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Malware1 associated actor3 associated CVEs

DatopLoader

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs22Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-34473via cybereason blogExploited in the wildProxyShell: Microsoft Exchange Pre-authentication Path ConfusionCVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth Path Confusion leading to ACL Bypass. Requires no privileges... the attackers utilized only one of the vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-34473, to perform unauthenticated email related activity on an Exchange server. | ProxyShell is a set of three security vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to perform unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) and email-related tasks on unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers... The three CVEs affect the on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers 2013, 2016 and 2019. | After a successful exploitation of ProxyShell, the attackers used the Exchange to distribute phishing emails to internal and external user accounts with the payload of QBot and DatopLoader. DatopLoader is a malware loader that emerged for the first time in September 2021.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34523via cybereason blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Privilege Escalation (ProxyShell)CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of Privileges on Exchange PowerShell backend. Requires no privileges. | After a successful exploitation of ProxyShell, the attackers used the Exchange to distribute phishing emails to internal and external user accounts with the payload of QBot and DatopLoader. DatopLoader is a malware loader that emerged for the first time in September 2021.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-31207via cybereason blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange Server Post-Authentication Arbitrary File Write (ProxyShell)CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leading to RCE. Requires “High” privileges. | After a successful exploitation of ProxyShell, the attackers used the Exchange to distribute phishing emails to internal and external user accounts with the payload of QBot and DatopLoader. DatopLoader is a malware loader that emerged for the first time in September 2021.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Conti

Compromised servers are then used to spread phishing emails delivering Datoploader (aka Squirrelwaffle) and the QBot trojan.

via truesectruesec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The attackers exploited recently disclosed vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Servers to gain access to the targeted networks.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Compromised servers are then used to spread phishing emails delivering Datoploader (aka Squirrelwaffle) and the QBot trojan.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The links in the email direct the victims to websites serving malicious .ZIP files.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Once it is done, an obfuscated Macro will be executed to create the C:\Datop folder

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The XLS macros are obfuscated by building each of the actual command characters from content of various cells in the document.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The .ZIP files contain macro-enabled Excel (.XLS) files... when opened, the XLS files present an image to the user, with instructions to enable macro execution.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

So far we have identified two ways that the malware made itself persistent. An autorun registry key launching regsvr32.exe to execute a DLL

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

So far we have identified two ways that the malware made itself persistent. An autorun registry key launching regsvr32.exe to execute a DLL

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The XLS macros are obfuscated by building each of the actual command characters from content of various cells in the document.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

When executed, the macros create the directory “C:Datop”, download three files to this directory, and run them using regsvr32.exe.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1534Internal SpearphishingEvidence1

These phishing emails were sent as a reply message to legitimate, hijacked email conversations the attackers stole from within organiziation’s Exchange server utilizing the ProxyShell vulnerability.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once it is done, an obfuscated Macro will be executed to create the C:\Datop folder, and to download three DLL files - test.test, test1.test and test2.test from malicious IP addresses.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching22Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.