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Malware1 associated actor

GoCaracal

Tracked since Aug 26, 2026 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs50Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

GoCaracal is a modular, Go-based remote-access malware framework targeting Windows systems. It was identified during a June 2026 cyberespionage intrusion against a communications organization in Venezuela, where it was deployed alongside Bandook. The intrusion was attributed to the Lebanon-linked Dark Caracal group with medium confidence. GoCaracal comprises lightweight and extended profiles built on a shared architecture, with development observed from January through July 2026.

The lightweight profile performs host profiling, encrypted command-and-control communications, interactive shell access, payload downloading and execution, and shellcode loading and process injection. Host reconnaissance includes operating-system, user, active-window, and security-product information. The extended profile adds file management and targeted file searches, browser credential-database and cookie collection, keylogging, SOCKS5 proxying, WebRTC-based remote desktop access, hidden browser sessions, and persistence. These features support sustained surveillance and interactive control of compromised systems.

The extended profile can recover from repeated primary command-and-control failures by querying public Ethereum JSON-RPC services for a replacement server address stored in a Solidity smart contract named BulletproofC2. The contract acts as a mutable dead-drop configuration mechanism; subsequent command-and-control traffic remains off-chain. Operators can update the fallback address without distributing a new malware binary.

Associated delivery activity uses Spanish-language financial and tax-themed phishing lures, malicious SVG attachments, shortened links, document-themed download infrastructure, compressed archives, and Delphi loaders. Phishing was assessed as the likely entry vector for the Venezuelan intrusion, although the original email and attachment were not recovered. Concurrent deployment with Bandook establishes GoCaracal as an addition to the operational toolkit rather than a demonstrated replacement.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dark Caracal

Researchers at Arctic Wolf discovered the new malware when investigating a targeted intrusion in Venezuela and are tracking the new framework as GoCaracal.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

“The campaign begins with Spanish-language financial and tax lures sent through phishing emails.”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

« Emails de phishing à thème financier/fiscal en espagnol » et « Pièces jointes SVG malveillantes avec URL Base64 encodée ».

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence4

« Redirection via services de raccourcissement d’URL » suivie d’un téléchargement depuis getpdfdigital[.]cloud.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

“The lightweight build handles ... remote shell.”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Le profil léger fournit un « shell distant » et permet le « téléchargement/exécution de payloads ».

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

“An SVG attachment sends the recipient’s browser through a shortened link and a redirect before the malware archive is delivered.”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

La version étendue fournit une « persistance après redémarrage » ; la liste cite « T1547 — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution ».

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Le profil étendu fournit un « accès persistant » et effectue une « manipulation de registre ».

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

Le profil léger GoCaracal comprend l’« injection de shellcode ».

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

La version étendue fournit une « persistance après redémarrage » ; la liste cite « T1547 — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution ».

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Le profil étendu fournit un « accès persistant » et effectue une « manipulation de registre ».

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Les pièces jointes SVG malveillantes contiennent une « URL Base64 encodée ».

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

Le profil léger GoCaracal comprend l’« injection de shellcode ».

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

Le profil étendu inclut le « keylogging ».

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence5

Le profil étendu prend en charge la « collecte de cookies navigateur ».

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Le profil étendu est conçu pour la « collecte de renseignements »; la liste TTP identifie explicitement T1552.001.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence6

“The extended version can search files, collect browser data and keystrokes.”

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

La liste TTP cite « T1557 — Adversary-in-the-Middle (Collection) ».

Discovery

5 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

During initialization, it gathers basic host information, including user, hostname, operating-system, uptime...

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

La liste TTP identifie explicitement T1057 dans les capacités de découverte du framework.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

Le profil léger réalise du « profilage hôte ».

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence6

La liste TTP identifie explicitement T1083 dans les capacités de découverte du framework.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence3

Phase 2 inclut la « découverte antivirus ».

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

« Version étendue : ... accès bureau à distance furtif » ; « T1021.001 — Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol ».

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

« Version étendue : recherche de fichiers, collecte de données de navigateur » ; « T1005 — Data from Local System ».

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

Le profil étendu inclut le « keylogging ».

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

La liste TTP cite « T1557 — Adversary-in-the-Middle (Collection) ».

Command and Control

12 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

“Notably, the extended version utilizes an Ethereum blockchain database as a backup for command-and-control servers.”

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

La liste TTP cite « T1071 — Application Layer Protocol (Command and Control) » ; GoCaracal communique avec les opérateurs et contacte des services RPC Ethereum.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Le profil étendu récupère une adresse C2 de remplacement via « eth_getStorageAt » sur un endpoint JSON-RPC Ethereum public.

T1090ProxyEvidence6

« Version étendue : ... création de proxy » ; « T1090 — Proxy (Command and Control) ».

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

Le profil étendu comprend un « proxy SOCKS5 ».

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

Le mécanisme « BulletproofC2 » utilise le réseau Ethereum et un endpoint JSON-RPC public pour obtenir une adresse C2 de remplacement.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence5

“When GoCaracal cannot reach its main control server, its extended version can ask an Ethereum service for data held in a smart contract.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

Le profil léger effectue le « téléchargement/exécution de payloads »; la chaîne livre aussi un loader Delphi avec Bandook et GoCaracal étendu.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

Le profil étendu fournit un « accès bureau via WebRTC ».

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence2

GoCaracal's extended build supports an Ethereum smart-contract fallback that lets operators retrieve replacement C2 infrastructure without redeploying the malware.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

“The lightweight build handles host profiling, encrypted C2, remote shell, payload download and execution, and shellcode injection.”

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

Phase 1 : « communications de base, profilage hôte, chiffrement AES-GCM ».

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Le profil étendu assure la « collecte de renseignements » et des communications C2 actives.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyberveilleNews · Sep 15, 2026Dark Caracal déploie GoCaracal, un nouveau framework Go avec C2 Ethereum, contre l'Amérique latine | CyberVeilleFramework modulaire écrit en Go, used as a lightweight initial-access implant or an extended post-compromise implant. Capabilities include host profiling, remote shell access, payload download and execution, shellcode injection, persistence, intelligence collection, keylogging, WebRTC desktop access, SOCKS5 proxying, browser-cookie theft, registry manipulation, and encrypted C2. Its extended profile can obtain a fallback C2 address through an Ethereum smart contract.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Sep 3, 2026BraZetsu Malware Turns Compromised Windows Hosts Into Criminal Marketplace InventoryA previously undocumented Go-based modular malware framework used in an intrusion against a Venezuelan communications organization. Its lightweight variant establishes access and deploys payloads, while the extended variant enables intelligence collection and interactive control, including an Ethereum smart-contract C2 fallback.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Aug 28, 2026Dark Caracal déploie GoCaracal avec fallback C2 via blockchain Ethereum | CyberVeilleFramework malveillant écrit en Go, déployé par Dark Caracal. Sa variante légère effectue le profilage de l’hôte, communique avec les opérateurs et télécharge des outils additionnels. La variante étendue collecte des fichiers et données de navigateur, enregistre les frappes, établit un proxy, fournit un accès bureau distant furtif et persiste après redémarrage. En cas d’indisponibilité du C2 principal, elle récupère une adresse C2 de repli depuis un contrat intelligent Ethereum.Read more ↗cyberaccord blogNews · Aug 28, 2026Dark Caracal Hackers Use Ethereum Blockchain to Keep New Malware Connected After C2 Disruption - Cyber AccordA Go-based modular espionage framework with lightweight and extended builds. The lightweight variant establishes an initial foothold, profiles hosts, communicates with operators, and retrieves additional tools. The extended variant can search files, steal browser data and keystrokes, create a proxy, provide concealed remote-desktop access, and maintain persistence. If its primary C2 is unavailable, it retrieves a replacement C2 address from a BulletproofC2 Ethereum smart contract.Read more ↗
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IOC matching50Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.