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Security researchers from Amazon Inspector uncovered a large-scale supply chain attack on the npm registry, identifying over 150,000 malicious packages linked to a coordinated token farming campaign associated with the tea.xyz protocol. Unlike traditional attacks that inject credential-stealing malware or ransomware, this campaign used self-replicating code to automatically generate and publish npm packages, exploiting the tea.xyz system to earn cryptocurrency rewards for the attackers. The malicious packages included tea.yaml files that connected them to attacker-controlled blockchain wallets, allowing the perpetrators to profit without the knowledge of legitimate developers or users.
This incident is considered one of the largest package flooding events in open source registry history, highlighting a shift in threat actor tactics toward financially motivated registry pollution at unprecedented scale. The attack was detected through a combination of advanced rule-based detection and AI, and the response involved rapid collaboration between Amazon Inspector and the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) to assign malicious package identifiers and coordinate mitigation. The event underscores the evolving risks in software supply chains and the necessity for industry-wide cooperation to defend against novel attack vectors driven by financial incentives.
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Follow-on reporting characterized the campaign as a worm-like or self-replicating attack that continuously published malicious npm packages designed to steal tokens and generate token-farming rewards. Multiple outlets reported that the activity was still not under control and represented a record-scale npm supply-chain incident.
Amazon Inspector reported detecting more than 150,000 malicious packages in the npm ecosystem tied to a large-scale token-farming campaign. The packages were described as part of a supply-chain abuse operation affecting the public registry.
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Researchers linked a threat actor tracked as **RED-LILI** to a large-scale software supply chain attack that pushed nearly **800 malicious packages** to the **npm** registry in a burst of activity over roughly a week. Checkmarx reported the operation began around February 23, 2022, and relied on a highly automated pipeline that created a separate npm account for each package, complicating bulk detection and takedown efforts. The campaign used custom Python tooling, Selenium, and the open-source **Interactsh** project to automate account creation and bypass npm email one-time-password verification during signup. The malicious packages were part of a broader effort to compromise developers and downstream environments through common package ecosystem abuse techniques, including **typosquatting** and **dependency confusion**. Reporting tied the activity to packages crafted to target organizations such as **Azure, Uber, and Airbnb**, underscoring how attackers can industrialize package publication at scale and turn open-source repositories into an efficient delivery channel for supply chain compromise.
Aug 15, 2026
A large-scale attack on the NPM (Node Package Manager) ecosystem has been uncovered, involving the publication of over 64,000 malicious packages by a coordinated group known as the IndonesianFoods worm. This campaign, active for more than two years, leveraged at least seven newly created NPM user accounts to distribute the malicious packages, which are notable for their consistent naming patterns and unusual internal dictionary. The attackers focused on creating new packages rather than stealing credentials, and the scale of the operation more than doubles the previously known number of malicious NPM packages. Security researchers have made available a comprehensive list of the affected packages and user accounts for further analysis. In a separate but related incident, researchers identified a highly popular fake NPM package, "@acitons/artifact," which was downloaded over 206,000 times. This package used a typosquatting technique to mimic the legitimate GitHub Actions Toolkit and was designed to steal GitHub credentials by executing a malicious post-install script. The attack highlights the growing threat of software supply chain compromises, with the malicious package aiming to exfiltrate tokens from build environments and potentially publish further malicious artifacts. Both incidents underscore the increasing sophistication and scale of supply chain attacks targeting the JavaScript development community.
Jun 29, 2026
A series of sophisticated supply chain attacks have targeted the NPM ecosystem, compromising both widely used and niche packages to deliver malicious payloads. The "Shai-Hulud" campaign has infected at least 187 NPM packages, including the highly popular tinycolor package, which receives approximately 2 million downloads weekly. Attackers in this campaign modify package manifests, inject malicious files, and republish the compromised packages, resulting in downstream projects unknowingly incorporating malicious code. The worm-like nature of the attack allows it to spread rapidly to other maintainers' packages, amplifying the impact across the software supply chain. Delayed detection of these compromises increases the risk, as many projects may already be affected before the breach is discovered. The attack highlights the critical importance of verifying package signatures and maintaining a robust software bill of materials (SBOM) to trace dependencies and versions accurately. In a related but distinct campaign, a threat actor using the NPM account "ongtrieuhau861.001" has published at least 94 malicious packages, many of which are specifically crafted to target Asian banks. These packages, often named with the pattern "dhhdbankxxxxx" and similar variants, deliver a JavaScript-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) dubbed "DHSollutionsBot." This RAT leverages Firebase Realtime Database for command and control, while exfiltrating stolen data through Discord webhooks, making detection more challenging due to the use of legitimate cloud services. The threat actor's NPM account history suggests either a long-term operation or the acquisition of an existing account for malicious purposes. The attack architecture is notable for its simplicity and effectiveness, combining two legitimate platforms for resilient and stealthy C2 operations. Both campaigns underscore the growing threat of supply chain attacks in the open-source ecosystem, where a single compromised package can have cascading effects on countless downstream projects. Developers and organizations are urged to implement cryptographic signing of packages, verify signatures before use, and maintain detailed SBOMs to mitigate the risk of such attacks. The incidents also demonstrate the need for continuous monitoring of package repositories and automated detection tools to identify and respond to malicious activity promptly. The use of trusted platforms like Discord and Firebase for C2 communications further complicates detection and response efforts. These attacks serve as a stark reminder that even well-established codebases can become vectors for compromise if their dependencies are not rigorously vetted and monitored. The campaigns have prompted renewed calls for improved security practices in the software development lifecycle, particularly in the management of third-party dependencies. Organizations are advised to review their exposure to affected NPM packages and take immediate remediation steps where necessary. The incidents highlight the evolving tactics of threat actors in targeting the software supply chain and the critical need for industry-wide vigilance.
Jul 12, 2026