MalwareUsed by 1 actor

NeedyMantis

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Storm-3069

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified NeedyMantis, a modular post-compromise malware family observed in a limited number of targeted operations. The malware is typically deployed after a threat actor has established access, and is used to maintain long-term access and support follow-on operations.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Persistence

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The first-stage loader extracts a second-stage payload from a custom archive whose offsets, XOR keys, compression, and filenames change between samples. The loader concealed API names and constants using obfuscated stack strings.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Operators have abused Poedit, curl, Vim, and TightVNC packages while disguising files as Microsoft Office, Broadcom, Intel, or NVIDIA libraries.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Discovery

6 techniques

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

An initial HTTPS request places compressed, Base64-encoded system details inside a Set-Cookie header, including the computer name, username, running process, parent process, installed files, and process list.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Some of the open-source software abused by the malware include: Poedit... curl... Vim... and TightVNC... [and] the archive contains several legitimate software components.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

In one incident, an operator used the Impacket toolkit to copy legitimate software, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted archive from a network share before executing the package on a selected device.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

In one observed incident, an operator used the Impacket toolkit during hands-on-keyboard activity to copy the legitimate software, malicious DLL, and file archive from a network share and execute it on a targeted device.

Command and Control

4 techniques

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Its configuration pointed to corp.tripswithengine[.]com over port 443 and the URI /library/zip/. Communication then upgrades to WebSockets.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Once active, the main component manages command-and-control traffic and downloadable modules. NeedyMantis can receive commands to load or unload modules.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

cyber security newsNews

Sep 28, 2026

Microsoft Finds New Malware Used to Maintain Secret Access Inside Target Networks

A modular post-compromise implant intended for covert, persistent espionage-oriented access. Its core component manages HTTPS/WebSocket command-and-control and can load or unload downloadable modules. It collects host and process details, uses encoded/compressed communications with optional RC4 encryption, and is deployed through DLL sideloading after initial access.

malware newsNews

Sep 28, 2026

NeedyMantis: Unpacking a post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators

A post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations. The supplied content provides no further technical capabilities, targeting, attribution, or delivery details.

microsoft generalNews

Sep 28, 2026

NeedyMantis: Unpacking a post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations | Microsoft Security Blog

NeedyMantis is a selectively deployed modular post-compromise framework used for persistent access and follow-on intrusion activity. It uses DLL sideloading with legitimate software, custom encrypted/compressed archives, staged loaders, shellcode, anti-debugging and string obfuscation. Its main component communicates with C2 over HTTPS upgraded to WebSockets, collects basic host information, and can load, unload, and dispatch data to additional modules whose capabilities are not yet confirmed.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

NeedyMantis

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Storm-3069

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Persistence

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Operators have abused Poedit, curl, Vim, and TightVNC packages while disguising files as Microsoft Office, Broadcom, Intel, or NVIDIA libraries.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Discovery

6 techniques

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Some of the open-source software abused by the malware include: Poedit... curl... Vim... and TightVNC... [and] the archive contains several legitimate software components.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

In one incident, an operator used the Impacket toolkit to copy legitimate software, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted archive from a network share before executing the package on a selected device.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Command and Control

4 techniques

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Its configuration pointed to corp.tripswithengine[.]com over port 443 and the URI /library/zip/. Communication then upgrades to WebSockets.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Once active, the main component manages command-and-control traffic and downloadable modules. NeedyMantis can receive commands to load or unload modules.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

cyber security newsNews

Sep 28, 2026

Microsoft Finds New Malware Used to Maintain Secret Access Inside Target Networks

malware newsNews

Sep 28, 2026

NeedyMantis: Unpacking a post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators

A post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations. The supplied content provides no further technical capabilities, targeting, attribution, or delivery details.

microsoft generalNews

Sep 28, 2026

NeedyMantis: Unpacking a post-compromise malware family used in targeted operations | Microsoft Security Blog

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.