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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
We identified at least seven scheduled tasks across two layers... Three WinRTCS scheduled tasks running as SYSTEM at one-, five- and fifteen-minute intervals... A further four scheduled tasks belonging to the keeper layer, registered under names that resemble legitimate Microsoft tasks.
We identified at least seven scheduled tasks across two layers... Three WinRTCS scheduled tasks running as SYSTEM at one-, five- and fifteen-minute intervals... A further four scheduled tasks belonging to the keeper layer, registered under names that resemble legitimate Microsoft tasks.
« désinstallation silencieuse de l’agent de sécurité via la chaîne de désinstallation du registre »
We identified at least seven scheduled tasks across two layers... Three WinRTCS scheduled tasks running as SYSTEM at one-, five- and fifteen-minute intervals... A further four scheduled tasks belonging to the keeper layer, registered under names that resemble legitimate Microsoft tasks.
After the RMM implant was removed, a surviving Gryxa component collected a specific set of records: the scheduled tasks and Windows event subscriptions present on the host; Windows installer and service-control logs... process-creation logs... [and] an inventory of every remote-access tool.
“Once launched, the installer retrieves components through HTTPS” and “Its guard checks the actor’s relay every five minutes.”
At two consecutive failures the toolkit disables Microsoft Defender and issues service stop and disable commands against EDR products from a hard-coded list. At three, it reads the uninstall string for the security agent from the registry and runs a silent uninstall.
15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Windows malware toolkit providing covert remote access through abused RMM software, persistent self-restoration via scheduled tasks, WMI event subscriptions, and backup copies, and Chromium-browser credential theft. A keeper component monitors remediation activity, exfiltrates host and Windows-log artifacts, and can retaliate against containment by disabling Microsoft Defender, stopping endpoint-security products, or silently uninstalling security agents.
Gryxa is a financially motivated modular malicious toolkit delivered likely through phishing. It establishes redundant scheduled-task and WMI persistence, downloads components over HTTPS while bypassing TLS revocation checks, steals Chromium-browser credentials by bypassing Chrome App-Bound Encryption, identifies cryptocurrency-wallet extensions, validates stolen credentials against cryptocurrency-exchange and fintech domains, and exfiltrates data through Telegram. It also disrupts Defender and EDR tooling when its relay is unavailable, removes competing remote-access tools, and retains a monitoring component that collects host remediation and forensic artifacts after visible RMM removal.
A financially motivated actor’s Windows initial-access and persistence toolkit. It deploys/abuses legitimate RMM software for covert remote access; maintains redundant persistence through scheduled tasks, a permanent WMI event subscription, and off-path file copies; steals browser credentials; inventories cryptocurrency-wallet extensions; sends collected data through Telegram; collects remediation-related Windows logs and host artifacts after RMM removal; and can disable Microsoft Defender and stop, disable, or silently uninstall listed EDR products after repeated C2/relay failures.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.