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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

AVSync

Tracked since Sep 15, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingPost exploitation
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

AVSync is a malicious Chromium browser extension deployed by the Brazil-focused KREMLIN banking-malware operation. KREMLIN installs it without user interaction into Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge profiles by bypassing Chromium extension-integrity controls using the Phantom Extension technique. AVSync impersonates a legitimate extension and obtains access to browser tabs, cookies, storage, and network requests. It captures screenshots, enumerates open tabs and browsing data, collects cookies, stored web data, passwords, and user-entered form text, enabling credential theft and reuse of authenticated sessions. It can also intercept HTTP requests, inject attacker-controlled content into web pages, and redirect user clicks, providing attackers with browser-level control over banking and other online sessions. KREMLIN campaigns primarily target Brazilian users through Portuguese-language financial-document lures impersonating banks and payment services; the associated installer and supporting malware operate on Windows endpoints.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF9334

The KREMLIN-deployed malicious extension is named AVSync (extension ID ndpbidppejfanjbhfgjlohfanbfbklff) and uses WebSocket communication via /google_ws/ and HTTP polling through /google_api/*.css.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence3

Одной из главных особенностей KREMLIN является установка расширения AVSync в браузеры Chrome и Edge без участия жертвы.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“The extension poses as AVSync” and “SentinelAgentCore.dll [is an] Unsigned KREMLIN payload masquerading as a legitimate DLL.”

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

вредонос правит файл Secure Preferences, заново рассчитывает HMAC и зашифрованные хеши, с помощью которых Chromium проверяет целостность настроек.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“It can take screenshots, list open tabs, collect cookies and stored web data, capture typed text, and inject attacker-controlled content into pages.”

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

расширение ... перехватывает пароли и любой текст, который пользователь вводит в формы. | расширение способно перехватывать HTTP-запросы, внедрять HTML на страницы, перенаправлять клики.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

После установки вредоносное расширение похищает файлы cookie, содержимое localStorage и sessionStorage... Сам KREMLIN тоже ... может похищать ... файлы cookie.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

KREMLIN ... похищает пароли... Сам KREMLIN тоже работает как инфостилер и может похищать браузерные базы данных.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“It alters Chrome’s protected preferences and recreates the checks that normally verify extension settings. That allows the browser to treat the add-on as approved, even though the user never installed it.”

Collection

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“It can take screenshots, list open tabs, collect cookies and stored web data, capture typed text, and inject attacker-controlled content into pages.”

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

расширение ... перехватывает пароли и любой текст, который пользователь вводит в формы. | расширение способно перехватывать HTTP-запросы, внедрять HTML на страницы, перенаправлять клики.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

расширение ... делает скриншоты.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

“[The extension] requests access to tabs, cookies, browser storage, and network requests… [and] inject[s] attacker-controlled content into pages.”

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

“It also archives browser databases and encryption keys before sending the data remotely.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

расширение способно ... получать команды через WebSocket.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

“It also archives browser databases and encryption keys before sending the data remotely.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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xakepNews · Sep 18, 2026Банкер KREMLIN ворует учетные данные и сессионные токены из Chrome и Edge - ХакерMalicious Chrome and Edge extension deployed by KREMLIN through a Chromium integrity-check bypass. It steals cookies, localStorage and sessionStorage contents, passwords, form input, screenshots, HTML, tab information, and browser history; it can also intercept HTTP requests, inject HTML, redirect clicks, and receive commands over WebSocket.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 16, 2026KREMLIN Banking Malware Infects Over 1,500 Systems With Malicious Chrome ExtensionA malicious browser extension deployed by KREMLIN that masquerades as AVSync. It abuses extensive browser permissions to collect credentials, cookies, stored browser data, screenshots, open-tab information, and typed text, and can inject attacker-controlled page content.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 16, 2026KREMLIN Banking Malware Infects Over 1,500 Systems With Malicious Chrome Extension | Cryptika CybersecurityThe malicious browser extension installed by KREMLIN. It masquerades as AVSync and abuses broad Chrome/Edge permissions to collect cookies, stored browser data, typed text, screenshots, and tab information, while also enabling web-page injection and data exfiltration.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Sep 14, 2026KREMLIN : un malware bancaire brésilien installe des extensions Chrome malveillantes via Ethereum | CyberVeilleMalicious Chromium extension deployed by KREMLIN. It captures screenshots, steals cookies and browser storage, logs keystrokes, injects HTML, intercepts HTTP requests, and redirects traffic. Its C2 infrastructure can be resolved dynamically via Ethereum smart contracts or an ENDPOINT_DINAMIC endpoint.Read more ↗
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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.