NeedyMantis
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- Cloaking
- Platforms
- Windows
NeedyMantis is a modular Windows backdoor used in targeted post-compromise operations since at least October 2025. It maintains long-term access to previously breached environments and supports system reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and deployment of additional components. Observed targets include telecommunications organizations, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental organizations, and government contractors. Microsoft identified Storm-3069 as an operator and assessed associated activity as China-based, without attributing it to a Chinese state-sponsored group or establishing that all deployments share one operator.
Operators deploy NeedyMantis after obtaining access, using DLL sideloading through legitimate applications including Poedit, curl, Vim, and TightVNC. Its staged architecture combines C++ components, x64 shellcode, encrypted and compressed custom archives, and a minimized PE-like executable format. Malicious components masquerade as legitimate software libraries. String obfuscation, dynamic API resolution, and anti-debugging techniques impede analysis. An older variant included a Windows-services-based persistence module.
The main component manages command-and-control communications and additional modules. It initially connects over HTTPS, reports host and user information, and transitions to a binary WebSocket protocol using encoding, compression, and encryption. Operators can load and unload modules and dispatch data to them; the specific functions of additional modules have not been confirmed. NeedyMantis was identified during investigation of activity associated with the DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise, but Microsoft did not observe the malware being distributed through the compromised installers.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The malware, dubbed "NeedyMantis," is a modular framework that has been used in a limited number of targeted intrusions against telecommunications companies, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental organizations, and government contractors.
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
NeedyMantis was discovered during investigations into the DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."
The second-stage x64 shellcode is disguised as a .ps1 file, and the TTP list identifies PowerShell.
C2 commands support loading and unloading modules, and the publication identifies Shared Modules as an execution technique.
An older version of the malware... contained only four files: ... is – Persistence module using Windows Services.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."
“A NeedyMantis sample collected in October of 2025 contained a persistence module based on Windows services.”
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
"NeedyMantis is a modular post-compromise malware family... typically deployed after initial access to maintain long-term persistence and support follow-on operations."
The publication's TTP list identifies Process Injection as a defense-evasion technique.
“A NeedyMantis sample collected in October of 2025 contained a persistence module based on Windows services.”
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
The malware uses string obfuscation and a custom encrypted/compressed archive format using XOR and RtlDecompressBuffer.
The second-stage x64 shellcode resolves APIs dynamically using ROR hashing.
“A second-stage component is extracted from the encrypted archive by the first-stage loader.” The embedded malware is “decoded and decompressed” before loading.
“Malicious DLLs were disguised as Microsoft Office, Broadcom, Intel, and NVIDIA components.” The archive also mixed malicious components with legitimate-looking Windows library names such as dnsapi.dll and ws2_32.dll.
The loader is disguised as WinSparkle.dll, shellcode is disguised as a .ps1 file, and DLLs impersonate names such as dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, and msvcrt140.dll.
The publication's TTP list identifies Process Injection as a defense-evasion technique.
A custom archive is encrypted/compressed with XOR and RtlDecompressBuffer, and the binary protocol uses XOR and RC4.
"The malware also contains anti-analysis techniques to hinder detection and analysis by security software and cyber defenders."
[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The initial beacon transmits computer/user names; the TTP list identifies System Owner/User Discovery.
The publication's TTP list identifies Process Discovery.
The initial beacon sends system information in an encoded Set-Cookie header.
The publication's TTP list identifies File and Directory Discovery.
"The malware also contains anti-analysis techniques to hinder detection and analysis by security software and cyber defenders."
Some of the open-source software abused by the malware include: Poedit... curl... Vim... and TightVNC... [and] the archive contains several legitimate software components.
[The loader] checked ProcessDebugFlags and ThreadHideFromDebugger to frustrate analysts.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
In one intrusion, an operator already inside the network used the Impacket toolkit to copy the package from a network share and launch it on the target machine.
“One incident involved the use of Impacket toolkit to copy a legitimate software package from a network share into the malicious file, which was then executed on the targeted computer.”
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The publication's TTP list identifies Archive Collected Data.
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
Communication then upgrades to WebSockets and uses a custom binary protocol with XOR encoding, compression, and optional RC4 encryption.
The C2 uses HTTPS followed by WebSockets to corp.tripswithengine[.]com:443.
The publication's TTP list identifies T1095 in connection with NeedyMantis command-and-control activity.
The C2 supports module loading, and the publication identifies Ingress Tool Transfer; deployment during hands-on-keyboard activity used Impacket.
The initial beacon sends system information in a Base64/JSON-encoded Set-Cookie header.
The legitimate programs used this way include the Poedit translation tool, curl, the Vim text editor, and the TightVNC remote access tool.
The binary C2 protocol uses XOR and RC4 encryption after an initial key exchange.
Observables
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.