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Sandworm APT has conducted a targeted cyber espionage campaign against military entities in Belarus and Russia, including the Belarusian military and Russian Airborne Forces. The attackers leveraged malicious .lnk files and multi-stage PowerShell scripts to compromise systems, deploying backdoors that expose local services such as OpenSSH over the Tor network using obfs4 bridges. This infrastructure allows the threat actors to maintain persistent, anonymous access to compromised networks and evade traditional detection mechanisms.
The infection chain often begins with decoy documents, such as nomination letters from military commanders, to lure victims into executing the malicious payloads. Once infected, the malware establishes persistence and configures the system to route sensitive services through Tor, enabling remote access via onion addresses. The campaign demonstrates a sophisticated approach to targeting high-value military personnel and infrastructure, with attribution pointing to the Sandworm APT group, known for its advanced capabilities and focus on Eastern European targets.
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2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Follow-on reporting attributed the activity to the Sandworm APT and described the use of an OpenSSH backdoor tunneled through Tor, including obfs4 for stealth and persistence. The added technical details clarified the campaign's infrastructure and tradecraft against Belarusian military targets.
Researchers disclosed a campaign dubbed Operation SkyCloak targeting military and defense-related entities in Russia and Belarus. The operation used malicious LNK files as an initial infection vector and focused on espionage-oriented access.
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CERT-UA reported that the Russia-linked **Sandworm** cluster `UAC-0145`, tied to `UAC-0002` and also tracked as **APT44** and **Seashell Blizzard**, has run a sustained campaign against Ukrainian targets using several social-engineering and malware-delivery methods. Investigators said attackers compromised more than 10 websites and deployed **ClickFix**-style fake CAPTCHA pages that instructed visitors to paste malicious PowerShell commands into Windows, while other lures included trojanized software installers from torrent trackers, bogus antivirus installation requests sent through Signal, and a fake Android security app. CERT-UA linked the activity to long-running operations targeting Ukrainian government and military-related organizations. The campaign used a broad malware ecosystem including **GHETTOVIBE**, **SCOUTCURL**, **FLUIDLEECH**, **LOADLOOP**, **FREAKYPOLL**, **SMARTAXE**, and the Android backdoor **COWARDDUCK**, alongside legitimate tools such as **OpenSSH**, **Tor**, and **rsync** for persistence, tunneling, and exfiltration. CERT-UA said at least one infection delivered through a trojanized installer enabled persistence and lateral movement inside an organization and was later used in a destructive attack against the infrastructure of a central executive authority of Ukraine. Analysts also found the operators using **Cloaking.House** and blockchain `eth_call` lookups to retrieve remote domains dynamically, while the Android malware was capable of stealing files, contacts, device data, and real-time geolocation and used the Dropbox API and content from legitimate services in its command-and-control workflow.
Jul 19, 2026
Nozomi Networks reported that **Sandworm**—also tracked as **APT44**, **Seashell Blizzard**, and **Voodoo Bear**—moved from compromised IT environments into operational technology networks at 10 industrial organizations across seven countries, targeting systems tied to physical processes. Based on telemetry collected between July 2025 and January 2026, researchers identified 29 Sandworm-linked events involving aggressive lateral movement across hundreds of internal systems and direct interest in engineering workstations, HMIs, and field devices including **PLCs**, **RTUs**, and **IEDs**. The activity aligned with Moscow business hours, often peaking around Wednesday afternoons, reinforcing assessments that the group operates as a centrally managed Russian state sabotage actor tied to **GRU Unit 74455**. The report found that Sandworm largely did not rely on novel exploits, instead abusing unresolved prior compromises, older malware, and long-known, patchable tools. Every affected environment had generated high-confidence alerts for weeks or months before the intrusions escalated, with an average warning window of 43 days, and researchers said the group typically intensified operations after detection rather than withdrawing. Nozomi warned that basic controls—including rapid investigation of commodity alerts, remediation of legacy compromises, tighter lateral movement controls, and stronger IT/OT segmentation—remain critical because preventable security gaps are enabling Sandworm to reach industrial control assets.
Jun 29, 2026
Russian GRU-linked **Sandworm** has targeted Ukrainian organizations through multiple intrusion paths, including exploitation of vulnerable **Exim Mail Transfer Agent** servers and malware-laced Microsoft **KMS activation tools**. NSA reporting tied GRU operators to active exploitation of Exim for initial access, while newer reporting said Sandworm used trojanized software installers in cyber-espionage campaigns aimed at Ukrainian users, expanding the group’s access beyond perimeter-facing mail infrastructure. Researchers and media reports said the activity affected about **20 critical organizations in Ukraine**, underscoring Sandworm’s continued focus on high-value government and infrastructure targets. The combined reporting shows a sustained campaign that blends server-side exploitation with social engineering and malicious software distribution to establish footholds, steal information, and support disruptive operations associated with the Russian military intelligence apparatus.
Jul 12, 2026