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Malware2 associated actors

DarkMusical

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DoNot

ESET researchers have decided to call one of the variants DarkMusical because of the names the attackers chose for their files and folders. This variant was used in campaigns targeting military organizations in Bangladesh and Nepal.

via eseteset.com
SECTOR02

ESET researchers have decided to call one of the variants DarkMusical because of the names the attackers chose for their files and folders. This variant was used in campaigns targeting military organizations in Bangladesh and Nepal.

via eseteset.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

According to ESET telemetry, Donot Team has been consistently targeting the same entities with waves of spearphishing emails every two to four months.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

According to ESET telemetry, Donot Team has been consistently targeting the same entities with waves of spearphishing emails every two to four months. The spearphishing emails have malicious Microsoft Office documents attached that the attackers use to deploy their malware.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malicious framework consists of a chain of downloaders that ultimately download a backdoor with minimal functionality, used to download and execute further components of Donot Team’s toolset.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The main purpose of the “yty” malware framework is to collect and exfiltrate data. These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The malicious framework consists of a chain of downloaders that ultimately download a backdoor with minimal functionality, used to download and execute further components of Donot Team’s toolset.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.