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Malware1 associated actor

Sauron Loader

Tracked since Sep 24, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionPost exploitation
Delivery
ClickfixVishing
Platforms
Windows

Sauron Loader is a C++ malware loader for Windows, designed to retrieve and execute additional attacker-controlled payloads. It has been observed in multiple attacks against organizations in Germany and advertised as a malware-as-a-service offering by an underground seller using the alias S4ur0n, exclusively for Russian-speaking customers. Observed delivery chains used ClickFix social engineering or email bombing followed by voice phishing, with attackers impersonating IT support personnel. In at least one incident, a victim was persuaded to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist session. The operators behind these intrusions have not been conclusively identified or linked to the seller.

An analyzed MSI delivery package deployed a legitimate executable and malicious libraries, using DLL side-loading to launch the loader. A supporting component decrypted its primary code in memory and established persistence through a recurring scheduled task. Encrypted code and configuration, deliberate execution delays, and in-memory loading complicate detection and analysis. The malware includes keyboard-layout-based CIS targeting checks and a separate public-sector targeting check; these mechanisms do not establish actor attribution, and the CIS check was disabled in the analyzed configuration.

Sauron Loader collects host information, including operating-system details, user and computer identity, domain membership, privilege level, and installed products. It supports command execution and numerous payload formats, including executables, DLLs, drivers, shellcode, installers, archives, and scripts. Execution mechanisms include manual PE loading, driver-service installation, and shellcode execution or process injection. It can capture the primary monitor or entire virtual desktop and exfiltrate screenshots in chunks. Command-and-control communications use HTTPS POST requests with randomized paths, Salsa20 encryption, and RSA signatures. The loader periodically polls for tasks and switches between configured controllers following communication failures.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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S4ur0n

Cet article présente une analyse technique approfondie d’une nouvelle famille de malware baptisée Sauron Loader, découverte lors de plusieurs engagements clients en Allemagne. Le malware est vendu sous forme de Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) dans des forums souterrains russes.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Attackers first flooded inboxes with spam, then called while posing as IT support.

T1566.004Spearphishing VoiceEvidence4

The attackers used both, ClickFix-style attacks as well as the recently popular voice phishing (vishing) technique.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

PowerShell | Stages .ps1 and executes with ExecutionPolicy Bypass.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

CMD | Stages .cmd and executes via cmd.exe /c.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

VBS | Stages .vbs and executes via wscript.exe.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence3

JavaScript | Stages .js and executes via wscript.exe.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

EXE | Stages and launches .exe via CreateProcessW.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Some victims faced ClickFix style fake prompts that tried to make them run harmful instructions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Driver | Stages .sys; installs/opens and starts driver service.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task named keyroll, which executes the loader at regular intervals.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

Shellcode | Fetches to memory; executes or injects into attrib.exe.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Driver | Stages .sys; installs/opens and starts driver service.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The first malicious library carried the loader’s main code in encrypted form.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence3

Defense Evasion | T1027.007 | Dynamic API Resolution

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

This component contains the primary loader functionality for this malware in an encrypted form.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

rnp.dll ... Malicious: Loader — DLL side-loaded by rnpkeys.exe.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

Shellcode | Fetches to memory; executes or injects into attrib.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

rnp.dll loads tdwp.dll, which is responsible for decrypting encrypted sections of rnp.dll directly in memory.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence3

In one instance Sauron Loader was distributed in an MSI installer which we have analyzed in-depth.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence3

DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence3

DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence3

This includes checking whether the victim is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) using the victim’s keyboard layout and a second targeting check for public sector organizations.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

The malware also paused during decryption, a delay researchers believe may frustrate automated analysis.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

DLL | Stages .dll; uses rundll32/regsvr32 or manual PE loader.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The registration message includes the malware’s bot ID, joined domain, computer name, username, Windows version, privilege level...

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence4

The bot ID is the lowercase MD5 hexadecimal digest of: <COMPUTERNAME>_<USERNAME>_<volume_serial>.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

Discovery | T1057 | Process Discovery

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

The registration message includes the malware’s bot ID, joined domain, computer name, username, Windows version, privilege level, malware versions, installed products, group ID, and build ID.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

The malware also paused during decryption, a delay researchers believe may frustrate automated analysis.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence3

Discovery | T1518.001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence3

Checking whether the victim is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) using the victim’s keyboard layout.

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

The corresponding handler captures the victim’s desktop as a PNG image.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The malware uses HTTP POST requests for C2 communication and has a specific UserAgent depending on the windows version.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

For direct downloads, the malware retrieves the file from the supplied URL and streams the response directly to either a file or an in-memory buffer, depending on the task handler.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence4

In one of the DCSO-observed incidents, the threat actor instructed the victim to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist remote assistance session.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Its traffic uses encrypted HTTPS requests with changing web paths, making the actual commands harder to see from network traffic alone.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

Every client request is Salsa20 encrypted and signed with RSA.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence3

The malware verifies the server ciphertext with the public key before decrypting it.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence1

It can also capture screenshots and return them in smaller pieces.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Each chunk is transmitted using a separate TaskResult message.

Impact

1 technique
T1667Email BombingEvidence2

In the vishing attacks users were flooded with spam emails and then contacted by attackers posing as IT support.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Sep 30, 2026Fortinet Uncovers SectopRAT Variant Hidden Inside Tampered Legitimate Windows SoftwareMentioned solely as a comparison for in-memory malware-loading techniques; the reference does not describe its role in this intrusion.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 25, 2026Sauron Loader Malware Uses DLL Side-Loading and In-Memory Decryption to Evade Detection | Cryptika CybersecurityA Windows malware loader delivered through ClickFix-style social engineering and email-bombing/fake IT-support schemes. It uses DLL side-loading, in-memory decryption, execution delays, and a scheduled task for persistence. It fingerprints the host, communicates with C2 over encrypted HTTPS using changing paths, downloads and executes additional payloads, and captures screenshots.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 25, 2026Sauron Loader Malware Uses DLL Side-Loading and In-Memory Decryption to Evade DetectionA malware loader delivered through ClickFix-style social engineering, spam/email bombing, and fake IT-support calls. It uses DLL side-loading and in-memory decryption, establishes persistence via a scheduled task, profiles infected Windows systems, communicates with C2 over encrypted HTTPS, downloads and executes additional payloads, and captures screenshots.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Sep 24, 2026Sauron Loader : analyse technique d'un nouveau loader vendu dans les forums russes | CyberVeilleA C++ MSI-based loader sold as a MaaS offering to Russian-speaking cybercriminals. It uses DLL side-loading through a legitimate Mozilla RNPGP binary, maintains persistence with a scheduled task, evades analysis through execution delays and CIS keyboard-layout checks, and uses encrypted HTTPS C2. It can execute EXE, DLL, driver, shellcode, MSI, archive, and scripting payloads; capture screenshots; collect system information; and exfiltrate data over C2.Read more ↗
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IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping38Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.