Malware

GhostCode

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The victim received an email containing a WeTransfer link to a password-protected HTML file, along with the password needed to open it.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Threat actors initiated the attack by submitting a seemingly innocuous inquiry through Salesforce... posed as a procurement officer for BJ's Wholesale Club and initiated contact via a web sales contact form.

Execution

1 technique

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When opened, the HTML file launched in the victim's browser and redirected to the device code phishing page.

Persistence

1 technique

T1098.005Device RegistrationEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens... Three distinct device registrations [were] completed... all automated and all via the stolen device code token.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1098.005Device RegistrationEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens... Three distinct device registrations [were] completed... all automated and all via the stolen device code token.

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The HTML file... use[d] three independent evasion layers... character-level HTML comment injection... [and] AES-256-GCM Encrypted Redirect URL.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

The same 50-character string repeats thousands of times throughout the HTML, serving to inflate the file size to slow scanning pipelines, pollute similarity hashing... and bury the real content far from the start of the file.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The actual payload - the redirect URL - is never present in plaintext anywhere in the file. It is decrypted via AES-256-GCM with the threat actor supplied password.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The lookalike domain, bjssourcing[.]com was registered 15 days prior to the outreach... over 30 similar domains impersonating US-based distributors, manufacturers, warehousing, and other companies.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

On the first visit, it serves a JavaScript challenge that computes a hash of browser-observable state... Headless browsers and basic HTTP crawlers that do not execute JavaScript are unable to generate the challenge token and are silently blocked... a user-agent blocklist was enforced server-side.

Credential Access

1 technique

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

After the victim signed in and completed MFA, the threat actors obtained authentication tokens... At 17:26:24Z... the attacker obtained a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for the victim's account.

Discovery

1 technique

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1114.002Remote Email CollectionEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens, and harvested emails.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

The phishing kit exposes the API query parameter /api/harvester?action=geoip to look up the victim's external location and activate a proxy through FlashProxy[.]io, a residential/rotating proxy provider.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

14 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

esentire blogNews

Sep 15, 2026

GhostCode: Dissecting a Novel Device Code Phishing Kit | eSentire

A device-code phishing kit that abuses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant flow. It uses password-gated and obfuscated HTML lures with AES-256-GCM-encrypted redirect URLs, bot filtering, Cloudflare Turnstile, GeoIP-aligned rotating residential proxies, and a Microsoft Authentication Broker App device-code request to steal authenticated Microsoft account tokens. Following authentication, it automates Entra device registration, Intune enrollment, Primary Refresh Token acquisition, and Microsoft Graph access.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching18

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

GhostCode

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The victim received an email containing a WeTransfer link to a password-protected HTML file, along with the password needed to open it.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Execution

1 technique

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When opened, the HTML file launched in the victim's browser and redirected to the device code phishing page.

Persistence

1 technique

T1098.005Device RegistrationEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens... Three distinct device registrations [were] completed... all automated and all via the stolen device code token.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1098.005Device RegistrationEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens... Three distinct device registrations [were] completed... all automated and all via the stolen device code token.

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The HTML file... use[d] three independent evasion layers... character-level HTML comment injection... [and] AES-256-GCM Encrypted Redirect URL.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The actual payload - the redirect URL - is never present in plaintext anywhere in the file. It is decrypted via AES-256-GCM with the threat actor supplied password.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The lookalike domain, bjssourcing[.]com was registered 15 days prior to the outreach... over 30 similar domains impersonating US-based distributors, manufacturers, warehousing, and other companies.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Credential Access

1 technique

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

After the victim signed in and completed MFA, the threat actors obtained authentication tokens... At 17:26:24Z... the attacker obtained a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for the victim's account.

Discovery

1 technique

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1114.002Remote Email CollectionEvidence1

They then registered several devices, acquired long-living tokens, and harvested emails.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

14 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

esentire blogNews

Sep 15, 2026

GhostCode: Dissecting a Novel Device Code Phishing Kit | eSentire

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching18

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.