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National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross emphasized the urgent need for the United States to counter China's efforts to export surveillance technologies and promote a global "clean American tech stack." Speaking at the 2025 Meridian Summit, Cairncross highlighted concerns over Chinese cyber operations targeting critical US infrastructure and called for stronger messaging and engagement with international partners to deter such activities. He argued that the US has not sufficiently signaled to China that its cyber behavior is unacceptable and poses strategic risks to American interests.
Simultaneously, analysis of international technical standards reveals that China has been actively shaping the protocols governing critical infrastructure worldwide by dominating standards bodies and committees. Chinese engineers and ministries have increased their influence in setting specifications for technologies such as 6G wireless, industrial automation, and port operations, giving Beijing significant leverage over global systems. This influence, combined with evidence of Chinese cyber campaigns targeting US infrastructure, underscores the strategic challenge posed by China's dual approach of technical standard-setting and cyber operations.
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In its annual implementation report released around the same time, CSC 2.0 said the Office of the National Cyber Director does not have enough authority to carry out its mission as originally intended. The report's authors and allies called for strengthening the office.
Speaking at the 2025 Meridian Summit in Washington, D.C., U.S. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross said the United States should counter China's global surveillance push by promoting a 'clean American tech stack' to partners. He also said the administration's forthcoming national cybersecurity strategy would be shorter and less prescriptive, and emphasized strengthening ONCD's role.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 expired in early October 2025, ending its existing legal protections for cyber threat-data sharing. Sean Cairncross later urged Congress to renew it for 10 years.
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US national security commentary and Defense Department testimony emphasized that **trust and cybersecurity** are being positioned as strategic differentiators in competition with China, particularly as AI capabilities proliferate. One argument framed cybersecurity as a key factor in global adoption of US AI and cloud technologies, contrasting the US private-sector ecosystem with China’s more consolidated AI cloud market and linking security posture to international trust and influence. Separately, senior DoD officials described **CYBERCOM 2.0** as a new force-generation model intended to improve agility against intensified Chinese cyber activity, including attacks on critical infrastructure involving **industrial control system (ICS) abuse** and **AI-enabled intrusions**, and highlighted efforts to “close the loop” between offensive learning and defensive readiness. A related policy critique pointed to the **Salt Typhoon** espionage campaign against US telecommunications providers as evidence that China’s access was enabled by basic security failures (e.g., legacy equipment, weak passwords, unpatched systems) and argued for mandatory operational baselines and tighter controls around **lawful intercept systems**, noting that major carriers had not convincingly demonstrated full eviction of intruders per Senate Commerce Committee discussions.
Jun 29, 2026
The **Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD)** said the US government is pursuing diplomacy to encourage other countries to adopt **American AI cybersecurity standards and norms**, positioning secure AI deployment as part of a broader effort to advance US AI leadership. Alexandra Seymour, the ONCD’s principal deputy assistant national cyber director for policy, said the administration plans to promote industry best practices for secure AI deployment and to accelerate adoption of **AI-enabled defensive tools** to “detect, divert and deceive” threat actors targeting critical systems, alongside continued federal network modernization and preparation for **post-quantum cryptography**. Seymour’s remarks were delivered at the *Identity, Authentication, and the Road Ahead Policy Forum* and were framed as consistent with themes in the administration’s **AI Action Plan**, including a role for the Departments of Commerce and State in advocating international governance approaches aligned with US values and countering authoritarian influence. Reporting also noted that some internationally oriented guidance has already been issued (including releases in May and December) and that other governments are similarly seeking to shape global AI security standards, while a forthcoming national cybersecurity strategy is expected to further address AI’s role in defending federal networks.
Jun 29, 2026
Senior officials from the **EU, NATO, the United States, Sweden, Estonia, and Taiwan** used the Munich Cyber Security Conference to warn that cyber and “hybrid” operations are now a persistent feature of geopolitical competition and are increasingly aimed at **critical infrastructure** (energy, health, government services, satellites, and military command networks). EU Executive Vice President **Henna Virkkunen** argued Europe cannot be “naive” about adversaries’ ability to disrupt essential services and pointed to proposed revisions to the **EU Cybersecurity Act** intended to strengthen the EU cybersecurity agency and reduce critical ICT supply-chain risk, including phasing out designated **high-risk suppliers**. NATO Deputy Secretary General **Radmila Shekerinska** said Russia and China are challenging the alliance in both physical and digital domains and cited attempted disruptions to Poland’s energy infrastructure as an example of the threat environment. U.S. officials signaled a shift from primarily defensive “resilience” toward **deterrence** by “imposing real costs” on malicious actors, while also emphasizing deeper cyber partnerships with allies and industry to send a coordinated message to adversaries; National Cyber Director **Sean Cairncross** said a forthcoming U.S. cyber strategy will align with broader national security strategy and rely on whole-of-government tools. Estonia’s intelligence chief **Kaupo Rosin** urged Europe to invest in **homegrown offensive cyber capabilities** to reduce reliance on non-European tools, while Swedish defense official **Lisa Gustafsson** said societies must be designed to function under sustained disruption under Sweden’s “total defense” model. Taiwan’s National Security Council adviser **Yuh-Jye Lee** warned China may be rehearsing a “digital siege,” referencing activity like **Volt Typhoon** and reporting on alleged Chinese training infrastructure (“**Expedition Cloud**”) designed to simulate foreign power grids and communications networks; separate reporting also underscored that much of the technology stack underpinning cyber defense is controlled by **U.S. firms**, complicating sovereignty and supply-chain decisions.
Jun 29, 2026