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SilkParasite is a cyberespionage activity cluster targeting government organizations in Central Asia and Georgia, with additional targeting themes involving energy and telecommunications entities. It has used spear-phishing emails carrying government-themed malicious Microsoft Office documents, sometimes packaged in password-protected archives. Document macros initiate DLL-sideloading chains that abuse legitimate signed Windows applications to execute remote-access malware. The operation employs DriveSilkRAT, SpiceRAT, CookiETagRAT, BloodAlchemy, NomadRAT, GoginRAT, and NodeEdgeRAT. Its modular implants support command execution, file operations, system and network discovery, and collection of information. DriveSilkRAT uses shared cloud-storage folders for command-and-control and transfer of collected results, while CookiETagRAT conceals command traffic in HTTP Cookie and ETag headers. BloodAlchemy has included clipboard logging, keylogging, user-session impersonation, and process execution capabilities. SilkParasite uses plugin-based tooling, in-memory plugin loading, scheduled-task persistence, legitimate cloud services, and rotating signed host applications for DLL sideloading to limit its endpoint footprint and evade detection. Related infrastructure has impersonated Central Asian government, state energy, railway, and telecommunications organizations. SilkParasite has been assessed with medium confidence as China-nexus, but it has not been conclusively attributed to a specific named group or to the Chinese government.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
36 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
190 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A long-running cyberespionage operation active since at least mid-2022 that targets Central Asian governments, state enterprises, energy, telecommunications, and critical-sector organizations. It uses infrastructure impersonating regional ministries, state entities, and local hosting providers.
A China-nexus cyberespionage campaign targeting Central Asian government, energy, and telecommunications organizations. It uses government-themed spear-phishing lures, trusted Windows programs, remote-access malware, and spoofed government, energy, railway, and telecom infrastructure; associated infrastructure may date to mid-2022.
A China-linked, long-running cyberespionage operation targeting Central Asian government, energy, and telecommunications entities. It uses government-themed spear-phishing lures, trusted Windows programs, remote-access malware, and impersonation infrastructure; linked infrastructure was active from at least mid-2022 through August 2026.
Operates long-running command-and-control infrastructure associated with SpiceRAT, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT, targeting Central Asian government and energy-related entities through infrastructure impersonating state railway, telecommunications, energy, and foreign-affairs organizations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.