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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Zebracon

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK2Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-40539via microsoft generalExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass and Remote Code Execution in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService PlusFollowing initial exploitation of CVE-2021-40539 on a targeted system, DEV-0322 performed several activities including credential dumping, installing custom binaries, and dropping malware to maintain persistence and move laterally within the network.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Threat Group-3390

“DEV-0322 also deployed a Trojan that we are calling Trojan:Win64/Zebracon.”

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Collection

1 technique
T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

These operations are used by the Zebracon malware to receive commands from the DEV-0322-controlled mailbox.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Subsequent commands are made to <ZimbraServer>/service/soap using an obtained authorization token (ZM_AUTH_TOKEN) to perform email operations on the threat actor-controlled mailbox

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping2Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.