GoginRAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Post exploitation
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
GoginRAT is a Go-based modular remote-access trojan used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. It uses a malicious loader DLL to decrypt and start its main orchestrator, separates command-and-control communications into a dedicated transmitter component, and retrieves functionality on demand to minimize its initial footprint. Its plugins provide file-system operations and shell access on compromised systems. GoginRAT has architectural similarities to NomadRAT despite being implemented in a different language. It was used against government organizations in Central Asia and Georgia in activity assessed with medium confidence to be China-nexus; SilkParasite has not been conclusively attributed to a single named threat actor.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The IOC set identifies info[.]ktnet[.]org and 193[.]29[.]56[.]205 as GoginRAT C2 infrastructure, plus malicious SvcLog.inf samples.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.
downloaded plugins into memory
Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
This malware is small, modular, and built specifically not to look like malware... hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.
SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
GoginRAT ... implements file system and shell capabilities as independent plugins.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
Rather than using one noisy implant, the actors maintained several tools, changed their supporting files between builds, and used cloud services and normal-looking traffic to make investigation harder.
"evo[.]hoster-kg[.]com NodeEdgeRAT C2 domain" and "hxxps://uzrailway[.]devon-uz[.]com:443 BloodAlchemy C2 URL"; numerous SpiceRAT, NomadRAT, and GoginRAT C2 URLs, domains, and IP addresses are also listed.
It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.
DriveSilkRAT formed the campaign’s backbone. It used a shared Google Drive folder for commands, downloaded plugins into memory, and returned collected data through the same service.
Bitdefender Labs found seven remote access tool (RAT) families in use, five of which were previously undocumented; we identified and named them: DriveSilkRAT, CookiETagRAT, NomadRAT, GoginRAT, and NodeEdgeRAT.
Observables
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.