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Mallory
Malware

Alinubx.sys

Tracked since Aug 28, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Capabilities
Defense evasionPersistence
Delivery
Seo poisoningLanding pageCloaking
Platforms
Windows

Alinubx.sys is a Microsoft-attested Windows kernel driver abused as a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver component to disable endpoint defenses. Derived from a driver associated with the CnCrypt disk-encryption product, it permits user-mode callers to request kernel-mode termination of arbitrary processes. Campaign operators deployed it under the guise of an NVIDIA component and registered it as an automatically started Windows service. The driver contains a hardcoded target list for 145 antivirus and EDR processes and can terminate protected security processes, including those protected by Protected Process Light. It has been used alongside the Rapuncel information stealer in SEO-poisoning campaigns using fraudulent software-download pages and DLL side-loading. The associated loader has been linked with high confidence to the Cruciferra PUROSANGUE ecosystem. Although the driver contains functionality associated with concealing files and registry entries, process injection, interception, traffic manipulation, and port redirection, those features were not observed being activated in the documented deployment.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Clicking download links leads to redirected payload-delivery servers where victims receive large ZIP archives... Inside these archives is a disguised installer that deploys the Rapuncel infostealer.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

После повышения привилегий до SYSTEM цепочка устанавливала драйвер Alinubx.sys, который регистрировал сервис NvFsFilter.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

Alinubx.sys is a renamed, identity-swapped version of CcProtect.sys... a driver already listed on LOLDrivers with public proof-of-concept killer code.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

После повышения привилегий до SYSTEM цепочка устанавливала драйвер Alinubx.sys, который регистрировал сервис NvFsFilter.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence4

The malware then gained SYSTEM privileges and installed a kernel driver... Once the driver killed security software from kernel level...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Репозитории выдавали себя за LastPass и другие компании; Alinubx.sys маскировался под компонент Nvidia nvfsflt64.sys; внутри ZIP находилась переименованная копия легитимного vsdbg.exe.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

« Alinubx.sys ... déguisé en nvfsflt64.sys (NVIDIA) » and “vsdbg.exe (outil Microsoft légitime renommé).”

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence3

The malware then gained SYSTEM privileges and installed a kernel driver disguised as an NVIDIA component. The driver had a valid Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher signature.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence9

Alinubx.sys содержит список из 145 процессов антивирусов и EDR и завершает их на уровне ядра, обходя даже Protected Process Light (PPL).

Command and Control

1 technique
T1090ProxyEvidence1

The kernel driver also contains code to intercept all web traffic passing through the machine and redirect it through a local proxy... This feature requires a configuration file that the attacker did not provide in this deployment, so it did not activate.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

It used a kernel-level process termination mechanism to stop the targeted tools.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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xakepNews · Sep 24, 2026Фальшивые репозитории LastPass Authenticator на GitHub содержат стилер Rapuncel - ХакерA Microsoft-signed, renamed CcProtect.sys driver used in the campaign to terminate 145 antivirus and EDR processes from kernel mode, including processes protected by Protected Process Light. The driver also contains capabilities for hiding files and registry entries, DLL injection, process and driver interception, traffic manipulation, and port redirection, though use of those additional capabilities was not observed.Read more ↗scworldNews · Sep 21, 2026New Rapuncel infostealer campaign uses fake GitHub repos to disable antivirus | brief | SC MediaMalicious signed kernel driver used with Rapuncel to impair endpoint defenses. It masquerades as an NVIDIA component and terminates antivirus and EDR processes, including protected processes.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Sep 21, 2026Rapuncel : un infostealer MaaS exploite GitHub pour cibler 40 entreprises via un driver signé Microsoft | CyberVeillePilote noyau abusé dans une chaîne BYOVD, conçu pour désactiver les défenses en tuant des processus AV/EDR, y compris des processus protégés. Il est masqué sous un nom de pilote NVIDIA et configuré pour persister comme service Windows.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Sep 21, 2026Fake LastPass Authenticator Installer Abuses Microsoft-Signed Driver to Kill Antivirus and EDRA Microsoft-signed Windows kernel driver deployed by the fake LastPass Authenticator installer. It disables antivirus and EDR processes from kernel mode, persists as a service, and can re-kill security tools after reboot. Dormant capabilities include file hiding, process injection, and web-traffic redirection.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.