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Malware2 associated actors

DriveSilkRAT

Tracked since Aug 19, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs49Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

DriveSilkRAT is a modular remote-access trojan used as the principal implant in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. Implemented in .NET and C++ variants, it polls a shared Google Drive folder for tasking, executes commands through in-memory .NET plugins, and uploads execution results and collected data through the same cloud service. Its plugin set supports host and network discovery, IP-configuration collection, directory and process enumeration, file display, copying, deletion, execution, and process termination. DriveSilkRAT also deployed other malware families within the SilkParasite toolset. SilkParasite targeted government and economic decision-making entities in Central Asia and Georgia, primarily using spear-phishing Office-document lures, password-protected archives, and DLL sideloading chains. The operation is assessed with medium confidence as China-nexus activity, without attribution to a specific named threat actor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilkParasite

DriveSilkRAT is represented by GoogleDriveClient.exe samples, mutexes, an attacker email address, RC4 keys, and plugins for host/network discovery, file operations, command execution, and process termination.

via github webgithub.com
Salt Typhoon

One of the new tools, DriveSilkRAT, uses Google Drive to exchange data with an infected machine, allowing some malicious traffic to be disguised as communication with a legitimate cloud service.

via timescatimesca.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The attackers appear to have gained access through targeted phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents, sometimes hidden inside password-protected archives.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

Initial access ran through malicious Microsoft Office documents, most likely delivered by spear-phishing email.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The command-execution plugin runs processes through Windows Management Instrumentation rather than spawning cmd.exe directly.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

DriveSilkRAT ... run it through an in-memory .NET plugin system ... NodeEdgeRAT ... spanning command execution ... SpiceRAT ... equipped to download and run executable binaries and arbitrary commands.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

downloaded plugins into memory

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The documents were designed to look legitimate and trick recipients into opening files that could infect their computers. Once opened, the documents can run malicious code that installs software giving the attackers remote access to the computer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk and launched the first-stage payload.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

DriveSilkRAT uses Google Drive to exchange data with an infected machine, allowing some malicious traffic to be disguised as communication with a legitimate cloud service.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

It supports 12 plugins for process listing, system and network enumeration, file management, and command execution.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

It supports 12 plugins for process listing, system and network enumeration, file management, and command execution.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware supports basic commands to gather host information... It supports 12 plugins for process listing, system and network enumeration, file management, and command execution.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

One of the new tools, DriveSilkRAT, uses Google Drive to exchange data with an infected machine, allowing some malicious traffic to be disguised as communication with a legitimate cloud service.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence4

One of the new tools, DriveSilkRAT, uses Google Drive to exchange data with an infected machine, allowing malicious traffic to blend in with traffic from a legitimate cloud service.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

DriveSilkRAT operators drop command files into a shared Google Drive folder. The infected host polls that folder, downloads its tasking ... and uploads results back to the same folder.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Bitdefender found seven families of remote access trojans, or RATs, five of which had not previously been documented. RATs are programs that allow attackers to control an infected device from a distance, including running commands and accessing files.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

DriveSilkRAT ... uses Google Drive as command-and-control (C2) to poll a specific folder for tasking ... and upload the results of the execution back to the same folder.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching49Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.