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Malware1 associated actor

NeedyMantis

Tracked since Sep 28, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Cloaking
Platforms
Windows

NeedyMantis is a modular Windows backdoor used in targeted post-compromise operations since at least October 2025. It maintains long-term access to previously breached environments and supports system reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and deployment of additional components. Observed targets include telecommunications organizations, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental organizations, and government contractors. Microsoft identified Storm-3069 as an operator and assessed associated activity as China-based, without attributing it to a Chinese state-sponsored group or establishing that all deployments share one operator.

Operators deploy NeedyMantis after obtaining access, using DLL sideloading through legitimate applications including Poedit, curl, Vim, and TightVNC. Its staged architecture combines C++ components, x64 shellcode, encrypted and compressed custom archives, and a minimized PE-like executable format. Malicious components masquerade as legitimate software libraries. String obfuscation, dynamic API resolution, and anti-debugging techniques impede analysis. An older variant included a Windows-services-based persistence module.

The main component manages command-and-control communications and additional modules. It initially connects over HTTPS, reports host and user information, and transitions to a binary WebSocket protocol using encoding, compression, and encryption. Operators can load and unload modules and dispatch data to them; the specific functions of additional modules have not been confirmed. NeedyMantis was identified during investigation of activity associated with the DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise, but Microsoft did not observe the malware being distributed through the compromised installers.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Storm-3069

The malware, dubbed "NeedyMantis," is a modular framework that has been used in a limited number of targeted intrusions against telecommunications companies, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental organizations, and government contractors.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence2

NeedyMantis was discovered during investigations into the DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The second-stage x64 shellcode is disguised as a .ps1 file, and the TTP list identifies PowerShell.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

C2 commands support loading and unloading modules, and the publication identifies Shared Modules as an execution technique.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

“A NeedyMantis sample collected in October of 2025 contained a persistence module based on Windows services.”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The publication's TTP list identifies Process Injection as a defense-evasion technique.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

“A NeedyMantis sample collected in October of 2025 contained a persistence module based on Windows services.”

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

The malware uses string obfuscation and a custom encrypted/compressed archive format using XOR and RtlDecompressBuffer.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The second-stage x64 shellcode resolves APIs dynamically using ROR hashing.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

“A second-stage component is extracted from the encrypted archive by the first-stage loader.” The embedded malware is “decoded and decompressed” before loading.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

“Malicious DLLs were disguised as Microsoft Office, Broadcom, Intel, and NVIDIA components.” The archive also mixed malicious components with legitimate-looking Windows library names such as dnsapi.dll and ws2_32.dll.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The loader is disguised as WinSparkle.dll, shellcode is disguised as a .ps1 file, and DLLs impersonate names such as dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, and msvcrt140.dll.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The publication's TTP list identifies Process Injection as a defense-evasion technique.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

A custom archive is encrypted/compressed with XOR and RtlDecompressBuffer, and the binary protocol uses XOR and RC4.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"The malware also contains anti-analysis techniques to hinder detection and analysis by security software and cyber defenders."

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence4

The initial beacon transmits computer/user names; the TTP list identifies System Owner/User Discovery.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The publication's TTP list identifies Process Discovery.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

The initial beacon sends system information in an encoded Set-Cookie header.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

The publication's TTP list identifies File and Directory Discovery.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"The malware also contains anti-analysis techniques to hinder detection and analysis by security software and cyber defenders."

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Some of the open-source software abused by the malware include: Poedit... curl... Vim... and TightVNC... [and] the archive contains several legitimate software components.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

In one intrusion, an operator already inside the network used the Impacket toolkit to copy the package from a network share and launch it on the target machine.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

“One incident involved the use of Impacket toolkit to copy a legitimate software package from a network share into the malicious file, which was then executed on the targeted computer.”

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The publication's TTP list identifies Archive Collected Data.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

The C2 uses HTTPS followed by WebSockets to corp.tripswithengine[.]com:443.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The publication's TTP list identifies T1095 in connection with NeedyMantis command-and-control activity.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

The C2 supports module loading, and the publication identifies Ingress Tool Transfer; deployment during hands-on-keyboard activity used Impacket.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

The initial beacon sends system information in a Base64/JSON-encoded Set-Cookie header.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The legitimate programs used this way include the Poedit translation tool, curl, the Vim text editor, and the TightVNC remote access tool.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

The binary C2 protocol uses XOR and RC4 encryption after an initial key exchange.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cysecurity newsNews · Sep 29, 2026NeedyMantis Malware Expands the Post-Compromise Threat Landscape - CySecurity News - Latest Information Security and Hacking IncidentsA staged, modular post-compromise malware family used to maintain access and enable further activity in compromised networks. It is delivered through DLL sideloading, using malicious DLLs packaged with legitimate applications and encrypted archives. Its loader extracts a shellcode-based second stage and a reduced/custom PE-like executable. Modules support C2 communications, including HTTPS followed by a binary WebSocket protocol, and can be added or removed by operators. At least one October 2025 sample included Windows-service-based persistence.Read more ↗infosecurity magazine newsNews · Sep 29, 2026Microsoft Warns NeedyMantis Malware Enables Persistent Network Access - Infosecurity MagazineA modular C++ and x64-shellcode malware framework used after initial compromise to establish stealthy, persistent access, support follow-on operations, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, exfiltrate data, and deploy further components. It uses staged loaders, DLL side-loading alongside legitimate/open-source software, and anti-analysis measures.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Sep 29, 2026NeedyMantis: Unpacking a post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations | Community Portal | GuruculA modular, multi-stage post-compromise malware family used to establish long-term persistence and enable follow-on operations. It uses loaders, encrypted archives, a custom file format, modular components, and command-and-control capabilities to evade analysis and maintain access.Read more ↗security weekNews · Sep 29, 2026Daemon Tools Hackers' NeedyMantis Malware Dissected by Microsoft - SecurityWeekA modular post-compromise backdoor framework used in targeted intrusions since at least October 2025. It uses DLL sideloading, multi-stage loaders, encrypted archives, a custom executable-file format, and WebSockets-based C2. Its core component collects system and user information and can load, unload, and communicate with additional modules, enabling extensible capabilities while evading detection.Read more ↗
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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.