Loading story…
Multiple incidents have been documented involving the deployment of the Lumma Stealer malware on Windows systems, followed by the installation of additional malicious payloads. Technical analysis reveals that the Lumma Stealer installer, a large PE32 executable, temporarily saves several files to the infected host, including AutoIt3 scripts and various data files. The infection process also generates a custom .a3x AutoIt3 script and establishes command-and-control (C2) communications with domains such as offenms[.]cyou. Network traffic captures and file samples from these incidents have been made available for further analysis, providing insight into the infection chain and the nature of the follow-up malware.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs), packet capture files, and extracted malware samples have been published to assist defenders in identifying and mitigating these threats. The technical details include SHA256 hashes of the malware, file paths used during infection, and specifics about the C2 infrastructure. These resources enable security teams to detect similar infections and understand the tactics used by threat actors leveraging Lumma Stealer in multi-stage attacks.
Mallory correlates global threat intelligence with your attack surface — know if you’re exposed before adversaries strike.
3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Researchers documented a Lumma Stealer infection chain in which a password-protected 7-zip archive posing as cracked software delivered an inflated Windows executable padded with null bytes. After the initial Lumma compromise, the infection retrieved and executed Sectop RAT (ArechClient2) as a 64-bit DLL via rundll32, with hashes, delivery URLs, storage paths, and C2 traffic published.
On January 1, 2026, researchers observed another Lumma Stealer infection in which a large PE32 executable dropped multiple files and scripts, including an AutoIt3-based payload, onto a Windows host. The malware communicated with offenms[.]cyou and additional follow-up infrastructure including pastebin[.]com, memory-scanner[.]cc, and communicationfirewall-security[.]cc, with PCAPs and IOCs released for analysis.
A Lumma Stealer infection was observed on December 30, 2025, with evidence that additional follow-up malware was deployed after the initial compromise. Analysis materials including IOCs, PCAP data, and related malware files were made available for defenders and researchers.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
3 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
isc.sans.edu
Open sourcemalware-traffic-analysis.net
Open sourcemalware-traffic-analysis.net
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Researchers documented multiple **Lumma Stealer** infection chains that begin with fake CAPTCHA or verification pages and trick Windows users into launching malicious PowerShell from the Run dialog. In one case, victims reached the lure through malicious pop-up ads on a pirated-content site; in another, a page at `you-checked.com` copied a hidden command to the clipboard that fetched follow-on payloads from domains including `ferrydero.com` and `fill-tomap.com`. The malware family, also known as **LummaC2**, is a malware-as-a-service infostealer designed to steal browser data, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, session tokens, and other sensitive information. The observed chains used `mshta.exe`, obfuscated HTA and JavaScript, layered PowerShell stages, and multiple packed .NET components to retrieve and execute the final payload while evading analysis. Analysts reported AES and XOR decryption, SmartAssembly and .NET Reactor packing, AMSI bypass attempts, anti-sandbox and anti-debugging checks, Windows Defender evasion, and cleanup steps such as deleting downloaded archives after execution. One intrusion created files under `C:\ProgramData`, contacted `iplogger.co`, and launched an infostealer executable named `jegule.exe`, while another sample ultimately communicated through `winhttp.dll` and `ws2_32.dll`; investigators also recovered additional URLs from a Steam Community profile using ROT15 decoding.
Jul 7, 2026
Threat actors distributed **LummaStealer** through two social-engineering chains that targeted users seeking pirated software or attempting to pass fake verification prompts. One campaign, active since at least December 2024, used GitHub repositories, cracked-software forums, URL shorteners, and posts on platforms including Facebook, Devpost, TikTok, and Chromium issues to push victims toward malicious JavaScript. That script suppressed referrer leakage, captured page-title context, and redirected users through intermediary domains on `.cfd`, `.click`, `.info`, and `.xyz` before serving password-protected archives from **MEGA** that extracted a LummaStealer executable. A separate delivery chain used counterfeit **CAPTCHA** pages to trick users into opening the Windows Run dialog and pasting a PowerShell command that fetched follow-on instructions from a shortened URL, downloaded a ZIP archive from `vultrcdn[.]com`, and launched a disguised `Setup.exe`. The infection sequence relied on legitimate-looking or signed binaries such as a revoked `Mergecap.exe`, a renamed `BtDaemon.exe` as `StrCmp.exe`, `more.com`, and `searchindexer.exe`, indicating DLL sideloading and process injection for evasion. Investigators observed outbound traffic to suspicious domains including `accentypastedw[.]store` and `onefreex.com`, while analysis of the final payload showed infostealer behavior including scheduled task creation, cryptographic API use, timestamp tampering, and file-permission changes.
Jun 29, 2026
Trend Micro reported that the **Lumma Stealer** malware was being delivered through Discord’s content delivery network, using trusted infrastructure to host and spread credential-theft payloads. The campaign abused Discord CDN links to make malicious downloads appear legitimate, increasing the likelihood that users would execute the malware and allowing attackers to bypass some reputation-based defenses. Once installed, Lumma Stealer was positioned to harvest sensitive data from infected systems, including credentials and other information valuable for follow-on fraud or intrusion activity. The use of a widely trusted platform for malware hosting highlights how threat actors continue to blend malicious payload delivery into legitimate cloud and social platforms, complicating detection and response for enterprise defenders.
Jul 12, 2026