A crypter/loader used to assemble and run shellcode and the OpcJacker payload from chunked data hidden in files such as WAV and CHM. It serves as the delivery and execution mechanism for OpcJacker.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Babadeda crypter

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware is loaded by patching a legitimate DLL library within an installed application, which loads another malicious DLL library.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The patched DLL’s (librawf.dll ... ) import address table was further patched to include two additional DLL libraries.

Stealth

6 techniques

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

OpcJacker from chunks of data stored in data files of various formats, such as Waveform Audio File Format (WAV) and Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM).

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The first stage shellcode then decrypts and combines all chunks to form the second stage shellcode (a loader) and the main malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware is loaded by patching a legitimate DLL library within an installed application, which loads another malicious DLL library.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

The patched DLL’s (librawf.dll ... ) import address table was further patched to include two additional DLL libraries.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trend micro researchNews

Mar 29, 2023

New OpcJacker Malware Distributed via Fake VPN Malvertising | Trend Micro (US)

A crypter/loader used to assemble and run shellcode and the OpcJacker payload from chunked data hidden in files such as WAV and CHM. It serves as the delivery and execution mechanism for OpcJacker.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.