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Malware1 associated actor

SparroWocky

Tracked since Sep 17, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK48Techniques
IOCs61Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
Windows

SparroWocky is a modular C++ backdoor for Windows used by the China-aligned cyberespionage group FamousSparrow since at least August 2025. A distinct family rather than a SparrowDoor variant, it rapidly replaced SparrowDoor as the group's primary implant. Observed targets include government organizations in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, as well as a telecommunications organization in Puerto Rico. Early deployments were delivered through existing SparrowDoor infections.

The backdoor supports arbitrary command execution, in-memory executable and Beacon Object File execution, system reconnaissance, file management and exfiltration, periodic screenshots, TCP proxying, and reverse port forwarding. It enumerates drives, directories, display devices, and user sessions, and can create processes in another logged-in user's session. Screenshot collection supports differential updates that transmit only changed screen regions after an initial capture. SparroWocky establishes persistence through Windows services or Registry Run entries and can remove its persistence and associated deployment files. It uses Mbed TLS for TLS-protected command-and-control communications and RC4 to encrypt command and exfiltrated data, with support for direct connections and HTTP or SOCKS5 proxies.

Deployment uses a three-component DLL side-loading chain comprising a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload. The loader decrypts the payload and reflectively maps it into memory; the payload's normal PE signature markers are removed. Evasion mechanisms include dynamic API resolution, call-stack spoofing, thread-creation hooks that disguise malicious thread start addresses, and forged Windows loader structures that make reflectively loaded executables resemble normally loaded modules. Integrated open-source offensive components allow additional functionality to execute within the backdoor without deploying separate tools.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Salt Typhoon

Since August 2025, SparroWocky has been spotted almost exclusively attacking government organizations in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, plus a telecommunications organization in Puerto Rico.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky MITRE ATT&CK techniques table.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables. | Listed in the MITRE ATT&CK tables for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables. | Listed in the MITRE ATT&CK tables for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence5

Listed in all three ATT&CK matrices.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence8

Its core capabilities allow an operator to execute arbitrary commands and files.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow. | Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

One of SparroWocky's most significant capabilities is its ability to execute Beacon Object Files (BOFs) directly in memory... SparroWocky incorporates code derived from the open-source COFF Loader project to load these modules and execute specified functions.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK table; FamousSparrow artifacts include legitimate programs used for DLL side-loading.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence10

SparroWocky supports two persistence mechanisms depending on its configuration: creation of a Windows service or creation of a value under the Windows Registry Run key. ESET observed configurations using a service named ProcAuditManager.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

SparroWocky supports two persistence mechanisms depending on its configuration: creation of a Windows service or creation of a value under the Windows Registry Run key. ESET observed... a Registry persistence value named SnapCart.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

La liste des TTPs identifiés inclut « T1055 — Process Injection ».

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence3

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and the earlier FamousSparrow activity. | Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence10

SparroWocky supports two persistence mechanisms depending on its configuration: creation of a Windows service or creation of a value under the Windows Registry Run key. ESET observed configurations using a service named ProcAuditManager.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

SparroWocky supports two persistence mechanisms depending on its configuration: creation of a Windows service or creation of a value under the Windows Registry Run key. ESET observed... a Registry persistence value named SnapCart.

Stealth

15 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

« le fichier .dat chiffré contenant la configuration et le payload » ; « Payload PE chargé en mémoire sans écriture disque [...] avec valeurs magiques MZ/PE supprimées ».

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence5

“The malware uses ... API hashing ... to evade detection.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Its custom PE loader performs additional host-process camouflage. When loading executable code into memory, SparroWocky can construct fake Windows loader structures and insert them into the Process Environment Block's module tracking structures.

T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky and 2024 FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables. | Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

La liste des TTPs identifiés inclut « T1055 — Process Injection ».

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

Listed in the SparroWocky and 2024 FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables. | Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence4

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow. | Listed in the SparroWocky and 2024 FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables.

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence3

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and the earlier FamousSparrow activity. | Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

« Le fichier .dat commence par le magic 0x11328712, suivi des tailles de configuration et payload, et d’une clé RC4 de 16 octets. »

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

“The malware uses ... anti-analysis techniques to evade detection.”

T1564.010Process Argument SpoofingEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK table; FamousSparrow artifacts include legitimate programs used for DLL side-loading.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence14

The resulting PE payload has its normal MZ and PE signatures removed and is reflectively mapped directly into memory rather than written to disk.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence5

“ESET believes this may help evade defenses that rely on simple pattern matching to identify suspicious code in memory.”

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence10

The malware collects extensive host information, including... network-interface IP addresses.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence9

“[It] collects information including hostnames, usernames, domain names, Windows versions and IP addresses.”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence15

The malware collects extensive host information, including the computer and user names, domain, Windows version, network-interface IP addresses, malware process ID, executable location, and other configuration information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

It can also enumerate logical drives, directories, remote user sessions, and display devices.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

SparroWocky can collect “user” details and enumerate “active user sessions.”

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

“The malware uses ... anti-analysis techniques to evade detection.”

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

Listed in all three ATT&CK matrices. | Listed in all three ATT&CK technique tables.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence16

After transmitting an initial JPEG image, the malware can repeatedly capture the display and transmit only blocks of pixels that changed from the previous screenshot.

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

C2 addresses communicated with the malware “directly over port 443 or 8080, or through HTTP and SOCKS5 proxies.”

T1090ProxyEvidence11

The malware supports direct connections as well as connections through system-configured, HTTP, and SOCKS5 proxies.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky ATT&CK techniques table.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Listed in the SparroWocky and 2024 FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables. | Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

“[The malware connects] directly to their IP addresses, generally on port 443, although ESET also spotted the malware using port 8080 in some cases.”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence9

Exfiltrated information is encrypted using RC4 and transmitted through TLS-protected communications. SparroWocky communicates with C2 infrastructure using TLS and incorporates the Mbed TLS library directly into the malware.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

Listed in the ATT&CK matrices for SparroWocky and FamousSparrow. | Listed in the SparroWocky and FamousSparrow ATT&CK tables.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence5

La liste des TTPs identifiés cite « T1573.002 — Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography », tandis que les caractéristiques décrivent « Chiffrement RC4 + transport TLS ».

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence14

For data collection, SparroWocky supports file retrieval and periodic screenshot capture... Exfiltrated information is encrypted using RC4 and transmitted through TLS-protected communications.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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polyswarmNews · Sep 25, 2026FamousSparrow Takes Flight with New SparroWocky BackdoorA modular C++ backdoor used by FamousSparrow for remote command execution, reconnaissance, file transfer and exfiltration, screenshots, TCP proxying, in-memory PE execution, and extensible in-memory BOF execution. It uses DLL side-loading, reflective loading, stack spoofing, API hooking, and fabricated Windows loader structures to evade detection.Read more ↗hackreadNews · Sep 21, 2026China-Linked FamousSparrow Deploys SparroWocky Backdoor in Latin AmericaA modular C++ cyberespionage backdoor used by FamousSparrow. It collects host and user information, captures screenshots, executes commands, exfiltrates files over TLS with RC4 encryption, provides TCP proxying, and can persist through services or Registry Run keys. It is deployed through DLL sideloading and reflectively loaded after PE magic values are removed to evade detection; it also uses stack spoofing for anti-analysis.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Sep 19, 2026FamousSparrow déploie SparroWocky, nouveau backdoor C++ ciblant l'Amérique latine | CyberVeilleA modular C++ backdoor used by FamousSparrow. It executes arbitrary files and commands, proxies TCP traffic, collects host information, exfiltrates files, captures screenshots, and loads Beacon Object Files in memory. It uses RC4-encrypted configuration/payload data and TLS C2 communications, and persists through a Windows service or Registry Run key. Its evasion includes API hashing, call-stack spoofing, reflective PE loading, and DLL side-loading deployment.Read more ↗register securityNews · Sep 17, 2026China's Salt Typhoon backdoors Latin American orgs with new snooping malwareA modular C++ espionage backdoor used by Salt Typhoon/FamousSparrow. It communicates with C2 infrastructure over TLS, uses anti-analysis and security-evasion mechanisms including API hooking, call-stack spoofing, API hashing, and in-memory COFF plugins, and is deployed through DLL side-loading. It can collect system and remote-session information, steal or delete files, take periodic screenshots, manage sessions and persistence, and spawn additional instances.Read more ↗
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IOC matching61Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping48Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.