MovieReaper
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- LureCracked software
- Platforms
- Windows
MovieReaper is a modular, multistage Windows malware framework that provides persistent remote file access and data-exfiltration capabilities. Identified in August 2026, it is distributed through malicious torrents masquerading as popular films, games, and pirated software. Attackers compromised a public torrent-file repository used by multiple torrent services, causing users requesting downloads through magnet links to receive substituted torrents that deliver a malicious executable. Long filenames and familiar application icons help disguise the executable as legitimate content.
The initial loader performs sandbox and virtual-machine checks, manually resolves Windows APIs, downloads shellcode, and executes subsequent stages primarily in memory. Its evasion techniques include encrypted strings, direct system calls, and alternative thread-creation mechanisms. A subsequent stage retrieves an encoded and encrypted command-and-control server address from the Solana blockchain, allowing operators to update infrastructure without replacing the malware binary. Communications with the secondary server use HTTPS, TLS certificate pinning, and Protocol Buffers messages. The framework loads COFF modules directly into memory; another module bypasses Windows User Account Control and establishes persistence while masquerading as a legitimate telemetry-related application.
The recovered file-management implant exposes 21 commands supporting directory enumeration, file reading and transfer, creation, copying, renaming, movement, deletion, permission changes, symbolic links, and previews or thumbnails. These functions enable operators to inspect and exfiltrate victim data. The campaign affected several hundred individuals and organizations across multiple continents, including government, IT, consulting, retail, transportation, and agriculture. Activity associated with the same operators has been traced to October 2025.
Techniques & procedures
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
“The campaign began by compromising torrent tracker storage to distribute malicious files to users.”
Злоумышленники взломали широко используемый публичный репозиторий торрент-файлов — itorrents[.]org; трекеры, полагающиеся на этот репозиторий, начали непреднамеренно распространять вредоносные торрент-файлы.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Le dépôt public itorrents[.]org retourne un fichier torrent malveillant à la place du contenu légitime lorsqu’un utilisateur télécharge via un lien magnet.
Attackers compromised the public torrent-file archive itorrents[.]org, causing users downloading via magnet links to receive substituted torrents that lead to a malicious loader.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Вредоносное ПО избегает вызовов LoadLibrary и GetProcAddress... выполняет ручной парсинг загруженной DLL для вычисления адреса функции... выполняет напрямую системный вызов NtProtectVirtualMemory ... Затем вызывает недокументированную функцию ntdll EtwpCreateEtwThread.
“Attackers use cracked software and malicious installers to infect large numbers of users.”
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
L’étape 3 est décrite comme « UAC Bypass & Persistance ».
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
L’étape 3 est décrite comme « UAC Bypass & Persistance ».
Étape 3 — UAC Bypass & Persistance : « Utilise des techniques publiques de UAC bypass ».
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
Le shellcode récupère l’adresse du C2 de second niveau, « encodée en base64 et chiffrée par XOR statique ».
The malware avoids making LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress calls ... Instead, it searches for loaded libraries ... and then performs manual parsing of loaded DLL to calculate the address of function.
“Torrent trackers are frequently abused to distribute malware disguised as popular movies, games, and pirated software.”
Filepath: “%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\msedge.exe”
Most of the filenames are rather large, presumably, to hide the '.exe' extension at the end.
L’adresse du C2 de second niveau est encodée en base64 et chiffrée par XOR statique.
Le malware « redémarre le processus avec un argument spécial pour contourner les vérifications anti-sandbox ».
Le shellcode « charge des modules COFF en mémoire ».
Before contacting its operators, the loader performs checks intended to frustrate automated analysis. It avoids common Windows calls, uses a vectored exception handler, and executes the next component in memory.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The final payload can "change access rights" for files.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The final payload is a file manager that allows operators to remotely browse directories and read files.
Le malware « redémarre le processus avec un argument spécial pour contourner les vérifications anti-sandbox ».
Before contacting its operators, the loader performs checks intended to frustrate automated analysis. It avoids common Windows calls, uses a vectored exception handler, and executes the next component in memory.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
L’implant final est un gestionnaire de fichiers exposant des commandes de lecture, listage, prévisualisation, copie et déplacement de fichiers.
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
Le loader télécharge le shellcode depuis deadhub[.]org via HTTP et le shellcode communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS.
Le shellcode interroge la blockchain Solana via api.mainnet.solana.com/getAccountInfo pour récupérer l’adresse du C2 de second niveau.
"To obtain the address of the second-stage command-and-control server, the malware accesses the Solana blockchain"; operators can change the C2 address in the blockchain without modifying the malware.
Le loader « télécharge un shellcode depuis le C2 deadhub[.]org » et l’implant peut charger d’autres modules à la demande.
MovieReaper’s second-stage component uses HTTPS with a pinned certificate.
Адрес второго C2 ... зашифрован статическим XOR-ключом... вторая стадия взаимодействует со своим C2-сервером строго через HTTPS с использованием закрепленного TLS-сертификата.
Le shellcode communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS avec certificate pinning TLS et protobuf (nanopb).
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
L’implant final expose notamment des commandes « téléchargement [et] upload » et communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS.
Observables
17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.