MalwareUsed by 1 actor

RUSTYSHADE

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Transparent Tribe

RUSTYSHADE is a new 64-bit Windows backdoor written in Rust that abuses attacker-controlled private GitHub repositories for C2 communication.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

RUSTYMOVE... monitor[s] for external removable media... and copy[ies]... malicious files to the root directory of each detected external drive.

Execution

1 technique

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

RUSTYSHADE's default command handler executes input as a shell command using %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

APT36 issued del commands for previously deployed tooling, including DriverInstaller.exe, HealthCheck.exe, sheets_agent.dll, and multiple ZIP files.

Discovery

10 techniques

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

ipconfig, ipconfig /all... Identify... network adapter configuration.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 swept 192.168.1.1 through 192.168.1.254 using ping and PowerShell Test-Connection, and used nbtstat and net view to identify network hosts.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed whoami, whoami /groups, and whoami /priv.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 used Test-NetConnection against ports 445 and 135 after identifying live hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

hostname, tasklist... [identify] running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed hostname, tasklist, echo %COMSPEC%, echo %USERPROFILE%, ipconfig, and ipconfig /all.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

HC_LIST List the contents of the current working directory... cd Change the working directory to [path].

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed net view, net view \\[IP], net share, and net session.

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Invoke-RestMethod http://ip-api.com/json... curl https://ipinfo.io/json... Retrieve the infected machine's external IP address and geographic coordinates.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

APT36 used ip-api.com, ipinfo.io, and ipapi.co to retrieve the compromised machine's external IP address and geographic coordinates.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

net use \\[IP]\IPC$ ... /user:[machine_name]\admin * Attempt to connect to the IPC$ share on a remote host.

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

RUSTYMOVE... monitor[s] for external removable media... and copy[ies]... malicious files to the root directory of each detected external drive.

Collection

3 techniques

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The ss_up command captures a screenshot using native GDI32 APIs, encodes it as PNG, and uploads it as screenshot.png.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

The CAP-photo command captures a webcam photo using WIA.CommonDialog and uploads it as webcam_photo.jpg.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

HC_DOWNLOAD Read the file at [path], compress it using Compress-Archive, encrypt it, and upload it as download.bin.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

RUSTYSHADE uses the GitHub REST API as its C2 channel... reads and writes specific filenames in the private GitHub repository to synchronize communication.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

APT36 deployed RUSTYSHADE and RUSTYMOVE using PowerShell wget commands to download ZIP archives from Backblaze-hosted URLs.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

All messages exchanged between RUSTYSHADE and the GitHub repositories are encrypted using AES-256-GCM.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence2

PSNATCH... exfiltrate[s] them to the threat actor's private GitHub repositories... using the GitHub Contents API.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

malware newsNews

Sep 16, 2026

Operation RapidRust: APT36 Deploys RUSTYSHADE, RUSTYMOVE, PSNATCH, and BASHNATCH - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators

Rust-based Windows backdoor used by APT36. It uses private GitHub repositories and the GitHub REST API for encrypted AES-256-GCM command-and-control, supports command execution, filesystem and drive enumeration, screenshot and webcam capture, and encrypted file collection/exfiltration.

zscaler threat labzNews

Sep 16, 2026

Operation RapidRust: New APT36 Malware Tools | ThreatLabz

A Rust-based Windows backdoor that uses the GitHub REST API and attacker-controlled private repositories as encrypted AES-256-GCM C2. It supports shell-command execution, directory and drive enumeration, screenshot and webcam capture, and encrypted file exfiltration.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping21

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

RUSTYSHADE

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Transparent Tribe

RUSTYSHADE is a new 64-bit Windows backdoor written in Rust that abuses attacker-controlled private GitHub repositories for C2 communication.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

RUSTYMOVE... monitor[s] for external removable media... and copy[ies]... malicious files to the root directory of each detected external drive.

Execution

1 technique

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

RUSTYSHADE's default command handler executes input as a shell command using %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

APT36 issued del commands for previously deployed tooling, including DriverInstaller.exe, HealthCheck.exe, sheets_agent.dll, and multiple ZIP files.

Discovery

10 techniques

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

ipconfig, ipconfig /all... Identify... network adapter configuration.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 swept 192.168.1.1 through 192.168.1.254 using ping and PowerShell Test-Connection, and used nbtstat and net view to identify network hosts.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed whoami, whoami /groups, and whoami /priv.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 used Test-NetConnection against ports 445 and 135 after identifying live hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

hostname, tasklist... [identify] running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed hostname, tasklist, echo %COMSPEC%, echo %USERPROFILE%, ipconfig, and ipconfig /all.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

HC_LIST List the contents of the current working directory... cd Change the working directory to [path].

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence2

APT36 executed net view, net view \\[IP], net share, and net session.

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Invoke-RestMethod http://ip-api.com/json... curl https://ipinfo.io/json... Retrieve the infected machine's external IP address and geographic coordinates.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

APT36 used ip-api.com, ipinfo.io, and ipapi.co to retrieve the compromised machine's external IP address and geographic coordinates.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

net use \\[IP]\IPC$ ... /user:[machine_name]\admin * Attempt to connect to the IPC$ share on a remote host.

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

RUSTYMOVE... monitor[s] for external removable media... and copy[ies]... malicious files to the root directory of each detected external drive.

Collection

3 techniques

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The ss_up command captures a screenshot using native GDI32 APIs, encodes it as PNG, and uploads it as screenshot.png.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

The CAP-photo command captures a webcam photo using WIA.CommonDialog and uploads it as webcam_photo.jpg.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

HC_DOWNLOAD Read the file at [path], compress it using Compress-Archive, encrypt it, and upload it as download.bin.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

RUSTYSHADE uses the GitHub REST API as its C2 channel... reads and writes specific filenames in the private GitHub repository to synchronize communication.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

APT36 deployed RUSTYSHADE and RUSTYMOVE using PowerShell wget commands to download ZIP archives from Backblaze-hosted URLs.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

All messages exchanged between RUSTYSHADE and the GitHub repositories are encrypted using AES-256-GCM.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence2

PSNATCH... exfiltrate[s] them to the threat actor's private GitHub repositories... using the GitHub Contents API.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

malware newsNews

Sep 16, 2026

Operation RapidRust: APT36 Deploys RUSTYSHADE, RUSTYMOVE, PSNATCH, and BASHNATCH - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators

zscaler threat labzNews

Sep 16, 2026

Operation RapidRust: New APT36 Malware Tools | ThreatLabz

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping21

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.