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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Les attaquants recourent massivement aux réseaux proxy résidentiels... Une connexion sortante chiffrée et persistante vers un serveur proxy est maintenue.
Maskify resolves C2 through ENS plus IPFS and updates automatically through ENS; Proxice also resolves its encrypted endpoint list through ENS.
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
ADB-delivered Android botnet masquerading as com.samsung.android.devicesecurity. It uses the libkys.so component, ENS and IPFS for C2 resolution, QUIC over port 443, automated ENS-based updating, and eight DDoS methods including DNS, Memcached, and CLDAP amplification.
Maskify variants were observed being installed through exposed ADB on SuperBox devices, turning them into proxy-network nodes or DDoS botnet participants.
Malicious application targeted at SuperBox devices; the article states that the identified malware can convert devices into residential-proxy nodes or DDoS botnet members.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.