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Malware2 associated actors

MythicRatatoskr

Tracked since Oct 22, 2026 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days17 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

MythicRatatoskr is a Go-based Windows backdoor that uses the decentralized Yggdrasil mesh network for command-and-control communications. It incorporates the open-source yggstack user-space networking stack to reach an overlay-hosted server without requiring a tunnel interface. Commands and results are exchanged as JSON messages over HTTPS. This architecture reduces reliance on conventional DNS infrastructure and complicates infrastructure discovery and disruption, although Yggdrasil does not provide anonymity.

The backdoor supports arbitrary shell command execution, directory navigation and enumeration, file upload and download, screenshot capture across active displays, and collection of usernames, hostnames, and local network information. It can expose local TCP ports and establish reverse SOCKS5 proxies, enabling operators to tunnel connections through compromised systems. Files and screenshots can be exfiltrated through its command-and-control channel. MythicRatatoskr maintains persistence as a Windows service, stores encrypted configuration data, and allows operators to change its command-and-control destination and communication intervals. Some samples delay startup by ten minutes to reduce immediate detection.

MythicRatatoskr was deployed on July 17, 2025, during an intrusion into a Ukrainian grain logistics company. Initial access was established by UAC-0099 through a spearphishing attachment, followed by the MATCHBOIL downloader and MATCHWOK backdoor; that execution chain subsequently delivered MythicRatatoskr. Additional copies were transferred to other systems using OpenSSH SFTP. The intrusion later culminated in a September 2025 destructive operation attributed to Sandworm, which used the legitimate SDelete utility distributed through Active Directory Group Policy. MythicRatatoskr provided remote access and espionage capabilities in this operation rather than performing the data wiping itself.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0099

« 17 juillet 2025 (09:28) : Déploiement de MythicRatatoskr sur la machine compromise, puis propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP. »

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Sandworm

“One day later, on July 17, the operators deployed a second implant: MythicRatatoskr.”

via tech timestechtimes.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

shell Execute a shell command via cmd.exe.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Persistance : service Windows nommé ieupdate.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Persistance : service Windows nommé ieupdate.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

MythicRatatoskr embarque une liste encodée en base64 de pairs publics Yggdrasil.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The backdoor-specific configuration stored on disk is a JSON file encrypted via AES‑256‑CFB using a hardcoded key embedded in the binary.

T1678Delay ExecutionEvidence1

Some samples also include a 10-minute startup delay, likely to avoid immediately connecting to the Yggdrasil network on execution, helping to evade detection.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Déploiement de MythicRatatoskr sur la machine compromise, puis propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Propagation latérale via un serveur OpenSSH SFTP.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Operators can use MythicRatatoskr’s command ls to find files of interest prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Fonctions clés : [...] screencat [...] ; T1113 — Screen Capture (Collection).

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Communication : HTTPS sur port 443 vers un nœud Yggdrasil, via des requêtes HTTP POST JSON [...] checkin, tasking, result, getfile.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

Déploiement d’un serveur SOCKS5 via MythicRatatoskr (extrait d’une archive WinRAR).

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

MythicRatatoskr connects to the C&C server within the Yggdrasil mesh network.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Additional MythicRatatoskr samples were subsequently deployed to other machines within the organization, this time using an OpenSSH SFTP server.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

result – return command output, base64-encoded when present

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The communication between peers within the Yggdrasil network is end-to-end protected.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Le C&C est hébergé à l’intérieur du réseau Yggdrasil [...] chiffrement E2E via clés Ed25519.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (Exfiltration) ; Fonctions clés : [...] upload, download.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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eset malware ioc commitsNews · Nov 4, 2026Added missing IoCs for MythicRatatoskrAn ESET malware-ioc repository update dated 2026-11-04 adds 12 hashes each in MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256 format for MythicRatatoskr samples. The content does not describe the malware's capabilities, delivery methods, targets, or attribution.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Oct 26, 2026MythicRatatoskr : backdoor Go via réseau Yggdrasil déployé par UAC-0099 et Sandworm | CyberVeilleGo-based backdoor deployed during an intrusion into a Ukrainian grain-logistics company. It communicates through the decentralized Yggdrasil network using HTTPS and JSON messages. Capabilities include command execution, file transfers, screen capture, and proxy management. It persists through a Windows service named ieupdate; some samples delay execution by ten minutes. The report suggests a possible Linux variant.Read more ↗tech timesNews · Oct 26, 2026Sandworm Turns Yggdrasil Mesh Network Into C2 Channel Before Wiping Ukraine Grain FirmGo-based backdoor deployed against a Ukrainian grain logistics company in July 2025. It uses the Yggdrasil IPv6 mesh network for resilient command-and-control and supports victim metadata collection, screenshots, file transfers, directory enumeration, command execution, C2 address changes, and a reverse SOCKS5 proxy. Some samples delay network contact by 10 minutes. UAC-0099 deployed the implant, but the report leaves unresolved whether UAC-0099 or Sandworm controlled it during the subsequent espionage phase. A possible Linux variant is suggested but unconfirmed.Read more ↗blueteamsecNews · Oct 25, 2026MythicRatatoskr: An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in a UAC‑0099-Sandworm collaboration - Infosec.PubA previously unknown Go-based backdoor that conceals its command-and-control server within the Yggdrasil mesh network. It enabled a subsequent destructive attack against a Ukrainian grain firm; the content does not establish that the backdoor itself performed the destructive actions.Read more ↗
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IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.