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The Akira ransomware group has been exploiting vulnerabilities in SonicWall SSL VPN appliances, particularly those inherited by large enterprises through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of small- and medium-sized businesses. Attackers have leveraged legacy admin credentials, weak hostnames, and inadequate endpoint defenses to gain rapid access to sensitive systems, with lateral movement to domain controllers occurring in under 10 hours on average. Security researchers note that these attacks are not necessarily targeting M&A activity directly, but the inherited, often misconfigured SonicWall devices present a lucrative entry point for ransomware operations.
Experts warn that the integration of overlooked or poorly secured network devices during M&A processes significantly increases the risk of compromise for acquiring organizations. The Akira campaign highlights the broader challenge of managing legacy security appliances, as attackers continue to exploit such devices for initial access and rapid ransomware deployment. Organizations are urged to conduct thorough asset inventories and strengthen security controls around inherited IT infrastructure, especially network edge devices like SSL VPNs.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On November 26, 2025, reporting based on ReliaQuest research highlighted that Akira had been compromising inherited SonicWall SSL VPN appliances in post-acquisition environments. The findings emphasized that many acquiring companies were unaware the devices still existed and that stale admin credentials were enabling ransomware deployment.
SonicWall released updated firmware and additional security guidance to address exploitation of SSL VPN devices, including issues tied to CVE-2024-40766. Despite the availability of patches, many organizations remained exposed because of end-of-life devices and poor credential hygiene.
During the 2025 intrusion wave, investigators found Akira could move laterally from compromised SonicWall SSL VPN access to domain controller compromise in as little as five to 10 hours. The activity affected multiple industries and was assessed as opportunistic rather than specifically aimed at M&A targets.
Between June and October 2025, ReliaQuest observed a series of Akira ransomware intrusions targeting organizations running SonicWall SSL VPN appliances. Initial access commonly involved legacy SonicWall devices and inherited administrator credentials left behind after mergers and acquisitions.
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Akira ransomware operators have been actively targeting organizations by exploiting SonicWall SSL VPN devices to gain unauthorized access to corporate networks. Security researchers observed that the attackers were able to authenticate to SonicWall VPN accounts even when one-time password (OTP) multi-factor authentication (MFA) was enabled, raising concerns about the effectiveness of MFA protections in these scenarios. The initial vector for these breaches was linked to an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall devices, tracked as CVE-2024-40766, which was disclosed in September 2024 and patched in August 2024. Despite the patch, threat actors continued to leverage credentials that had been previously stolen from devices vulnerable to this flaw, allowing them to maintain access even after organizations applied the security update. Arctic Wolf researchers reported that attackers were able to solve multiple OTP challenges, suggesting that they may have compromised OTP seeds or found alternative methods to generate valid tokens, effectively bypassing MFA protections. The campaign has been described as lightning-fast, with Akira ransomware operators quickly exploiting exposed VPN accounts to move laterally within networks and deploy ransomware payloads. SonicWall responded by urging administrators to reset all SSL VPN credentials and ensure that the latest SonicOS firmware was installed on affected devices. The persistence of the attacks, even after patching, highlights the importance of credential hygiene and the need for organizations to rotate credentials following a security incident. The attackers’ ability to bypass MFA by potentially using previously stolen OTP seeds demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of authentication mechanisms and underscores the evolving tactics of ransomware groups. The Akira ransomware group has been known for its rapid intrusions and effective exploitation of remote access infrastructure, making it a significant threat to organizations relying on SonicWall VPN solutions. Security experts recommend that organizations monitor for unusual login activity, enforce strong password policies, and consider additional layers of authentication beyond OTP-based MFA. The incident serves as a reminder that patching vulnerabilities is only one aspect of a comprehensive security strategy, and that post-compromise credential management is critical to preventing ongoing unauthorized access. The Akira campaign against SonicWall VPNs is part of a broader trend of ransomware groups targeting remote access solutions to gain initial footholds in enterprise environments. Organizations are advised to review their VPN access logs, investigate any suspicious activity, and implement network segmentation to limit the impact of potential breaches. The continued exploitation of previously stolen credentials, even after security updates, demonstrates the long-term risks associated with credential theft and the need for proactive incident response measures. This series of attacks has prompted renewed calls for vendors and customers alike to improve the security of remote access infrastructure and to remain vigilant against evolving ransomware tactics.
Jun 29, 2026The Akira ransomware group is actively exploiting the year-old SonicWall vulnerability CVE-2024-40766, along with SSLVPN misconfigurations and exposed Virtual Office Portals, to gain unauthorized access and deploy ransomware. Despite patches being available since August 2024, many organizations failed to reset local user passwords or address configuration weaknesses, leaving them vulnerable. Security advisories from SonicWall, Rapid7, and the Australian Cyber Security Centre urge immediate patching, password resets, MFA enforcement, and network access restrictions to mitigate ongoing attacks.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors have launched a widespread campaign targeting SonicWall SSL VPN devices, resulting in the compromise of over 100 accounts across at least 16 customer environments. Security firm Huntress reported that attackers are rapidly authenticating into multiple accounts on compromised devices, indicating possession of valid credentials rather than relying on brute-force methods. The campaign began in earnest around October 4, 2025, with authentication attempts traced to a specific IP address, 202.155.8[.]73. In some cases, attackers disconnected after brief access, but in others, they conducted network scanning and attempted to access local Windows accounts, suggesting a range of post-compromise activities. The incident follows SonicWall’s disclosure of a security breach involving unauthorized exposure of firewall configuration backup files stored in MySonicWall accounts, which could provide attackers with sensitive information such as user and group settings, DNS configurations, and certificates. Although there is no direct evidence linking the configuration file breach to the VPN compromises, the risk of credential exposure remains high, prompting advisories for organizations to reset credentials on live firewall devices. Concurrently, security teams observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents exploiting SonicWall SSL VPN devices, initially suspected to be due to a zero-day but later attributed to the known vulnerability CVE-2024-40766. This vulnerability, an improper access control flaw in SonicOS, affects multiple generations of SonicWall devices and was first disclosed and patched in August 2024. Despite the availability of a patch, unpatched devices remain vulnerable and have been actively targeted by Akira ransomware affiliates. In one documented case, Darktrace detected suspicious activity including network scanning, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration on a customer’s network, with approximately 2 GiB of data exfiltrated before the attack was contained. The attackers’ tactics included leveraging both the CVE-2024-40766 vulnerability and misconfigurations to gain access. The campaign underscores the importance of timely patching and credential hygiene, as attackers are exploiting both technical vulnerabilities and exposed credentials to infiltrate networks. Organizations using SonicWall’s cloud backup service are particularly at risk if they have not reset credentials following the configuration file exposure. Security advisories recommend immediate credential resets and patching of all affected SonicWall devices to mitigate ongoing threats. The incidents highlight the persistent threat posed by ransomware groups like Akira, who continue to exploit both new and previously disclosed vulnerabilities in widely deployed network infrastructure. The rapid detection and response by managed security services, such as those provided by Darktrace, have proven effective in limiting the impact of these attacks. However, the scale and speed of the current campaign demonstrate the attackers’ ability to coordinate and execute widespread compromises across multiple organizations. The situation remains dynamic, with ongoing investigations into the full extent of the compromise and the potential links between credential exposure and active exploitation. Organizations are urged to review their SonicWall device configurations, monitor for suspicious authentication activity, and ensure all security patches are applied without delay.
Jun 29, 2026