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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit. Frameless BitB avoids iframes and supports Evilginx-based proxying of Microsoft login pages.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.
The link redirected recipients through several websites before leading to a false Microsoft OneDrive sign-in page... intended to capture account credentials.
A custom module... automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.
This allowed supported password and MFA steps to complete while the attacker captured the resulting session cookies. The goal was a usable cloud session, not simply a stolen password.
Proofpoint described the operation as an adversary-in-the-middle phishing attack... the attacker captures the session information created by the login.
Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.
The link redirected recipients through several websites before leading to a false Microsoft OneDrive sign-in page... intended to capture account credentials.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A browser-in-the-browser/AitM phishing toolkit used to present a convincing fake browser login window while proxying legitimate Microsoft authentication and capturing authenticated cloud-session cookies.
A browser-in-the-browser phishing toolkit used to present a convincing embedded browser/login window and proxy genuine Microsoft authentication, enabling capture of authenticated cloud session cookies rather than only credentials.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.