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Malware1 associated actor

GoginRAT

Tracked since Aug 19, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

GoginRAT is a Go-based modular remote-access trojan used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. It uses a malicious loader DLL to decrypt and start its main orchestrator, separates command-and-control communications into a dedicated transmitter component, and retrieves functionality on demand to minimize its initial footprint. Its plugins provide file-system operations and shell access on compromised systems. GoginRAT has architectural similarities to NomadRAT despite being implemented in a different language. It was used against government organizations in Central Asia and Georgia in activity assessed with medium confidence to be China-nexus; SilkParasite has not been conclusively attributed to a single named threat actor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilkParasite

The IOC set identifies info[.]ktnet[.]org and 193[.]29[.]56[.]205 as GoginRAT C2 infrastructure, plus malicious SvcLog.inf samples.

via github webgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

downloaded plugins into memory

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This malware is small, modular, and built specifically not to look like malware... hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

GoginRAT ... implements file system and shell capabilities as independent plugins.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Rather than using one noisy implant, the actors maintained several tools, changed their supporting files between builds, and used cloud services and normal-looking traffic to make investigation harder.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

"evo[.]hoster-kg[.]com NodeEdgeRAT C2 domain" and "hxxps://uzrailway[.]devon-uz[.]com:443 BloodAlchemy C2 URL"; numerous SpiceRAT, NomadRAT, and GoginRAT C2 URLs, domains, and IP addresses are also listed.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

DriveSilkRAT formed the campaign’s backbone. It used a shared Google Drive folder for commands, downloaded plugins into memory, and returned collected data through the same service.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Bitdefender Labs found seven remote access tool (RAT) families in use, five of which were previously undocumented; we identified and named them: DriveSilkRAT, CookiETagRAT, NomadRAT, GoginRAT, and NodeEdgeRAT.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.