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Malware

MovieReaper

Tracked since Sep 17, 2026 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
LureCracked software
Platforms
Windows

MovieReaper is a modular, multistage Windows malware framework that provides persistent remote file access and data-exfiltration capabilities. Identified in August 2026, it is distributed through malicious torrents masquerading as popular films, games, and pirated software. Attackers compromised a public torrent-file repository used by multiple torrent services, causing users requesting downloads through magnet links to receive substituted torrents that deliver a malicious executable. Long filenames and familiar application icons help disguise the executable as legitimate content.

The initial loader performs sandbox and virtual-machine checks, manually resolves Windows APIs, downloads shellcode, and executes subsequent stages primarily in memory. Its evasion techniques include encrypted strings, direct system calls, and alternative thread-creation mechanisms. A subsequent stage retrieves an encoded and encrypted command-and-control server address from the Solana blockchain, allowing operators to update infrastructure without replacing the malware binary. Communications with the secondary server use HTTPS, TLS certificate pinning, and Protocol Buffers messages. The framework loads COFF modules directly into memory; another module bypasses Windows User Account Control and establishes persistence while masquerading as a legitimate telemetry-related application.

The recovered file-management implant exposes 21 commands supporting directory enumeration, file reading and transfer, creation, copying, renaming, movement, deletion, permission changes, symbolic links, and previews or thumbnails. These functions enable operators to inspect and exfiltrate victim data. The campaign affected several hundred individuals and organizations across multiple continents, including government, IT, consulting, retail, transportation, and agriculture. Activity associated with the same operators has been traced to October 2025.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

“The campaign began by compromising torrent tracker storage to distribute malicious files to users.”

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

Злоумышленники взломали широко используемый публичный репозиторий торрент-файлов — itorrents[.]org; трекеры, полагающиеся на этот репозиторий, начали непреднамеренно распространять вредоносные торрент-файлы.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Le dépôt public itorrents[.]org retourne un fichier torrent malveillant à la place du contenu légitime lorsqu’un utilisateur télécharge via un lien magnet.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence4

Attackers compromised the public torrent-file archive itorrents[.]org, causing users downloading via magnet links to receive substituted torrents that lead to a malicious loader.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence3

Вредоносное ПО избегает вызовов LoadLibrary и GetProcAddress... выполняет ручной парсинг загруженной DLL для вычисления адреса функции... выполняет напрямую системный вызов NtProtectVirtualMemory ... Затем вызывает недокументированную функцию ntdll EtwpCreateEtwThread.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence7

“Attackers use cracked software and malicious installers to infect large numbers of users.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

L’étape 3 est décrite comme « UAC Bypass & Persistance ».

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

L’étape 3 est décrite comme « UAC Bypass & Persistance ».

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence6

Étape 3 — UAC Bypass & Persistance : « Utilise des techniques publiques de UAC bypass ».

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Le shellcode récupère l’adresse du C2 de second niveau, « encodée en base64 et chiffrée par XOR statique ».

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The malware avoids making LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress calls ... Instead, it searches for loaded libraries ... and then performs manual parsing of loaded DLL to calculate the address of function.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence7

“Torrent trackers are frequently abused to distribute malware disguised as popular movies, games, and pirated software.”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence5

Filepath: “%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\msedge.exe”

T1036.007Double File ExtensionEvidence1

Most of the filenames are rather large, presumably, to hide the '.exe' extension at the end.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

L’adresse du C2 de second niveau est encodée en base64 et chiffrée par XOR statique.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

Le malware « redémarre le processus avec un argument spécial pour contourner les vérifications anti-sandbox ».

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence6

Le shellcode « charge des modules COFF en mémoire ».

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Before contacting its operators, the loader performs checks intended to frustrate automated analysis. It avoids common Windows calls, uses a vectored exception handler, and executes the next component in memory.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222.001Windows PermissionsEvidence1

The final payload can "change access rights" for files.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

The final payload is a file manager that allows operators to remotely browse directories and read files.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

Le malware « redémarre le processus avec un argument spécial pour contourner les vérifications anti-sandbox ».

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Before contacting its operators, the loader performs checks intended to frustrate automated analysis. It avoids common Windows calls, uses a vectored exception handler, and executes the next component in memory.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

L’implant final est un gestionnaire de fichiers exposant des commandes de lecture, listage, prévisualisation, copie et déplacement de fichiers.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

Le loader télécharge le shellcode depuis deadhub[.]org via HTTP et le shellcode communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

Le shellcode interroge la blockchain Solana via api.mainnet.solana.com/getAccountInfo pour récupérer l’adresse du C2 de second niveau.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence4

"To obtain the address of the second-stage command-and-control server, the malware accesses the Solana blockchain"; operators can change the C2 address in the blockchain without modifying the malware.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

Le loader « télécharge un shellcode depuis le C2 deadhub[.]org » et l’implant peut charger d’autres modules à la demande.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

MovieReaper’s second-stage component uses HTTPS with a pinned certificate.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Адрес второго C2 ... зашифрован статическим XOR-ключом... вторая стадия взаимодействует со своим C2-сервером строго через HTTPS с использованием закрепленного TLS-сертификата.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Le shellcode communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS avec certificate pinning TLS et protobuf (nanopb).

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

L’implant final expose notamment des commandes « téléchargement [et] upload » et communique avec le C2 secondaire via HTTPS.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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kaspersky blogNews · Oct 26, 2026Cybersecurity in Christopher Nolan’s The Odyssey | Kaspersky official blogDistributed through compromised torrent trackers as purported movie downloads, particularly The Odyssey. MovieReaper evades detection, provides attackers with remote access to victims’ devices, and deploys additional modules that can maintain persistence even after the original malware is removed. The reported multistage campaign began in mid-August and has affected victims worldwide.Read more ↗kaspersky ruNews · Oct 26, 2026Одиссея, информационная безопасность и торренты | Блог КасперскогоDescribed as previously unknown malware distributed through compromised torrent trackers, disguised as popular films, particularly The Odyssey. It reportedly evades detection, provides remote access to victims’ devices, and deploys additional modules that enable persistence even after removal. The multistage campaign reportedly began in mid-August, with victims worldwide; no discovery date or year is specified.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Sep 21, 2026The Odyssey and trojans again: MovieReaper attacks users in multiple countries via compromised torrents | Community Portal | GuruculA modular, multi-stage malware framework distributed through compromised torrent-tracker storage and files disguised as popular movies, games, cracked software, and malicious installers.Read more ↗xakepNews · Sep 18, 2026Троян MovieReaper маскируется под "Одиссею" на торрент-трекерах - ХакерModular malware distributed through tampered torrent files masquerading as popular films. Its loader performs sandbox checks and memory-resident execution, retrieves second-stage C2 information from the Solana blockchain, bypasses Windows UAC, establishes persistence, and deploys a remotely controlled file-manager payload supporting 21 commands for file and directory operations, permission changes, and image-preview extraction.Read more ↗
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IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.