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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

KREMLIN

Tracked since Sep 15, 2026 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK48Techniques
IOCs89Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

KREMLIN is a Windows banking-malware toolkit used by REF9334, a cybercriminal operation active since at least May 2025 and focused primarily on Brazilian banking users. Campaigns employ Portuguese-language lures impersonating Brazilian financial institutions, presenting malicious JavaScript as invoices, receipts, statements, or payment documents. Infection begins when a victim manually executes the disguised script. Researchers identified 1,515 infected systems, more than 98% of them in Brazil.

The toolkit combines multistage JavaScript and Node.js loaders with custom C++ installers and malicious Chromium extensions. It establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and uses Ethereum smart contracts as dead-drop resolvers for mutable payload locations and command-and-control configuration. Evasion mechanisms include sandbox and virtual-machine checks, DLL sideloading through a legitimate signed SentinelOne executable, and malware components concealed in JPEG carriers.

KREMLIN silently installs the AVSync malicious extension into Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge profiles. Using techniques including Phantom Extension, it modifies protected browser preferences and regenerates integrity metadata to make the unauthorized extension appear legitimate. It also recovers browser encryption keys, including App-Bound key material, through browser debugging and memory access. KREMLIN steals browser databases, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and web storage. Its extension supports keylogging, screenshots, tab enumeration, page-content collection, HTTP-request interception, HTML injection, and attacker-controlled redirects. Collected data is exfiltrated through command-and-control channels, enabling credential compromise and reuse of authenticated sessions. REF9334 campaigns have also distributed Pulsar RAT and Remcos RAT alongside browser-extension components.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF9334

Elastic Security Labs describes REF9334 as a Brazilian banking-malware operation active since May 2025. The toolkit is named KREMLIN by its author, Kr3mlin4rt1st, and deploys a malicious Chromium extension while using Node.js, scheduled-task persistence, DLL sideloading, and Ethereum smart contracts for configuration and payload delivery.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence2

Les smart contracts stockent les URLs des payloads (installateur, extension, modules).

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

“The campaign begins with fake JavaScript documents that pose as bank records or invoices.”

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

Étape 1 : Évasion sandbox (comptage de fichiers bureau, processus WMI).

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Тот закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Multiple campaigns used JavaScript → PowerShell → RunPE chains, and PowerShell loaded RunPE assemblies.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence3

“Once opened, they install components and target Chrome and Edge profiles.”

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The malware uses indirect syscalls to interact with the kernel and retrieves processes using ZwQuerySystemInformation.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

“Once opened, they install components and target Chrome and Edge profiles.”

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Тот закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач.

T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence6

Одной из главных особенностей KREMLIN является установка расширения AVSync в браузеры Chrome и Edge без участия жертвы.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Тот закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A JPEG carrier contains a .NET process-injection kit (RunPE); later RunPE injects payloads into explorer.exe using Early Cascade Injection.

Stealth

14 techniques
T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Для хранения полезных нагрузок хакеры также использовали Internet Archive, скрывая малварь внутри изображений JPEG.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1027.007 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1027.009 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1027.013 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Заражение начинается с файла JavaScript, который маскируется под банковскую квитанцию, счет, платежный документ или другой корпоративный файл.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence2

Persistance via tâche planifiée (MicrosoftNodeRuntimeUpdater).

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

DLL sideloading de SentinelMemoryScanner.exe; leurre Adobe Framesync.

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence2

Les fichiers JavaScript utilisent des noms en portugais (COMPROVANTE, Extrato, PIX).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A JPEG carrier contains a .NET process-injection kit (RunPE); later RunPE injects payloads into explorer.exe using Early Cascade Injection.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1070.004 — Indicator Removal: File Deletion.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

После запуска скрипт проверяет, не работает ли он в песочнице или на виртуальной машине... KREMLIN использовал домен, чтобы определить, не запущен ли он в песочнице.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Évasion sandbox (comptage de fichiers bureau, processus WMI).

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1620 — Reflective Code Loading.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

вредонос правит файл Secure Preferences, заново рассчитывает HMAC и зашифрованные хеши, с помощью которых Chromium проверяет целостность настроек.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“It can take screenshots, list open tabs, collect cookies and stored web data, capture typed text, and inject attacker-controlled content into pages.”

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence4

После установки вредоносное расширение похищает файлы cookie, содержимое localStorage и sessionStorage... Сам KREMLIN тоже ... может похищать ... файлы cookie.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence4

KREMLIN ... похищает пароли... Сам KREMLIN тоже работает как инфостилер и может похищать браузерные базы данных.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

Discovery

8 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1033 — System Owner/User Discovery.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

Évasion sandbox via processus WMI.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1082 — System Information Discovery.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Évasion sandbox (comptage de fichiers bureau).

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Le malware débogue le processus Chrome et lit sa mémoire.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

После запуска скрипт проверяет, не работает ли он в песочнице или на виртуальной машине... KREMLIN использовал домен, чтобы определить, не запущен ли он в песочнице.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Évasion sandbox (comptage de fichiers bureau, processus WMI).

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1518.001 — Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery.

Collection

7 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Vol de cookies/sessionStorage/localStorage; lecture mémoire via ReadProcessMemory.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“It can take screenshots, list open tabs, collect cookies and stored web data, capture typed text, and inject attacker-controlled content into pages.”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

“It can take screenshots...”

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The extension can enumerate tabs, collect history, extract HTML, obtain cookies and storage, and capture screenshots.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence2

The extension requests access to browser tabs, cookies, storage, and the webRequest API, and can upload intercepted requests, page HTML, and session data.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

“It also archives browser databases and encryption keys before sending the data remotely.”

T1560.002Archive via LibraryEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1560.002 — Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence1

The extension periodically polls /google_api/ for configuration data; requests masquerade as CSS file fetches.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

After establishing a WebSocket channel with the C2 server, the extension also polls a '/google_api/' endpoint through requests masquerading as CSS file fetches.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

“[KREMLIN] retrieves fresh hosting details from an Ethereum smart contract.”

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence3

“[KREMLIN] retrieves fresh hosting details from an Ethereum smart contract.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

получает из смарт-контракта Ethereum адреса для загрузки следующих пейлоадов и запускает их.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence2

Codecaudiog used a generate endpoint with output=base64; TTPs list T1132.001.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

TTPs détectés : T1573.001 — Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

“It also archives browser databases and encryption keys before sending the data remotely.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

89 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching89Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping48Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.