Sauron Loader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionPost exploitation
- Delivery
- ClickfixVishing
- Platforms
- Windows
Sauron Loader is a C++ malware loader for Windows, designed to retrieve and execute additional attacker-controlled payloads. It has been observed in multiple attacks against organizations in Germany and advertised as a malware-as-a-service offering by an underground seller using the alias S4ur0n, exclusively for Russian-speaking customers. Observed delivery chains used ClickFix social engineering or email bombing followed by voice phishing, with attackers impersonating IT support personnel. In at least one incident, a victim was persuaded to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist session. The operators behind these intrusions have not been conclusively identified or linked to the seller.
An analyzed MSI delivery package deployed a legitimate executable and malicious libraries, using DLL side-loading to launch the loader. A supporting component decrypted its primary code in memory and established persistence through a recurring scheduled task. Encrypted code and configuration, deliberate execution delays, and in-memory loading complicate detection and analysis. The malware includes keyboard-layout-based CIS targeting checks and a separate public-sector targeting check; these mechanisms do not establish actor attribution, and the CIS check was disabled in the analyzed configuration.
Sauron Loader collects host information, including operating-system details, user and computer identity, domain membership, privilege level, and installed products. It supports command execution and numerous payload formats, including executables, DLLs, drivers, shellcode, installers, archives, and scripts. Execution mechanisms include manual PE loading, driver-service installation, and shellcode execution or process injection. It can capture the primary monitor or entire virtual desktop and exfiltrate screenshots in chunks. Command-and-control communications use HTTPS POST requests with randomized paths, Salsa20 encryption, and RSA signatures. The loader periodically polls for tasks and switches between configured controllers following communication failures.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Cet article présente une analyse technique approfondie d’une nouvelle famille de malware baptisée Sauron Loader, découverte lors de plusieurs engagements clients en Allemagne. Le malware est vendu sous forme de Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) dans des forums souterrains russes.
Techniques & procedures
38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Attackers first flooded inboxes with spam, then called while posing as IT support.
The attackers used both, ClickFix-style attacks as well as the recently popular voice phishing (vishing) technique.
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.
PowerShell | Stages .ps1 and executes with ExecutionPolicy Bypass.
CMD | Stages .cmd and executes via cmd.exe /c.
VBS | Stages .vbs and executes via wscript.exe.
JavaScript | Stages .js and executes via wscript.exe.
EXE | Stages and launches .exe via CreateProcessW.
Some victims faced ClickFix style fake prompts that tried to make them run harmful instructions.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.
Driver | Stages .sys; installs/opens and starts driver service.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.
Shellcode | Fetches to memory; executes or injects into attrib.exe.
Driver | Stages .sys; installs/opens and starts driver service.
Stealth
12 techniques
Stealth
The first malicious library carried the loader’s main code in encrypted form.
Defense Evasion | T1027.007 | Dynamic API Resolution
This component contains the primary loader functionality for this malware in an encrypted form.
rnp.dll ... Malicious: Loader — DLL side-loaded by rnpkeys.exe.
Shellcode | Fetches to memory; executes or injects into attrib.exe.
rnp.dll loads tdwp.dll, which is responsible for decrypting encrypted sections of rnp.dll directly in memory.
In one instance Sauron Loader was distributed in an MSI installer which we have analyzed in-depth.
DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.
DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.
This includes checking whether the victim is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) using the victim’s keyboard layout and a second targeting check for public sector organizations.
The malware also paused during decryption, a delay researchers believe may frustrate automated analysis.
DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The registration message includes the malware’s bot ID, joined domain, computer name, username, Windows version, privilege level...
The bot ID is the lowercase MD5 hexadecimal digest of: <COMPUTERNAME>_<USERNAME>_<volume_serial>.
Discovery | T1057 | Process Discovery
The registration message includes the malware’s bot ID, joined domain, computer name, username, Windows version, privilege level, malware versions, installed products, group ID, and build ID.
The malware also paused during decryption, a delay researchers believe may frustrate automated analysis.
Discovery | T1518.001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Checking whether the victim is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) using the victim’s keyboard layout.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The corresponding handler captures the victim’s desktop as a PNG image.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
The malware uses HTTP POST requests for C2 communication and has a specific UserAgent depending on the windows version.
For direct downloads, the malware retrieves the file from the supplied URL and streams the response directly to either a file or an in-memory buffer, depending on the task handler.
In one of the DCSO-observed incidents, the threat actor instructed the victim to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist remote assistance session.
Its traffic uses encrypted HTTPS requests with changing web paths, making the actual commands harder to see from network traffic alone.
Every client request is Salsa20 encrypted and signed with RSA.
The malware verifies the server ciphertext with the public key before decrypting it.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
It can also capture screenshots and return them in smaller pieces.
Each chunk is transmitted using a separate TaskResult message.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
In the vishing attacks users were flooded with spam emails and then contacted by attackers posing as IT support.
Observables
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.