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Malware2 associated actors

SUBTLE-PAWS

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs56Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

An interesting campaign leveraging a new SUBTLE-PAWS PowerShell-based backdoor has been identified targeting Ukraine... This custom Powershell backdoor is currently being tracked as “SUBTLE-PAWS” by the team.

via securonix blogsecuronix.com
STEADY#URSA

An interesting campaign leveraging a new SUBTLE-PAWS PowerShell-based backdoor has been identified targeting Ukraine... This custom Powershell backdoor is currently being tracked as “SUBTLE-PAWS” by the team.

via securonix blogsecuronix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Lateral movement for the STEADY#URSA campaign relies solely on the use of USB drives in an attempt to deliver and spread the malware from system to system.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Tactics Techniques Execution T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Throughout the entire attack campaign, most of the code executed by the malware was PowerShell.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

The exploitation chain is relatively simple: it involves the target executing a malicious shortcut (.lnk) file which loads and executes a new PowerShell backdoor payload code.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence is established by creating a new registry key at “ HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run ” which uses an invoke expression to load and execute the “run” registry key saved into “ HKCU:\System “.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence is established by creating a new registry key at “ HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run ” which uses an invoke expression to load and execute the “run” registry key saved into “ HKCU:\System “.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

These files contain a single PowerShell one liner containing a single variable consisting of a large Base64 string of the SUBTLE-PAWS backdoor.

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

A small amount of PowerShell obfuscation is used to break up strings in order to evade detection.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

In an effort to improve OPSEC (Operational Security), the attackers introduced a failsafe where if the script fails to communicate with the IP over HTTPS, the script forcefully removes itself

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

This string gets decoded and executed towards the end of the script.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Lateral movement for the STEADY#URSA campaign relies solely on the use of USB drives in an attempt to deliver and spread the malware from system to system.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Executed code is encoded using a key and presented in Base64 in an effort to hide the original commands.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

If the script fails to communicate with the IP over HTTPS, the script forcefully removes itself

Indicators of compromise

Observables

56 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching56Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.