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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In March, we discovered a new malware strain actively targeting a government entity in Pakistan. We designated this malware “DreamLand”. The malware is modular and utilizes the Lua scripting language in conjunction with its Just-in-Time (JIT) compiler to execute malicious code that is difficult to detect.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Next, it patches the entry point of the process it was being loaded into, to call its exported function curl_easy_cleanup.
This script is a loader that decodes, decompresses, decrypts and runs the main module and configuration data.
Before calling curl_get_build_version to execute UpdatCheck.dll, it tries to dynamically resolve the API functions AzApplicationOpen (azroles.dll) and DllEnumClassObjects (mshtml.dll) subsequently to call them instead of curl_get_build_version if they exist in the process. That was probably done to stop the malware from running on certain systems or when a specific security software is present.
It dynamically resolves the API functions GetConsoleWindow and ShowWindow and calls the latter with the parameter SW_HIDE to hide its console window.
When curl_get_build_version in UpdatCheck.dll is executed, it first decompresses and decrypts an embedded payload that is internally named HttpClientLJ.dll... After a memory module was created out of the raw payload, its entry point (DllMain) is called to run the normal and Lua initialization routines.
Before calling curl_get_build_version to execute UpdatCheck.dll, it tries to dynamically resolve the API functions AzApplicationOpen (azroles.dll) and DllEnumClassObjects (mshtml.dll) subsequently to call them instead of curl_get_build_version if they exist in the process. That was probably done to stop the malware from running on certain systems or when a specific security software is present.
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.