Frameless BitB
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit. Frameless BitB avoids iframes and supports Evilginx-based proxying of Microsoft login pages.
Techniques & procedures
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Proofpoint linked the activity to credential-phishing campaigns aimed at researchers... with lures designed to steal access to their cloud accounts.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.
If the target replied, TA419 followed up with a shortened URL that purported to share additional information. The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page.
TA419 impersonated prominent figures and a senior Anthropic employee in apparently harmless collaboration emails, then directed recipients through a multi-stage URL redirection chain to a credential-phishing attack.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Clicking a document, or OneDrive’s own prompt to sign in, opens a fake Chrome login window drawn inside the page.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
The campaign spoofed Lynne Edwards Parker, Heidi Crebo-Rediker, and a senior Anthropic employee; the landing page performed a Cloudflare Turnstile check behind a phony OneDrive loading screen.
The group occasionally registers domains that impersonate specific organizations like heritiages[.]org and heritiage[.]org for the Heritage Foundation.
The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.
Credential Access
7 techniques
Credential Access
Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.
A counterfeit Microsoft login pop-up placed over a OneDrive-lookalike page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.
A custom script built into the kit reports the victim’s progress to the attackers, gives them a live view of the session, accepts the “Keep me signed in” prompt and submits one-time codes as soon as they validate.
The phishing page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing the harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.
Credentials entered in that window are relayed to Microsoft’s servers, so the password, the MFA code and conditional access checks would all go through.
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.
A custom module, /secondary/observe.js, tracked each target’s progress through authentication. It also automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
This allowed supported password and MFA steps to complete while the attacker captured the resulting session cookies.
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.
A counterfeit Microsoft login pop-up placed over a OneDrive-lookalike page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.
Frameless BitB ... contains a Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) overlay [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.
Credentials entered in that window are relayed to Microsoft’s servers, so the password, the MFA code and conditional access checks would all go through.
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.