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Malware1 associated actor

Frameless BitB

Tracked since Oct 1, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA419

The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit. Frameless BitB avoids iframes and supports Evilginx-based proxying of Microsoft login pages.

via cryptika blogcryptika.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

Proofpoint linked the activity to credential-phishing campaigns aimed at researchers... with lures designed to steal access to their cloud accounts.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence4

If the target replied, TA419 followed up with a shortened URL that purported to share additional information. The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

TA419 impersonated prominent figures and a senior Anthropic employee in apparently harmless collaboration emails, then directed recipients through a multi-stage URL redirection chain to a credential-phishing attack.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Clicking a document, or OneDrive’s own prompt to sign in, opens a fake Chrome login window drawn inside the page.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The campaign spoofed Lynne Edwards Parker, Heidi Crebo-Rediker, and a senior Anthropic employee; the landing page performed a Cloudflare Turnstile check behind a phony OneDrive loading screen.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

The group occasionally registers domains that impersonate specific organizations like heritiages[.]org and heritiage[.]org for the Heritage Foundation.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The link ultimately led to a fake OneDrive AitM credential phishing page designed to gain access to the target’s cloud account.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence4

A counterfeit Microsoft login pop-up placed over a OneDrive-lookalike page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence3

A custom script built into the kit reports the victim’s progress to the attackers, gives them a live view of the session, accepts the “Keep me signed in” prompt and submits one-time codes as soon as they validate.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence7

The phishing page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing the harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence7

Credentials entered in that window are relayed to Microsoft’s servers, so the password, the MFA code and conditional access checks would all go through.

T1557.003DHCP SpoofingEvidence1

The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationEvidence1

A custom module, /secondary/observe.js, tracked each target’s progress through authentication. It also automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550.004Web Session CookieEvidence1

This allowed supported password and MFA steps to complete while the attacker captured the resulting session cookies.

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Because it forwards the victim's Microsoft 365 login to Microsoft in real time, the password, multifactor authentication (MFA) code and conditional access checks all pass.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence4

A counterfeit Microsoft login pop-up placed over a OneDrive-lookalike page relayed the login to genuine Microsoft infrastructure, allowing harvesting of Microsoft 365 passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Frameless BitB ... contains a Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) overlay [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence7

Credentials entered in that window are relayed to Microsoft’s servers, so the password, the MFA code and conditional access checks would all go through.

T1557.003DHCP SpoofingEvidence1

The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.