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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malicious npm package impersonating sorted-btree. Its runtime-triggered loader fingerprints hosts, exfiltrates reconnaissance to Slack and Telegram, retrieves and decrypts a second-stage payload through a Sepolia Ethereum smart-contract C2 channel, and can erase its files and restore altered package code.
Paquet npm malveillant agissant comme loader dans une campagne de compromission de chaîne d’approvisionnement. Il injecte une logique dans la méthode BTree.prototype.set afin d’exécuter son premier étage sans script d’installation, collecte des informations système, puis récupère et déchiffre une charge utile de second étage via un canal C2 fondé sur un smart contract Ethereum Sepolia. Il exfiltre également des données vers Slack et Telegram et tente de supprimer ses traces.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.