TA419 is a China-aligned cyber-espionage threat actor assessed to support Beijing’s intelligence interests. Active since at least April 2025, it has targeted personnel and organizations connected to the United States and Japan, including think tanks, universities, law firms, defense contractors, and organizations involved in national security, energy, international relations, and foreign policy. TA419 conducts highly targeted credential-phishing operations that impersonate credible subject-matter experts, public officials, and organizations. In 2026, it targeted artificial-intelligence policy specialists with lures concerning AI governance, export controls, supply chains, and military use of AI. The actor impersonated former U.S. government officials and a senior employee of an AI company to establish rapport before delivering fraudulent cloud-document sharing pages. The group uses adversary-in-the-middle phishing infrastructure built from a customized Frameless BitB Browser-in-the-Browser kit. Its operations proxy genuine Microsoft authentication workflows, including MFA and conditional-access steps, enabling the theft of credentials and authenticated session cookies. TA419 also uses URL-shortening services, cloud-service-themed infrastructure, CDN-based hosting concealment, and residential proxies in support of its phishing activity. Its targeting is consistent with intelligence collection against policy, regulatory, and strategic developments relevant to Chinese government interests.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
China-aligned cyber-espionage activity targeting AI-policy researchers and experts at think tanks, universities, and law firms. The group uses trusted-persona impersonation and fake OneDrive credential-harvesting pages to obtain Microsoft account credentials and gather intelligence related to AI policy, export controls, defense, national security, energy, international relations, and foreign policy.
China-aligned, espionage-motivated actor conducting targeted credential-phishing operations against US and Japan-linked think tanks, universities, defense contractors, law firms, and policy experts. Its July 2026 activity impersonated AI-policy figures to steal Microsoft 365/Entra ID cloud-account sessions from US AI-policy targets.
Conducting credential-phishing and impersonation campaigns against AI-policy experts, including researchers at U.S. think tanks, universities, and law firms. The group impersonated former U.S. officials and an Anthropic employee, then directed engaged recipients to counterfeit OneDrive pages to steal Microsoft credentials. It is also described as consistently interested in defense, national security, energy, international relations, and foreign-policy targets with a predominant U.S. and Japanese nexus.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.