MythicRatatoskr
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
MythicRatatoskr is a Go-based Windows backdoor that uses the decentralized Yggdrasil mesh network for command-and-control communications. It incorporates the open-source yggstack user-space networking stack to reach an overlay-hosted server without requiring a tunnel interface. Commands and results are exchanged as JSON messages over HTTPS. This architecture reduces reliance on conventional DNS infrastructure and complicates infrastructure discovery and disruption, although Yggdrasil does not provide anonymity.
The backdoor supports arbitrary shell command execution, directory navigation and enumeration, file upload and download, screenshot capture across active displays, and collection of usernames, hostnames, and local network information. It can expose local TCP ports and establish reverse SOCKS5 proxies, enabling operators to tunnel connections through compromised systems. Files and screenshots can be exfiltrated through its command-and-control channel. MythicRatatoskr maintains persistence as a Windows service, stores encrypted configuration data, and allows operators to change its command-and-control destination and communication intervals. Some samples delay startup by ten minutes to reduce immediate detection.
MythicRatatoskr was deployed on July 17, 2025, during an intrusion into a Ukrainian grain logistics company. Initial access was established by UAC-0099 through a spearphishing attachment, followed by the MATCHBOIL downloader and MATCHWOK backdoor; that execution chain subsequently delivered MythicRatatoskr. Additional copies were transferred to other systems using OpenSSH SFTP. The intrusion later culminated in a September 2025 destructive operation attributed to Sandworm, which used the legitimate SDelete utility distributed through Active Directory Group Policy. MythicRatatoskr provided remote access and espionage capabilities in this operation rather than performing the data wiping itself.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
« 17 juillet 2025 (09:28) : Déploiement de MythicRatatoskr sur la machine compromise, puis propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP. »
“One day later, on July 17, the operators deployed a second implant: MythicRatatoskr.”
Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
shell Execute a shell command via cmd.exe.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Persistance : service Windows nommé ieupdate.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Persistance : service Windows nommé ieupdate.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
MythicRatatoskr embarque une liste encodée en base64 de pairs publics Yggdrasil.
The backdoor-specific configuration stored on disk is a JSON file encrypted via AES‑256‑CFB using a hardcoded key embedded in the binary.
Some samples also include a 10-minute startup delay, likely to avoid immediately connecting to the Yggdrasil network on execution, helping to evade detection.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
Déploiement de MythicRatatoskr sur la machine compromise, puis propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP.
Propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Operators can use MythicRatatoskr’s command ls to find files of interest prior to exfiltration.
Fonctions clés : [...] screencat [...] ; T1113 — Screen Capture (Collection).
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
Communication : HTTPS sur port 443 vers un nœud Yggdrasil, via des requêtes HTTP POST JSON [...] checkin, tasking, result, getfile.
Déploiement d’un serveur SOCKS5 via MythicRatatoskr (extrait d’une archive WinRAR).
MythicRatatoskr connects to the C&C server within the Yggdrasil mesh network.
Additional MythicRatatoskr samples were subsequently deployed to other machines within the organization, this time using an OpenSSH SFTP server.
result – return command output, base64-encoded when present
The communication between peers within the Yggdrasil network is end-to-end protected.
Le C&C est hébergé à l’intérieur du réseau Yggdrasil [...] chiffrement E2E via clés Ed25519.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (Exfiltration) ; Fonctions clés : [...] upload, download.
Observables
36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.